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Abstract 
In the interest of avoiding the reproduction of classification of the world as US, UK, and „other‟ 
(Nobes and Stadler 2013) this work addresses questions that likely matter to much of the world, 
but not awarded enough attention. The roots of contemporary social phenomena have been 
shaping for centuries with ideologies infiltrating the various domains of social life (e.g. 
Acemoglu et al. 2001; Annisette 2000; Aschroft 2001; Errington 2001; Gallhofer et at. 2011; 
Massad 2001; Poullaos and Uche 2012). Thus, I undertake an explanation of how features of 
modern European colonization contribute to current perceptions and practices in accounting. I 
show how colonial ideologies, largely sustained in missionary private schools, Western 
credentials and the English language, contribute to the power relations within the field and 
opportunities within it. I further examine the potential influence of colonial strategies and 
mechanisms in accounting outcomes showing that the colonial legacy institutionalized, matters 
in explaining accounting quality across countries. In conducting the various analyses I build on 
multiple theoretical concepts from the fields of sociology and institutional economics, as relevant 
to colonialism, profession, and power in unraveling the social complexity, using both inductive 
and deductive analytical methods. This thesis makes multiple contributions to accounting 
research. First, it treats the colonial legacy as central to understanding the organization of the 
accounting field and its practices in many countries. While this is not the first such work in 
research on professionalization in audit it is likely the first to examine the evolving 
organizational practices within the corporate accounting occupation, and conceptualize this 
transformation as professionalization while also naming the missionary institution in the 
reproduction of colonial conditions. Second, the thesis extends Bourdieu‟s work on language and 
symbolic power (1991) to a post-colonial context. The analysis shows how audit and IFRS, 
among other mechanisms, contribute to the internalization of English, the language that has been 
perceived higher in the linguistic hierarchy in Jordan since the British colonization. This is likely 
the first paper that analyzes in depth the role of language within accountancy and ensuing social 
structural changes in the field. In conducting this analysis research is enriched with insights into 
the day-to-day practices of accountants in settings of which accounting research has developed 
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little understanding (Hopwood 2007). Finally, this work shows that the colonial experience is 
relevant to explaining   contemporary institutions and consequently accounting quality in a large 
subset of countries while providing new instruments to minimize the endogeniety of institutional 
proxies in accounting research. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
In the words of the late Anthony Hopwood „If innovation and new understandings are more 
prone to emerge from the margins of the subject that are in touch with different perspectives and 
bodies of knowledge, then accounting research seems to have become too stable and 
insufficiently innovative in a changing world‟ (Hopwood 2007, p. 1370). A desire to understand 
contemporary phenomena in accounting as it is embedded in the broader societal and 
occupational contexts motivates the individual chapters constituting this work, which at times 
may not fall neatly within one classification or another. Yet, crossing traditional boundaries and 
research methodologies and finding interconnections with other disciplines contributes to the 
innovation of research (Chapman 2012; Hopwood 2007).  
Current accounting research grew largely out of the US and UK (Nobes and Stadler 2013) 
increasingly becoming the standard worldwide while undermining non-Anglo-American research 
(Humphrey and Gendron 2014). Yet, what may be irrelevant to research in these countries may 
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be crucial to others (Cooper et al. 1998), and the enrichment of research calls for perspectives 
from the different cultures to resist ethnocentrism (Gallhofer and Chew 2000). In the interest of 
avoiding the reproduction of the marginalization of the „other‟ (Nobes and Stadler 2013) this 
work addresses questions that matter to much of the world, yet have been given limited attention. 
My goal is to explain accountants‟ behaviors and accounting practices in times when globalizing 
trade is intensifying, transnational institutions are prevailing, distances shrinking, accounting 
standardizing, and English is far reaching. Such understanding requires relating contemporary 
observations to their roots that have been shaping as early as nations, in the name of trade, were 
conquering and being conquered. Together with armies, settlers, missionaries, and languages 
accounting practices and structural forms were exported from the empirical center. With 
ideologies institutionalized in educational forms, elitism, artificial borders, capitalist thought, 
English language and accounting harmonization, the colonial influence in wide aspects of 
economic life has not ceased following official independence (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2001; 
Annisette 2000; Aschroft 2001; Errington 2001; Gallhofer et at. 2011; Massad 2001; Poullaos 
and Uche 2012). This proposes endless questions around the connection between modern 
colonization and accounting that scholars have been interested in over the last fifteen years (see 
Annisette and Neu 2004).  
In this domain, accounting research demonstrates that ‘informal empire’ continues influencing 
the accountancy field through professional associations, professional education, certification of 
accountants, political imperialism, technological dependency, unequal access to training, 
hierarchy, and local elites maintaining exclusivity (Annisette 1999, 2000; Davie 2000; Poullaos 
and Sian 2010; Ukwatte and Yapa 2013). For example in her influential research Annisette 
(2000) demonstrates that in the formerly colonized Trinidad and Tobago the continued power of 
the British Association of Chartered Certified Accountants on the professional education and 
certification of accountants, through political imperialism, technological dependency, and local 
elites successfully thwarts efforts to establish a local system of training. Annisette also suggests 
that in different political, economic, and social environments varieties of profession may be 
constructed. Motivated by this research I begin by conducting an in-depth examination of the 
forms of accounting organization in Jordan, a state in the modern sense formed by and subjected 
to British colonization in the 20
th
 century with large remaining influence on identity formation 
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(Massad 2001). Jordan shares the colonial history, and the continued involvement of Western 
countries with large parts of the world. The presence of missionary schools since the days of the 
British formal presence is one indicator of such involvement. In this work I analyze discourses in 
the corporate accounting practice, a domain that has rarely been examined, even though social 
status factors that may incite closure are present across all accounting occupations (Chua 1986; 
Cooper and Robson 2006). I show how the adoption of Western credentials, ways of being, and 
the English language, are institutionalized contributing to regulating the field and opportunities 
within it. Evans (2010) explains that the introduction and success of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS), with English as its official language, has made English the 
international lingua franca in all related accounting spheres and elevated its position such that 
professional bodies and academics globally attempt to enhance their prestige by incorporating 
English terminology into their accounting discourse, resulting in unconscious adoption of Anglo-
American culture. I then attempt to explain how English, hardly examined in accounting 
research, is used as a mechanism in the reconstruction of power relations in a non-Anglo-
American setting. 
As professionals in Jordan are subject to colonial influences the first two analyses stimulate a 
question on whether findings related to the role of the colonial institution in accounting can be 
extended to other countries. To examine that chapter 4 addresses the potential role of the colonial 
institution in accounting quality.  While institutions have been shown to play a role in accounting 
practice (Leuz et al. 2003; Ball et al. 2000; Ball et al. 2003; Brown et al. 2014; Daske et al. 2008; 
Defond and Hung 2004; Landsman et al. 2012) the argument made in this chapter is that the 
choice of variables is itself subject to the categories deemed relevant to Anglo-American 
accounting research. This is where incorporating variables from the institutional economics field 
shown to influence economic outcomes (Acemoglu et al 2001, 2002; Alesina et al. 2003; Alesina 
et al. 2011) is helpful. For example Acemoglu et al (2001) argue that different colonial strategies 
of settlement produce different persisting institutions. The authors contend that in “extractive 
states” where they didn‟t settle colonizers exploited local labor and natural resources while 
subjecting colonized societies to high taxes with little constraint and little incentives to invest in 
institutions, where as in settler colonies they tried to replicate the institutions of their home 
countries giving attention to property rights that would enable them to become richer. The 
authors find that differences in institutions can explain nearly three-quarters of Gross Domestic 
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Product (GDP) per capita differences in formerly colonized countries. Collectively, the three 
questions addressed in this thesis undertake an explanation of the different features of this 
colonial influence and its institutionalization contributing to current perceptions and practices in 
accounting. 
As these interdisciplinary questions are complex, I rely on multiple theoretical concepts relevant 
to colonialism, profession, and power in unraveling the layers. To understand how the infiltration 
of imperial ideological myths as standardized forms of knowledge influence the colonial 
discourse of the colonized in the next chapter I build on the insights of Joseph Massad (2001) 
who extends the work of Edward Said (1978), and explains how imperialism shapes the 
colonized societies themselves as institutions are repressive and reproductive shaping resistance 
to closure and identity formation. In chapter three, the theoretical concepts of Pierre Bourdieu 
help unpack how power among accountants is constituted with the English language, a 
contemporary phenomenon taking roots over centuries in non-English-speaking societies. 
Finally, to understand the relevance of the colonial experience to accounting outcomes I build on 
multiple works from the institutional economics literature led by Acemoglu et al. (2001) in 
examining if and how, historic colonial strategies explain contemporary economic differences. 
Diversity in research requires diversity in methods of analysis whether they be inductive or 
deductive (Chapman 2012). This is an excellent opportunity for someone training in a PhD 
program to widen the path to choices and innovative work, contrasted with falling into the trap of 
a „natural‟ form of accounting research (Chapman 2012). An understanding of how actors 
construct their reality, not objectively real, lends itself to qualitative methodology in which 
interviewing, as one of the methods, allows researchers to get close to the data and emphasize 
meanings and ordinary behaviors (Ahrens and Chapman 2006). This is the methodology adopted 
in chapters two and three, were data was collected by conducting field work in Jordan. The 
insights generated by this work led to questioning whether the colonial experience and its 
institutionalization influences accounting outcomes. Given that prior literature acknowledges the 
role of institutions in different accounting outcomes, and colonialism is shown to influence 
economic development, a hypothesis testing approach then seems appropriate. Thus the 
qualitative methodology first provided some understanding of the relation between what started 
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decades ago and the current accounting environment while helping formulate predictions around 
accounting outcomes, specifically accounting quality.  
In the next chapter I examine the interplay of the forces of colonialism and modernity in the field 
of corporate accounting in Jordan. I analyze corporate accountants‟ discourses in light of threats 
to status given the lacking knowledge of IFRS, and intense competition. I propose that in what is 
perceived as a project of modernity, corporate accountants are self-regulating using certificates, 
recruitment exams, English language proficiency, and image to restrict membership to their 
enacted profession and limit mobility within it. I argue that in doing so accountants recreate 
colonial forms of organization for exclusion and authority of the West, reproduced by enduring 
colonial schools. The paper is currently in a revise-and-resubmit stage at Accounting Auditing 
and Accountability Journal and was presented at the European Accounting Association annual 
congress, the Workshop on Accounting and Management Control in Madrid, and the 
International Accounting Research Symposium in Burgos. 
In chapter three we analyze the use of English in the construction of accounting hierarchy and 
identities in Jordan using Pierre Bourdieu‟s theoretical concepts on language and symbolic 
power. We show how the historic and contemporary factors combine in accountants‟ habitus 
influencing their discourse and actions, as they redefine social capital and identities. We also 
elaborate on how English in the accountancy field in Jordan is a symbolic instrument used in the 
structuring of the field and the relations within it. This paper has been presented at the Global 
Accounting and Organizational Change Conference in Sharjah.  
In chapter four we examine the use of exogenous colonial strategies to explain institutional 
differences following the institutional economics literature (Acemoglu et al. 2001) and find 
evidence that these strategies influence accounting quality via institutions. The study provides 
evidence that investor protection (Leuz et al. 2003), a measure widely used in the international 
accounting literature to proxy for institutional variation among countries, fails to explain 
differences in earnings quality in countries with colonial legacy. We also examine the possibility 
that what is observed is the effect of changes in institutions over time but find no such effect. 
This paper was presented at an informal workshop at Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, and the 
Global Accounting and Organizational Change Conference in Sharjah.  
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This thesis makes multiple contributions to accounting research. First this work treats the 
colonial legacy as central to understanding the organization of the accounting field and its 
practices in many countries. While this is not the first study to do so in research on profession 
(Cooper and Robson 2006), it is one of the very early studies to examine its influence in 
accounting practice.  Having said that, the next chapter is likely the first analysis to 
conceptualize corporate accounting as a field and transformations within it as a  
professionalization project (Larson 1977). In this analysis I also show how contemporary 
missionary and private schools act as vehicles through which colonial education is 
institutionalized and upon which this professionalization project rests. Second, the thesis extends 
Bourdieu‟s work on language and symbolic power (1991) to a post-colonial context. The 
analysis shows how audit and IFRS, among other mechanisms, contribute to the internalization 
of English, the language that has been perceived higher in the linguistic hierarchy in Jordan since 
the British colonization. The argument being made is that with this normalization „symbolic 
violence‟ takes shape as English becomes a source of professional distinction and domination 
reproducing hierarchy in the field of accountancy. This is likely the first paper that analyzes in 
depth the role of language within accountancy and ensuing social structural changes in the field. 
In conducting this analysis research is further enriched with insights into day to day practices of 
accountants in settings of which accounting research has developed little understanding 
(Hopwood 2007). Third, the colonial experience in this work is shown to be relevant to 
explaining institutional differences and consequently accounting quality in a large subset of 
countries. In conducting this analysis instruments are provided for future research to minimize 
the endogeniety of institutional proxies that are commonly predetermined with accounting 
quality. These findings challenge the institutionalization of accounting research which places 
Anglo-Saxon research in higher esteem within accounting research (Humphrey and Gendron 
2014). Forth, and in the interest of diversity this thesis relies on a number of theoretical works 
that can help researchers better understand accounting phenomena. As shown in this thesis 
accounting research can benefit from the interdisciplinary insights offered by Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson in their multiple works starting in 2001 and the work of Joseph Massad 
(1991), that are relatively new to the framing of accounting analysis. Pierre Bourdieu‟s 
theoretical concepts, while familiar to some accounting researchers, are not wide spread, yet they 
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offer opportunities for „exposing the fictions of the present‟ in the interest of opening new 
possibilities for change (Malsch et al. 2011). 
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Chapter 2: Corporate Accounting, a Non-traditional Site of 
Professionalization  
1. Introduction 
Professions are social forms organized for control and exclusion (Abbott 1988; Annisette 2000; 
Caramanis 2002; Grey 1998; Poullaos and Uche 2012; Ramirez 2001). Prior research has 
identified professional institutions as sites for regulation and professionalization (e.g., Annisette 
2003; Carnegie and Edwards 2001; Greenwood et al. 2002; Poullaos and Sian 2010; Willmott 
1986) and more recently, accounting professional firms (Cooper and Robson 2006; Suddaby et 
al. 2007). Research so far has hardly examined forms of organization within the field of 
corporate accounting, or accountants in industry, even though social status factors that may incite 
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closure are present across all accounting occupations (Chua 1986; Cooper and Robson 2006)
1
. In 
the literature, corporate accountants are in „non-traditional‟ environments, with their 
commitment perceived largely to their respective bureaucratic organizations, and interest in them 
is mostly restricted to the role of those migrating from accounting professional firms (e.g. 
Walker 2000; Suddaby et al. 2007).  
To fill part of this void, I analyze the discourse and practices of corporate accountants in Jordan, 
a small setting where social changes gain visibility. The observed practices are conceptualized as 
a project of professionalization (Larson 1977), a struggle in which rules are evolving to 
determine membership to a status-aspiring group, limiting opportunities within and around it. In 
this paper „Corporate accounting profession‟ refers to the collective mobilization of a group in a 
way that defines what the category itself is; one that is not removed from the theoretical 
construction of profession, and playing out differently from one setting to another (Evetts 2003; 
Johnson 1982; Larson 1977). 
 The paper argues that meanings of modernity contribute to evolving controls and regulations 
across Jordanian corporate accounting departments in an attempt to enhance the status of the 
group, and enact profession. This compares to much of the prior literature in its social closure 
dimension, yet is different in that it is not contingent on formal professional association or 
professional codes, rather on ideology which perceives modernity as Westernization (Johnson 
1982). I argue that this professionalization obtains as corporate accountants regulate their field 
using at least four strategies that reflect their perception of modernity in a post-colonial 
environment: certificates, recruitment exams, English language, and image. The common 
Western dimension of these practices strengthens the link between them, and enables corporate 
accountants’ contest for status, while generating a distance from the ‘traditional’. Meanings 
associated with these concepts are constantly being reconstructed. In Jordan while at times 
‘tradition’ and ‘modern’ are associated with the assertion of national culture, and Western 
technological advancement, respectively, at the extreme of the continuum, ‘tradition’ stands for 
static, submissive, and status quo, while at the other end ‘modernity’ stands for change, freedom 
and Western values. I further propose that normalizing modernity and Western beliefs and values 
                                                          
1
 Previous studies within managerial accounting have explored questions relating to role change (Burns and 
Baldvinsdottir 2005; Granlund and Lukka 1998) and occupational identity (Ahrens and Chapman 2000), however 
corporate accounting is a more comprehensive group than the management accounting group.  
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is part of the colonial heritage that is perpetuated in missionary and private primary and 
secondary schools. 
Jordan is a relatively small country where corporations are concentrated in the capital Amman 
enabling closer interaction among corporate accountants; a factor relevant to the transformation 
of the corporate accounting occupation in the absence of professional association.
2
 As historic 
events continue to shape the post-colonial world (e.g. Ashcroft 2001; Hourani 1962; Said 1978; 
Young 1994) contemporary presence of institutions of social inequality and Western dominance 
perpetuates elitism contributing to professionalization. British military control in Jordan lasted 
officially from 1922-1946, but in effect until 1956. While relatively short, its impact continues to 
be felt today largely because it was the British who defined the borders of the current state 
blending cultural and economic groups from Palestine, Syria, and Hijaz, resulting in the unease 
in defining who a Jordanian is (Massad 2001). Thus identity tensions closely related to class 
issues arise, or what Barakat (1993) conceives as the constant unresolved conflict between 
‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’. It is in this space where forces of modernity and tradition interact 
that profession is constructed. The Jordanian setting also illustrates the role of contemporary 
primary and secondary missionary schools, founded during the colonial era in 
professionalization, apart from that of accounting educational organizations (e.g. Annisette 2000; 
Poullaos and Sian 2010). I argue that missionary schools play a reproductive role in Western 
style elitism contributing to the evolvement of rules of membership and boundaries in corporate 
accounting. Because their graduates have continually been among the political, business, and 
social elite, missionary schools increasingly gained prestige and became the model for other 
private schools.  
The analysis of thirty-three semi-structured interviews with a wide range of stakeholders shows 
that corporate accountants implement practices that they perceive are essential for improving the 
quality of their services, primarily to modernize the economy and facilitate new market 
                                                          
2A few CFO‟s founded Jordan Association for Management Accountants (JAMA) in 2009 with the goal of improving the 
corporate accounting occupation and offering training. It is however a very small organization, with no official or occupational 
recognition and limited funding. The only two interviewees who knew about JAMA were its founders. While this shows the 
limited role of formal association it may reflect the desire on the part of at least some corporate accountants in a group identity 
and status enhancement. Another relevant association is Jordan Association of Certified Public Accountants (JACPA), 
responsible for organizing the audit occupation under the supervision of the High Council for Accounting and Auditing (HCAA). 
JACPA is a union-like association, in which corporate accountants who were previously certified as practicing auditors may 
remain members, but this has limited influence on their role as corporate accountants. 
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investments. This rationalization however, is consistent with Willmott’s (1986) argument that 
what is deemed necessary for quality is the outcome of the environment in which the occupations 
exist. Therefore, it is not the intentions of corporate accountants that are examined in this paper, 
rather their situation within the political, social, and economic context.  
The paper contributes to accounting research in three ways. First, this is likely one of the very 
few papers to examine the evolving organizational practices within the corporate accounting 
occupation, and conceptualize this transformation as professionalization in a post-colonial 
context. Corporate accounting in this paper is a site regulating entry and restricting job 
opportunities within and around the occupation, similar to professional associations (e.g., 
Annisette 2000; Bakre 2006; Caramanis 2002; Carnegie and Edwards 2001; Chua and Poullaos 
1998; Greenwood et al. 2002; Willmott 1986); the state (e.g., Carrera and Carmona 2013; 
Cooper and Robson 2006; Ramirez 2001; Sian 2007; Kamla et al. 2012; Yapa 1999); 
professional accounting firms (e.g., Arnold 2005; Cooper and Robson 2006; Greenwood and 
Suddaby 2006); and transnational organizations (e.g., Arnold 2005; Suddaby et al. 2007). 
Second, the paper argues that equating modernity with Westernization is the legitimating factor 
in the corporate accounting collective claim for improved status. This specificity enriches the 
study of accounting profession by examining the construction of professions in contexts other 
than where they originated (Cooper and Robson 2006 ; Poullaos and Uche 2012). Finally, the 
paper links missionary and private schools to profession as they instill the authority of Western 
knowledge, epistemology, ways of being and nurture elitism. While the role of accounting 
training and credentialing in professionalization has been examined in the accounting literature 
(e.g. Poullaos and Sian 2010), there is no examination of how normalization in primary and 
secondary schools contributes to profession.  
2. Profession and accounting 
Abbott (1988) acknowledges differences among professions subject to their environment, yet, he 
argues that common to professions is the social construction of an abstract body of knowledge or 
expertise, to determine a profession’s jurisdiction and differentiate it from the competition while 
legitimating it in the public eye. Larson (1977) contends that status benefits can accrue to 
‘professions’ even without the cognitive or technical knowledge dimension, as empirically 
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demonstrated by Grey (1998). According to Grey professional knowledge may be about behavior 
such as‘appropriate’ dress, social hierarchy, what to say, and the value of symbolism. The social 
values determine the knowledge relevant to the construction of profession, so as image gains 
more attention in the enhancement of status, technical knowledge becomes less relevant 
(Carruthers 1995). With the shift from the functionalist research approach on profession to the 
interactionist and critical approach, the examined dimensions increasingly shifted from technical 
knowledge, independence and altruism to the process of negotiated boundaries and claim for 
professional recognition and status (Chua and Poullaos 1998; Uche 2002; Willmott 1986, Yapa 
1999), or from the normative value system to the controlling ideology (Evetts 2003). 
The literature on profession largely focuses on professional associations as discussed in the 
review of Cooper and Robson (2006), with emphasis on their relation to the typically sanctioning 
State (e.g. Carnegie and Edwards 2001; Carrera and Carmona 2013; Greenwood et al. 2002; 
Walker 1995; Willmott 1986). Much of this literature uses historical analysis providing valuable 
insights on the interaction between accounting practice and its social and political environment. 
There is however, not enough examination of contemporary practice in among every day 
accountants especially given the British exportation of the concept of profession, education, and 
capitalism and the interconnectedness among these influences (Cooper and Robson 2006). Chua 
and Poullaos (1993) point that commonality in interests can take different shapes and can be 
assumed depending on social conditions. Thus, while interests are easier to analyze in the 
boundary rules generated within associations, professional associations are not a necessary 
element in defining the emergence of profession. For example, Ramirez (2001) shows, that in 
France, the accounting profession started its social closure many years before its association, 
arguing that in their early stages of formation professions associate themselves with the 
economic, social or cultural capital forms valued in society. Furthermore, Suddaby et al. (2007) 
argue that boundaries in emerging fields can develop in any space that allows patterns of 
interaction and shared meanings, where soft actors develop a mutual awareness of the identity of 
their project. With advancements in network theory, it is not difficult to conceive of a profession 
evolving without an association particularly in close social networks (Strang and Soule 1998) 
among structurally equivalent actors like Chief Financial Officers (CFOs). In a post-colonial 
society it is even less likely that professional associations are the entities regulating entry to the 
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profession as their features have been significantly modified with the colonial experience from 
their origins (Johnson 1972).  
Whether via professional associations or shared meanings, one goal of profession is to promote 
the social status of its members (Carnegie and Napier 2010; Sikka 2013; Willmott 1986). 
Professions may thus locate themselves within higher social class in society to gain legitimacy 
and access through social and political channels (Abbott 1988; Larson 1977). In an empirical 
example Jacobs (2003) shows that by emphasizing outcomes of socio-economic status such as 
leadership and teamwork skills and grades in employment forms, big accounting firms 
discriminate against individuals from working class background to protect their status. 
Within the status dimension, the accounting literature studies profession and modern Western 
colonialism in a shared context, one that supports capitalism’s economic expansion (Poullaos 
and Uche 2012). Building on Johnsons’ (1972) concept of corporate patronage, or the power of 
colonial administration and the post-colonial State in institutionalizing social divisions and racial 
superiority, this literature explores the historic role of the elitist groups that mutually support 
colonial and neo-colonial powers in the emerging hybrid forms of profession. Annisette’s (2000) 
influential research is a case of ‘informal empire’ demonstrating the continued power of the 
British Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) on the professional education 
and certification of accountants, through political imperialism, technological dependency, and 
local elites successfully resisting efforts to establish a local system of training. Annisette also 
suggests that different varieties of profession may be constructed contingent on the political, 
economic, and social environment. This is supported by multiple authors in the volume 
Accountancy and Empire: The British Legacy of Professional Organization who identify 
additional factors influencing accounting organization in former colonies, and the imperial 
center. In addition to British capital, British accountants, local elites, and law, these factors 
include social hierarchy and unequal access to training, and the British idea of professional 
accounting with its credentials, exams, and exclusivity (Poullaos and Sian 2010). In an example, 
relevant to the use of English among Jordanian accountants, as a boundary-defining mechanism, 
Ukwatte and Yapa (2013) note that the professional accounting body in Sri Lanka continued 
post-colonialism to conduct its examinations only in English, offering more opportunities to 
elites educated in Britain. Further examples of studies on professionalization within the context 
15 
 
of colonial effects in Kenya, and Fiji, are Sian (2007) and Davie (2005), respectively. While 
providing major insights, so far the literature, as mentioned earlier, has largely restricted 
discussions to the mobilization of accountants in and around professional associations and public 
accounting, and has not explored possible organizational transformations among corporate 
accountants.  
3. Colonial modernity 
Modern western colonialism happened over a 500-year period. It was, and remains, as much an 
ideological domination, as a military, political and economic endeavor (Strang 1996; Banerjee 
and Prasad 2008). Edward Said, in his seminal work Orientalism, demonstrates how the West 
forms an ideology of viewing the East as the ‘other’, the opposite of everything the West stands 
for; and how this framing empowers the West to exercise its power over the East. The authority 
of the West over the Orient, in its own eyes, comes from what it perceives as knowledge of the 
Orient, making the Orient what it is. Within Orientalist discourse, the Egyptian is with ‘light 
intellectual ballast’ (p. 212), the Orient is a place of ‘strangeness’, ‘difference’ and exotic 
sensuousness (p. 72) and Orientals are ‘unequal’ (p. 152). This ideology was a call to instruct the 
subordinates in the ways of the West, and some even saw their contribution a form of heroism in 
saving the Orient, disregarding what locals view as their needs or aspirations (Said 1978). Said – 
in the later editions of his book – further argues that current Orientalism is supported by 
American economic, cultural, and marketing influence in the Arab world, and reverberated by 
Arab elites. 
How Orientalism shapes the ‘other’ via institutions is demonstrated by Massad (2001) in his 
work on colonial effects on national identity in Jordan. Massad identifies the military, law, 
economic relations and education as lasting colonial institutions, but only examines the first two 
in detail. The economics literature explains the persistence of institutions in the post-colonial 
period with replacement cost, incentives of elites, and the continuing involvement of colonial 
powers (Acemoglu et al. 2001).
3
 Enduring colonial institutions are coercive, in that they 
delegitimize the local, and productive, in that they produce a hybrid cultural form that 
                                                          
3 In Jordan after the termination of the British annual subsidy in 1956, the US stepped in with monetary aid in addition to USAID 
contribution to major infrastructure projects. High debt amounting to nearly $8billion (174% of GDP) in the late 80‟s resulted in 
an IMF 15-year economic program enabling it to become an actor in setting social as well as economic policies, similar to other 
post-colonial societies (Annisette 2004; Ashraf and Ghani 2005; Arnold 2012; Mir and Rahaman 2005). 
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superficially relates to the traditional, in an attempt to avoid social conflict (Massad 2001). 
Massad contends that formation of the Jordanian state, mentioned earlier, presented challenges to 
national identity with one group advocating Arab nationalism against all forms of colonialism, 
while others saw the British as allies against any threat. The author argues that with lingering 
unresolved issues of identity in present times, a dominant elite group in Jordanian society still 
maintains strong alliance with the West. 
Massad (2001) explains how modern Jordanians view themselves and how they perceive 
modernity. The Western view of the Bedouins as wild and left from the past, meant transforming 
them, not only through force and exile, but also through educating them in the ways of Empire 
(Massad 2001).
4
 Massad argues that this view is shared by the modern Jordanian who ‘views 
her- or himself and presents that self as constituted through a repudiation of tradition, the 
Bedouin self, that is said to constitute her or his origin, while simultaneously reclaiming that 
tradition and that self as a living past!’ (Massad 2001, p 78). This explains why corporate 
accountants may distance themselves from the traditional, and transform their occupation by 
embracing Western values and practices, associating them with modernity. Western colonial 
modernity, in this context, constitutes what Robson and Cooper (1990) refer to as the external 
legitimating source of power for the profession.  
As mentioned earlier, prior literature does not explain the persistence of the colonial influence in 
schools, a key element in shaping the accounting profession in the analyzed context. In the next 
section, I offer some background on missionary schools in Jordan expanding on how they 
contribute to developing the perceptions of ‘modern’ and ‘Western’ as synonyms, while 
increasingly being associated with unequal opportunities to education, similar to other post-
colonial societies (e.g. Susela 2010; Yapa 2010).  
4. Missionary colonial heritage 
Missionary establishments and European colonial expansion supported each other (Nunn 2010, 
Strang 1996). Missions were a way of cheaply operating sectors of social policy, such as 
education and health (Young 1994). Permission, to operate Catholic, Russian Orthodox, 
                                                          
4The Bedouin molding extended to changing the way they dressed to British designed garments that looked traditional, replacing 
the camel they ate with Australian mutton, coffee with tea, and grains with white rice (Massad 2001). British inventions included 
the Jordanian flag and the bagpipes still in use in the Jordanian army band.   
17 
 
Protestant, and Jesuit schools in the Levant, was conceded to the British and French in the 19
th
 
century, preceding their military rule (Hourani 1962). Among the general population missions 
gained access because they provided healthcare, clothing, and food for some groups in need, and 
in terms of education, they were seen as bringing knowledge that may help catch up with 
European scientific advancements.  
Missionary educational services were part of spreading Western culture and languages, in an 
effort to ‘civilize’, and set an example for how societies should build their nations (Marten 2006). 
Being civilized thus, meant the belief in the rightness of European values and their superiority to 
others, while socially mimicking Western manner, dress, and speech. In missionary schools 
students learned European literature, and European history and epistemology; and what Said 
(1978) refers to as ‘the system of knowledge about the Orient’. Said’s (1978) literary analysis 
shows that a large group of European writers and poets, including Kipling, Lane, Disraeli, 
George Eliot, and Flaubert have subscribed to, and produced the antithetical system of 
Orientalism. Missionaries were also among those who wrote about local communities and their 
views contributed to establishing ethnic and linguistic hierarchies (Errington 2001).  
Under British control in Jordan missionary schools expanded, and over the years their teachings 
became engrained in the minds of a group of individuals as did the perception of distinction 
afforded to them, key reasons why systems in formerly colonized countries are not ‘an aspect of 
emerging national identity and citizenship rights’ (Tikly 2001). According to Young (1994) 
within new class and ethnicity lines associated with colonialism, elites are made up of one group 
of Western and missionary graduates, and another affiliated with governing families pre-
colonialism. The newer cultural elite became the officials, scholars, professionals
5
, and 
merchants of post-colonialism, while the political elites took military and government posts. 
Elites, however, do not perceive themselves as a privileged category; rather, responsible for 
leading their people and improving their conditions (Young 1994). These typical colonial 
conditions are consistent with the case of Jordan (Massad 2001). Paradoxically, it was among 
graduates of the missionary educational establishments
6
 that ideas of Arab nationalism first 
emerged in Lebanon and Egypt and spread to other places (Hourani 1962). The relevant complex 
                                                          
5 In the folk sense of the word. 
6 In particular the American University of Beirut, founded as the Syrian Protestant College. 
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explanation is that European modernity concepts entailed a united nation-state with a common 
citizenship and language (Goldthorpe 1996), so Arab Nationalism, while securing Arab 
independence for some, was emerging within a European discourse; one that accepted the newly 
defined separate nations (Anderson 2002). This is a good explanation of how missionary schools 
are weaved into the social structure of Jordan defining ideologies, and influencing social trends. 
Modern social elitism with Western values fostered by these schools, lends itself well to the 
social hierarchy and closure, typical of the construction of professions.  
5. Analysis 
5.1. Method 
I conduct thirty-three semi-structured interviews with corporate accountants, auditors, 
academics, and regulatory officials in Jordan as part of a larger project to elicit information on 
how the accounting occupation in Jordan is dealing with change in light of harmonization and 
privatization. In qualitative research, aiming at understanding social reality interviewing can help 
the researcher understand how individuals comprehend relationships between actors and the 
work (Ahrens and Chapman 2006). Appendix A (p., 129) provides details on the interviewees 
with pseudonyms for confidentiality.  
To capture multiple perspectives and minimize potential bias, the ranks of the twenty two 
corporate accountants interviewed range from entry level to CFO, in private and public 
companies, and in audit from senior to partner in small and large firms. Three formal interviews 
with faculty members and two informal with students at one public and another private 
university were conducted to understand educational practices and choices of curriculum. Male 
interviewees are more than females, consistent with the make-up of the accounting student body. 
In 2010, 23% of accounting graduates were females - who otherwise make up over 55% of the 
overall undergraduate population
7
. I also conducted a phone interview with a Human Resources 
consultant and obtained samples of recruiting exams. All one-on-one interviews were arranged 
                                                          
7
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Jordan. http://www.mohe.gov.jo/.   
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through personal contacts and snowballing, except the ones in academia arranged by cold 
calling.  
In addition to interviews, I consulted statistics and regulations available on the websites of the 
Department of Statistics, Ministry of Industry and Trade, and Jordan Association of Certified 
Public Accountants. Random accounting job ads from local newspapers, and Bayt.com website 
were reviewed, and in a few cases presented to interviewees to facilitate discussion about 
recruiting processes. I also reviewed schools’ websites and newsletters, to learn more about their 
education and environment. Finally, personal knowledge of the Jordanian society, accounting 
occupation, and schools proved helpful. In qualitative research the researcher influences the 
study as the research ‘requires close engagement rather than objective distant capture’ (Ahrens 
and Chapman 2006). While this subjectivity may have its limitations, it is helpful in providing 
access to the field, knowledge of the environment (Gallhofer et al. 2011) and theoretical framing 
and conceptualization relevant to the case. 
The semi-structured format acknowledges that interviews are meaning-making unfolding 
processes, in which interviewees have a constructive role (Holstein and Gubrium, 1997). 
Because of the open questions, deeper questions arise based on interviewees’ responses, and this 
active interviewing, reduces the bias since respondents cannot ‘spoil’ what they are creating 
(Holstein and Gubrium 1997).     
The Arabic interviews lasted between 40-110 minutes, and were recorded to facilitate translation 
and transcription. As is the case in current-day Jordan, it is not uncommon for people to use 
English phrases or full sentences in their Arabic speech, a form of code-switching. This occurs 
more in situations where individuals have studied in Western countries or graduated from 
missionary and private schools. Where the English used by interviewees deviates from standard 
English, as common in non-native settings (Phillipson 2008), I reword it to match the rest of the 
text while preserving the meaning intended by the speaker. 
 I compare twice the English transcription to the Arabic recording. Interviews were gradually 
compared to each other to better define the research project and find conceptually-based 
explanations. The open-ended questions highlighted interviewees’ attention to certification and 
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presentability, while their discourse brought attention to the importance of English. In discussing 
hiring practices and skills their attention to private schools became apparent.  
 
5.2. Interviews  
Jordanian corporate accounting is a case of structural change emphasizing the embodiment of 
modernity to improve status and enhance prestige in a context where status matters. Similar to 
accountants in Spain and France (Carrera and Carmona 2013; Ramirez 2001) Jordanian 
accountants do not enjoy the status they aspire to as their discourse reflects. The stereotype of the 
traditional accountant in Jordan is not very different from that in the UK and US illustrated by 
Carnegie and Napier (2010), ‘positively, the traditional accountant is honest and trustworthy, 
careful with money, painstaking, reliable, polite and well-spoken. Negatively, the traditional 
accountant is dull, boring and colorless, excessively fixated with money, pedantic, uncommercial 
and shabby’. This motivates accountants to take action to improve society’s view (Ramirez 
2001).  
The problem is that people don't value the accountant; they look down on accounting. 
When a man makes a marriage proposal to a woman they [her family] look down upon 
him as just an accountant. (Imad) 
Owners and company management don't really appreciate [corporate] accounting as a 
profession
8… they consider it a cost center, which is wrong. (Maher) 
In the first part below, I show how in missionary and private schools meanings of modernity 
develop and how they relate to elitism influencing their professional project. In the second part, I 
analyze corporate accountants‟ discourses, showing how they operationalize and employ 
modernity and distance themselves from the „traditional‟ limiting access to and mobility within 
their field. 
5.2.1. Normalization in Jordanian Missionary and Private Schools 
                                                          
8
The use of the term „profession‟ by interviewees overlaps with its theoretical use in this paper, however interviewees mostly use 
the term to contrast their occupation with „support‟ functions and are interested in showing that their occupation is, as some put 
it, „value added‟. 
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Errington (2001) argues that missionaries played a role in establishing socio-economic 
stratification in colonial communities, at least partly, via languages they taught to the elite during 
colonial times. The Levant is a good example of this (Kamla 2012). In Jordan, the Ahliyyah 
School for Girls (previously Christian Missionary School), Bishop’s School, Terra Sancta 
College, Rosary College School, and De La Salle College were founded during British control in 
1926, 1936, 1948, 1949, and 1950 respectively. The success of these schools spurred others in 
the 60’s such as the Amman Baptist School, and the National Orthodox School. The trend 
continued into the 80’s and 90’s without the religious affiliation, but with some mimicking the 
philosophy of their predecessors, and others importing newer models like the Amman 
Baccalaureate School, and the Modern Montessori School. With time and with the commonality 
between missionary and non-religious private schools, the term ‘missionary’ was dropped and 
collectively all these schools became known simply as ‘private schools’. Multiple quotes 
summarize just how important of a role these schools play in the hiring decisions among 
corporate accountants. 
The high school they [job candidates] graduated from is important, it is very very very 
important. (Ragad) 
[On the resume] I stopped looking at universities, and I now look at the high school the 
person graduated from because some schools here are really good, like the Orthodox 
school or the Bishops school, and their graduates have good command of English. They 
have brains in their heads, or a head over their shoulder, I guess. (Maher) 
Decision makers perceive graduates from missionary and private schools as better than those 
from public or United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRWA) schools and define them as „different‟ consistent with the idea that the „producers‟ or 
leaders of the professional project determine what constitutes talent (Larson 1977).  
But graduates from the schools that offer the international baccalaureate and the GCE 
are different from the rest, they think differently. Their language skills and their soft skills 
are completely different. (Nasser) 
The star performers are the private school graduates. (Imad) 
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[Describing an employee] He comes with innovative ideas. He is a graduate of the 
baccalaureate school and then went to Georgetown. He has a different mindset. You feel 
there's a big gap between him and the others. (Khaled) 
Graduates from private schools are perceived as having good soft skills, language skills, brains, 
and are positively different. Although upper class is not directly mentioned, it is present by the 
mention of the Western credentials and schools that can only be afforded by that class. Students 
don’t just accumulate knowledge in these schools, more importantly they accrue cultural capital 
which gives them power over their respective fields (Bourdieu 1985). The Baccalaureate school, 
mentioned above, is one of the most expensive schools, whose alumni attend universities 
primarily in the UK, US, or Canada.  
While there is no denying the benefits of education, these schools are simultaneously training 
students in Western ways of thinking, and in the superiority of Western certification like the 
British General Certificate of Education (GCE) or the International Baccalaureate (IB). As 
Friedland and Alford (1991) explain ‘categories of knowledge contribute to and yet depend upon 
the power of institutions which make them possible’. British and American9 books, teaching 
material and staff are just some ways of normalizing Western values and directing attention to 
the West as the authority that matters. The following examples are from schools’ websites and 
informal observations, using exact labels as they appear in English with no Arabic equivalent in 
most cases. Concepts and skills include ‘Inquiry’, ‘Reflection’, ‘Critical thinking’, and 
‘Knowledge creation’. Students are organized by ‘Homeroom’ and ‘Learning zones.’ Classes are 
called ‘Busy Bees,’ ‘Dinosaurs,’ and ‘Class of 2014, 2015…’ Academic and social activities 
include a ‘Readathon,’ ‘Open Mic,’ ‘Heels to Wheels,’ ‘Hands On,’ ‘Laptops for Learning,’ and 
‘Fun Run.’ Clubs include ‘Visual and Performing Arts,’ ‘Archeology Club,’ and ‘Fun Science.’ 
A closer read into activities reported in schools’ newsletters reflects the embeddedness in 
Western values. One schools’ newsletter reported hosting ‘prestigious universities’ and its long 
list included only US, UK, and Canadian universities. Of the four newsletters I reviewed, 
inspirational quotes were exclusively by Anglo-Americans including William Blake, Maya 
                                                          
9
 While the influence on Jordan was British during colonial days, the transition of economic dependence from 
Britain to US (see footnote 3) increased the US influence considerably. Combined these influences are referred to as 
“Western” influences as used by Massad (2001) and Said (1978). This paper suggests that the original British 
colonial experience provided a foundation for current Western influence.   
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Angelou, Courtland Milloy, and Tony Robbins. These examples reflect the Western preeminence 
in knowledge, forms of organizing, and social skills and values. This normalization happens in 
the earliest stages of individuals’ socialization when taken-for-granted assumptions are being 
formed, and are as Tikly (2001) writes ‘remarkably resistant to change’. It can be seen as an 
extension of the practices of Western mimicry taught to Bedouins by the colonial powers since 
the inception of the state intended to transform them in ways that make them more accepting of 
colonial rule and Western dominance without the use of force (Massad 1991). 
English in private schools is taught on daily basis starting in kindergarten, and is increasingly 
replacing Arabic in content subjects (e.g. science, math, social studies). On the other hand, public 
schools until 2001 did not teach English till 5
th
 grade with lower frequency and a much simpler 
curriculum. 
People now pay abundant fees for private schools in Amman, why? At the end of the day 
for two reasons, to teach them good English skills that are not available in the public 
schools, and provide an environment for them that you believe is similar to yours. 
(Mazen) 
Friendships, careers, and business relations form not just among the students but also their 
parents who likely revolve in the small upper class circles. The network of parents and alumni in 
turn offer the schools resources, enabling them to provide differentiated experiences. I suggest 
that the strong bond between private schools and „us‟ contributes to society‟s definition of status, 
and the reproduction of social divisions. Their role in contemporary Jordan is critical in 
explaining sources of power with which the aspiring profession allies itself in its social mobility 
pursuit (Robson and Cooper 1990).  
5.2.2. Corporate accounting and profession 
In this section, I describe and analyze mechanisms that reflect corporate accountants‟ perceptions 
of what a modern profession is and how they are used in the production of a corporate 
accounting profession via inclusion, exclusion, and restricting mobility. The elite decision 
makers are a small network of people who revolve in a small social circle, so they are mutually 
aware of the project of professionalization and its elements, two requirements for the emergence 
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of a new field (Suddaby et al. 2007). Among the interviewees, all executives with one exception 
had attended one of the missionary or private schools. 
Certification: While most companies in Jordan may be considered small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) where an accounting Bachelor’s degree with some relevant experience, is 
quite likely sufficient for someone to do the work, the corporate accounting field exhibits an 
understanding that without Anglo-American certificates people’s opportunities remain limited. 
The institutional view conceptualizing certificates as contributors to normative pressure and the 
perception of legitimacy within a field (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) sheds light on this practice. 
Consistent with what obtains in other post-colonial societies (e.g., Annisette 2000; Ashraf and 
Ghani 2005; Gallhofer et al. 2011) Western certifications like Certified Public Accountant 
(CPA), Certified Management Accountant (CMA), and Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) are 
quite prestigious and enhance the symbolic capital of individuals (Bourdieu 1985), thus 
contributing to the status of the whole corporate accounting field. In addition to the big financial 
cost, time, and strong English skills involved in pursuing the CPA, until recently, Jordanian 
candidates had to travel to the US to take the exam. Collectively the cost, English skills required, 
and travel to US or UK contribute to their social status. The prestige of Western certification is 
confirmed by most corporate accountants and auditors interviewed, here is one example: 
If I am screening CVs and one person has a CPA and experience at Pepsi, then I 
certainly would prefer him, over someone who has worked at the Tobacco Company and 
doesn’t have a CPA… Even if he does not have a CPA, then a CMA or an MBA. 
(Khaldoun) 
The last sentence above indicates that the three credentials are interchangeable even though in 
content they are different suggesting that, at least partly, it is about the symbolism of the 
certificate rather than the knowledge itself. Serving as an example of the “repudiation of 
tradition” referred to by Massad (2001) the interviewee combines the CPA and the American 
Pepsi company, in the more positive category, relative to a lack of CPA and experience in the 
traditional Jordan Tobacco and Cigarettes Company, one of the oldest local public companies.  
This quote also hints at the modern verses traditional social conflict. The combination of CPA 
and Pepsi experience in the quote confirms the idea that a CPA license in Jordan may be sought 
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to obtain a job in industry, not a career in audit. This can be explained as part of a socially 
constructed knowledge system (Scott 2008), reflecting the need to converge to a more Western 
form of organization legitimating modernity, and enabling distinction and closure. An older 
auditor demonstrates this: 
These credentials are distinguished in society, so if one has the financial ability to enroll 
in a program and the mental ability to study for it then why not...because ‘Kul-frenji-
brinji’[everything Western is good], that's the way life is. For example if you were to say 
you are a graduate of the University of Jordan verses a graduate of the American 
University of Beirut, or a university in the United States, they do not all mean the same 
thing. At the same time people received benefits from these credentials. The number of 
educated people has increased ... so if I were one of these graduates how would I 
distinguish myself? The way to do it is to obtain the distinguished certification. 
(Mamdouh) 
The interviewee places certificates with Western universities, just as the one before placed Pepsi 
with CPA, and one can easily add missionary and private schools. The Western certification in 
this case is just one way of determining corporate accounting membership, similar to 
professional associations. Sian (2007) shows how qualification during and post colonialism, 
excluded Kenyans from participating in the accounting profession, unless they had the mostly 
unattainable British certification. Similarly, Bakre (2006) shows how the localized professional 
institution furthers inequality by extending the requirement for local accountants to obtain 
foreign certification for practicing.  
The quote above, however, also shows some sarcasm reflecting mixed feelings. While the widely 
used phrase „Kul-frenji-brinji‟ reinforces the feeling of inferiority, the cynicism is a distancing 
mechanism likely because most individuals remain aware that Westernization may also be 
construed as anti-nationalistic. This explains why corporate accountants may appear critical of 
their own practices, while at the same time championing them. Another interviewee highlights 
the status of the Western certificates, confirming what was quoted earlier, while also noting the 
pecking order among the different certificates and emphasizing the powerful American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA).  
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It's more about the image probably than the experience with the CPA, this is why when 
companies put ads for jobs for financial controllers and above they ask for things that the 
financial controller really doesn't need to have, they ask for CFA sometimes and I don't 
know why, I look at the ad and I think why do they need a CFA, CFA is for something 
totally different. The ad would say CPA/CMA/CFA preferred, why do you need a CFA? 
You probably need a CMA more than a CPA as a matter of fact. However if you go to a 
company, and let's say you have a CMA, I don't think they really value it much, and most 
of them would ask what it is, even though it is a CMA, but if you have a CPA they all 
know what a CPA is. The AICPA is an extremely strong Institute and has been there 
forever and it's part of the American culture, like the bar, this is why it gained that 
credibility and reputation I guess, but I think in private companies you probably really 
need more CMAs than CPAs, however I don't see people with CMA getting salary 
increases much really… It's like driving a Ferrari; I can say I have a Ferrari. (Maher) 
Becoming certified makes the Jordanian corporate accountant a counterpart to Euro-American 
accountants and moves him/her to „the level on which she or he finds modernity‟ (Massad 2001, 
p. 77).   The CPA specifically contributes to the symbolic capital of individuals within corporate 
accounting even if it is an audit license, or quite likely because it is an audit license, and can be 
associated with the Western big audit firms. It gives the holder the power to make certificates a 
common sense category in the evolving construction (Bourdieu 1985) in this case of the 
corporate accounting profession. However, if the motivation for obtaining the certificate were 
technical knowledge corporate accountants would more likely favor JCPA, the local qualification 
requiring first, knowledge of IFRS – the standards applicable in Jordan – instead of US GAAP, 
and second, knowledge of local tax laws and relevant regulations instead of American laws. 
Multiple interviewees made it clear that JCPA comes last, if at all, on their list even though it is 
the requirement for local auditors as one audit partner informs us.  
But in Jordan the only qualification you need to practice or to sign an audit report is the 
JCPA. However the JCPA is not structured in a way that is helpful, they simply translate 
the CPA exams into Arabic and administer them and sometimes the translation may not 
be “accurate” or weak. The second part which is the rules and regulations, as they are 
per the Jordanian laws, this does not have any issues with it. (Walid) 
Yet the same auditor when asked how he would rate three job candidates who are JCPA, CPA, 
and ACPA responded: 
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We would probably hire the CPA probably because they would have the advantage of the 
language. (Walid) 
Relating this quote to the broader Jordanian colonial legacy, an argument can be made here that 
the preference for CPA over the Jordanian and Arab certificates is that local forms in formerly 
colonized societies are not legitimating. For example, in Trinidad and Tobago to become 
legitimate and gain independence the local accounting association needed Western recognition to 
be accepted by the community (Annisette 2000). One Jordanian corporate accountant who 
attempted to become licensed nevertheless questions the relevance of the CPA: 
Even though I did it [took the exams] I thought that it was an American promotion, 
because we study American GAAP, but in Jordan we apply IFRS...I don't want to 
undermine the CPA, but you study rules that are inapplicable in Jordan, like deferred 
taxes, and leases. Their tax rules are much more complicated than ours, and their laws 
are not applicable to us. (Sanad) 
The quotes demonstrate that while critical, corporate accountants as well as auditors want to 
become CPAs. One recent entrant to the field discusses her perception of the importance of 
certification and the cost she is willing to incur: 
A BA now is equivalent to a high school degree, and without professional credentials one 
will not get anywhere and will remain in the same place 20 years later. You have to 
continue to work on yourself after the BA because it is not enough… It cost me 1200JD 
for the classes, in addition to 560JD in exam fees and 200JD for the second exam
10
. 
(Luma) 
The cost for the interviewee is equivalent to at least 5 months‟ earnings. The quote also shows, as 
do others from informal interviews, that young individuals entering the profession reproduce the 
rhetoric of the importance of certifications and the marginalization of the university education, 
an inherent feature of the original English accounting profession (Annisette 2000). 
Many mid-level Jordanian job ads in corporate accounting either require or „prefer‟ some form of 
Western certification. These ads are successful in filtering out people as illustrated by one 
interviewee‟s comments on ads presented to him by the researcher for comments. 
                                                          
10
 1 JD = 1.08 Euro on March 12, 2013 
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One important thing about these ads is some of them require professional certifications 
such as CMA or CPA; I would immediately dismiss these jobs because I do not have the 
certification. (Ammar) 
The certification is a strong signal to this interviewee that he does not belong to this group even 
though he holds a Bachelor’s degree with a few years of experience.  
Recruitment tests: Similar to certifications, tests are part of the legitimation process of a field 
(Meyer and Rowan 1977). A filtering practice increasingly used in corporate accounting 
departments is to require job applicants at the junior level, to pass a test that is typically one or 
more of three parts, English, accounting, and analysis in English. Two of the three new entrants 
interviewed, graduates of public schools and local universities, had lost opportunities due to 
failing some of these exams. One interviewee took an exam at an airline company:  
It was math and logic... it was hard for me because I had just graduated from university 
and my English skills were not good, so I did not score well. (Lara) 
Another failed the English phone screening with Deloitte and the English written exam at TAG
11
: 
I passed the accounting exam, but not their English exam. Their English exam was very 
difficult, I don't know if you've heard but the English exams at TAG, E&Y, and Deloitte 
are very challenging. They are looking for a higher level of English. (Luma) 
The higher level of English referred to in the quote is only attainable locally in missionary and 
private schools, so the test is a way to discern the social background of the candidates, and align 
the goals of the entrants with the modernity being constructed. Abbott (1988) contends that to 
gain its legitimacy a profession may recruit from upper class and elite educational institutions. 
The modern Western link between all status related practices explains why corporate accounting 
decision makers prefer to have the tests in English, as is the case in the following example: 
Human Resources screens the applicant in Arabic first. The next step is an English test. 
There is a section on translating accounting terms from English to Arabic, and vice 
versa, and another section on writing in English. We test IQ, English, and accounting 
                                                          
11 Talal Abu Ghazaleh, a reputable local audit firm that is perceived by some to be in the same class as the multinational audit 
firms and by others as tier two. 
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skills. I don’t know why we did it in English, but of course someone who graduated from 
abroad will have better English skills. (Yazan) 
The use of IQ tests reflects the interest in favoring graduates from missionary and private schools 
and Western universities who are more familiar with the Western culture inherent in the English 
administered versions of the tests. It is understandable that the CFO did not prepare the exam 
himself, yet, not questioning the use of English reflects his embeddedness in the Western 
dominated environment and his, conceivably unintended, role in reproducing it. In this context 
this executive, similar to others likely believes that he is contributing to the modernization of his 
nation (Massad 2001).  
Samples of exams show that the level of difficulty is a range, with the more sophisticated tests 
requiring a combination of analytical and language skills close to what is on the Graduate 
Management Admission Test (GMAT). Determining the minimum level of English is a decision 
by CFOs, who either combine private schooling with Western universities, or with transnational 
audit firm experience, or all three. These social characteristics influence the standardization in 
the professionalization project (Larson 1977). 
English and titles: Filtering and signaling strategies are applied in corporate accounting even 
before recruitment tests with English job ads placed in the Arabic newspapers. A sample of 
accounting ads reviewed in the local newspapers shows that the practice is widely used in 
accounting, especially among medium and large size companies. The emphasis on English in 
recruiting can take precedence over accounting, as noted by an auditor: 
Sometimes companies ask me to help them find an employee, and they tell me that they 
are interested in someone who speaks English, even if he is not a good accountant, and I 
laugh at that! (Kasim) 
Technical knowledge takes secondary place as the field seeks to enhance its image and status 
(Carruthers 1995). The institutionalization of English, as argued, makes it more legitimizing than 
the technical accounting knowledge because it is an indicator of candidates’ upper class and their 
eligibility for inclusion in the rising profession to which they bring prestige. 
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People are intimidated by those who speak English well, and consider that person very 
knowledgeable particularly among a certain class. If you don't speak English some 
people don't have much respect for you. (Nayef) 
English, status, and knowledge or the perception of it, are inseparable, as the above quote 
demonstrates. With English replacing Arabic in the field, one question solicited some 
interviewees’ thoughts on it. The following two quotes openly express what appears to be the 
sentiment of others less vocal about the rejection of Arabic in favor of English, at least in 
business.  
I think the English language is much more advanced when it comes to business, 
accounting and finance. Arabic is not the language to be used, honestly I don't like to use 
it. There are many accounting terms that I don't know in Arabic. I just think English is 
much more powerful, especially in business. Arabic is too backward to be used in 
business, that‟s my opinion... I heard that they are trying to Arabize the CPA exam which 
would look funny, but I just heard it I am not sure about it… If you have an English-
speaking staff you are looked upon as a more advanced company by outsiders, by 
auditors. For example I now would not hire TAG to do my audit, most of their staff don't 
speak English… my impression is that if they don't speak English they are not 
progressive. (Maher) 
I feel that English in financial reporting gives more prestige. (Yazan) 
These quotes can be explained in light of language hierarchy engendered by missionary and 
colonial linguists (Errington 2001). Arabic then in corporate accounting is affiliated with 
tradition, backwardness, and lower status, while English is linked to modernity, technical 
advantage and prestige. This repudiation of „tradition‟ is, as Massad (2001) explains, an element 
in the make-up of the identity of the „modern‟ Jordanian. Given a context where Arabic is 
typically a pillar of nationalism (Hourani 1962), and as one common debate in the post-colonial 
societies is around modernity and nationalism, one would expect concerns from corporate 
accountants or reservations on the preeminence of English, but with few exceptions, most 
interviewees did not express such concern reflecting how the colonial experience continues to 
contribute to ideology and degradation of the local culture. 
What reasons do accountants provide for this attention to English? The following rationale was 
echoed by other interviewees: 
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The junior accountants deal only with their peers in the other companies, those at the 
same level. In the higher positions one communicates with a different group of people so 
you need a more sophisticated level of communication skill; one might need to 
communicate with bankers, investors, and there is a bigger need for language and 
terminology sharing. (Yazan) 
Reasons mentioned by other interviewees include communication with companies in other 
countries, software, and Arab graduates of foreign universities who do not know accounting 
terms in Arabic, and those who started their career in big audit firms. Carruthers (1995) argues 
that rationalization by the organization is part of legitimizing its appearance, and between inside 
and outside the organization the „process is a cultural and political one that concerns legitimacy 
and power much more than efficiency alone‟.12 Concluding from the interviews a basic 
knowledge of accounting terminology in English is needed to perform a job in medium and large 
size companies as software packages are increasingly in English.
13
 This basic proficiency 
however, is conceivably attainable in public schools and local university education combined 
with on-the-job training. 
Job titles are increasingly translated from Arabic to English, even though they are typically in 
Arabic in the job contracts. The same holds for names of departments and groups. Examples of 
titles uttered in English by interviewees are „accounting manager‟, „internal control coordinator‟, 
„junior accountant‟, „chief accountant‟, and „treasury and credit control‟. Titles are symbolic 
capital and offer rewards other than the labor compensation (Bourdieu 1985). This explains why 
the CFO in the following quote feels so strongly about his title: 
The general manager introduces me as Head of Finance and this gives me a stroke of 
course. He doesn't say „CFO‟, he says Head of Finance. (Imad) 
Head of Finance was uttered by the interviewee in Arabic, while CFO was uttered in English. 
The three letters in this context have symbolic meanings related to prestige and easily 
recongnizable in the Jordanian workplace, and among upper social class in general. Much more 
than Head of Finance, the imported CFO designation distinguishes the owner from the masses by 
virtue of an affiliation with modernity and Western status. The interviewee‟s strong expression 
                                                          
12
 Concepts are expanded in chapter 3. 
13The interviews reflect that at least in two cases the CFO after being appointed chose to replace the Arabic software with an 
English one. 
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reflects the tension surrounding the use of Arabic and the Westernization of the title which can 
be interpreted as a response to threats to a distinguishing strategy. The symbolic property of this 
title does not emanate from the state as more common (Bourdieu 1985), rather, it emanates from 
the hierarchy between Western categories and local ones being reproduced in this instance. Such 
transformation in titles may contribute more to the status of those at the top, but they also 
contribute to the prestige of the group as a whole.  
‘Presentable’, or image: Personal appearance and mannerism have long been identified as 
dimensions of the post-colonial concept of profession (Johnson 1972). Grey (1998) demonstrates 
that professionalism in big audit firms is understood as appearance, youth, type and color of 
clothing, accessories, skin condition, class of people one associates with, time management, and 
identification with the firm. A „presentable‟ image among Jordanian corporate accountants is 
modeled after the big X auditor who is in trendy clothing, well groomed, behaves in a certain 
way, and flaunts the latest gadgets, as a former Arthur Andersen auditor elaborates: 
When we went to meet a client we had to be in fashionable clothing, carry a nice looking 
briefcase, and behave in a certain way. They taught us how to deal with clients and how 
to talk to them. These were things that local Jordanian companies did not pay attention 
to. Even until now some local auditors don't wear a necktie, at other times the necktie is 
not properly tied, I see this all the time. They don't have these skills for communicating 
with the client and coming across as professional. The large audit companies consider 
the auditor or the accountant a professional, similar to a lawyer. This was something 
imported from the US, not something native.
14
 Among the big companies Arthur Andersen 
was the most effective in presenting this image of the professional. When we carried these 
computers, people would look at them as if they were rockets. They looked at us with 
apprehension, probably thinking: Who are these people? Who are these very well dressed 
people who are trying to be sophisticated with English? Part of it was an admiring look, 
because they felt that we are elevating the profession and they wanted to look like us. 
Many people admired us and thought that we were well dressed, well shaven and 
groomed. This is the image they had of us.  I myself like this image. I like this style, I like 
to be organized. (Yazan) 
                                                          
14 Historically the concept of professional accountant originated in Scotland (Walker 1995) and travelled with British colonists 
(Chua and Poullaous 1998). 
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Corporate accountants are influenced by big auditors‟ Anglo-American culture15. However, what 
is specific to the case of the Jordanian context, is that the claim to profession is not just about the 
image itself, but, applying concepts from Massad (2001), it is more about seeing it through 
Western eyes and related positive categories, in contrast to the rejected traditional ones. 
Conceivably, this is why the interviewee acknowledging that this is a Western import 
welcomingly adopts it in this „material‟, „outer‟, „modern‟ (Massad 1991) work context. The 
categories and values structuring this adoption have been produced and reproduced over years by 
extant institutions. I suggest that the modern and traditional split in this context is the same as 
that between elite and masses, private and public schools, and ‘professional’ and ‘non-
professional’ accountants.  
The next quote is another example of the meanings associated with presentability in the 
production of profession and its extension to the spouse. The interviewee is the CFO at one of 
the largest industrial companies with affiliates abroad describing one of his direct reports: 
This guy for example is doing well, but from a leadership point of view, even though he 
presents to the board, I still cannot send him abroad. You know how abroad they invite 
people out and he has to bring his wife and his wife wears the hijab.
16
 So there are 
certain limits that once he gets to, he cannot go beyond, the background is very 
important. (Khaldoun) 
This quote is an even better example of how one decision maker evaluates appearance through 
the eyes of those „abroad‟, and when it does not measure up to the Western standard it becomes a 
barrier. The idea that „background‟ matters was echoed by many interviewees and one of them 
mentioned the word „background‟ on four separate occasions. The term is typically uttered in 
English and is a disguise for class. Decision makers in corporate accounting in this post-colonial 
environment are achieving and institutionalizing closure similar to colonial administration and 
the post-colonial State based on social divisions (Johnson 1972). The hijab here is a signal to the 
interviewee of the employee‟s „background‟. Kamla (2012) argues that the hijab is the 
embodiment of the conflict between tradition and modernity in an Arab context Western or 
Westernized companies discriminate against women wearing the head scarf while Islamic 
                                                          
15As described by Cooper et al. (1998) 
16In the Arab Levant hijab refers to women‟s head cover.  
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companies discriminate against women not wearing head scarf. In the Jordanian corporate 
accounting context the hijab, a form of resistance to Western imperialism (Kamla 2012), may 
constitute a threat the efforts of the emerging profession.  
The quote below further reflects how the measures discussed so far combine together in a 
„package‟, a term used in English by this interviewee: 
When we selected the auditor the criteria were cost and image… A good image means the 
auditor is presentable, from a good family, knows English, has good exposure, and has 
good personal appearance which is very important. There's also the image of the 
partners; who they are, and their credentials. For example, the partners at E&Y are my 
friends; they are presentable, and knowledgeable. You may find that technically a partner 
at XYZ company is better than a partner at E&Y but at the partner level you have to 
consider the entire package, and they have this package. For example they show up 
wearing a good suit, on the other hand when in the past I dealt with Bawab [a local audit 
company] the partner came to the meeting wearing the same suit four years in a row. 
This reflects on the firm‟s image, you have to be dressed professionally and in good 
colors, not turquoise; he came in a turquoise suit. (Fahed) 
Again, we find the attention to social stratification and family background in this quote, and we 
find that technical knowledge takes secondary place. So in total the ‘package’ is a combination 
of upper class, private schooling, fluency in English, and the „right‟ look, or symbolic capital 
(Bourdieu 1985). By disassociating from the Turquoise old fashioned suit and the old-fashioned 
Arabic language and affiliating with the Western certificates, English lingo, English-sounding 
titles, and private schools corporate accountants aim to define their occupation as a modern 
profession. Earlier in his career the interviewee had worked in the big audit firms, as did six of 
the seven other executives interviewed. These individuals bring their Anglo-American big audit 
practices and contribute to the professionalization of corporate accounting. Even though cultural 
inconsistencies between the Anglo-American and Arab cultures may initially suggest a lower 
likelihood of accepting these practices, Strang and Soule (1998) argue that diffusion is smoother 
when there is cultural legitimacy of the adopted innovations. In the case of Jordan‟s missionary 
and private schools, their education is a significant part of the institutional environment 
engendering the Western cultural legitimacy and practices reducing resistance to them. 
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6. Discussion and conclusions 
The analysis shows that corporate accountants are constructing what they perceive is a modern 
profession, making their occupation an option mainly for individuals from upper class. Practices 
deemed modern via their Western association are status-enhancing and legitimating in an 
environment where Western superiority is institutionalized. The analysis suggests that this form 
of closure is consistent with the social divisions and linguistic hierarchies established by 
missionaries (Errington 2001) and continue to be produced in current day missionary and private 
schools producing a system where modernity is equated with Westernization (Johnson 1982). 
Divisions based on certification, English language, titles, and appearance or combinations of 
them are being institutionalized in corporate accounting in a manner consistent with the 
antithetical system of Orientalism (Said 1978) yet within the Orient itself in this case and with 
the purpose of achieving „modernity‟ in the Western sense.  
However, two lingering questions remain unanswered, first, what is prompting this change now, 
given that some factors explored have been in existence for many years? Second, how does this 
change relate to other trends like global Westernization? 
To answer the first question, two suggestions are made. The first is the growing proportion of 
accounting graduates as a consequence of privatization of higher education, and the second is the 
missing relevant knowledge of IFRS. Both conditions increase the degree of uncertainty, which 
is more likely to give rise to professionalization (Lounsbury 2002). The first suggestion 
conceives of professionalization as a response to competition pressure (Abbott 1988) from within 
the accountancy field. Privatization initiatives with the support of USAID and World Bank were 
initiated in the early 90‟s and extended to education. In its aftermath, the number of universities 
grew from 8 in 1990 to 27 in 2010, with an increase in accounting enrollment from 1,618 
students in 1991/1992 to 15,676 students in 2010/2011
17
 or 968%. The growth in total labor 
force for the same period was only 215%.
18
 About 30% of students in all undergraduate 
programs in 2010/2011 were enrolled in private universities, but unlike the general trend over 
55% of accounting students chose private universities which are perceived socially and by 
                                                          
17Data on 1991/1992 student numbers from (Khasharmeh 1995), all other university enrollment data from ministry of higher 
education and scientific research http://www.mohe.gov.jo/Statistics/tabid/69/language/ar-JO/Default.aspx. 
18Data from http://data.worldbank.org. 
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employers as less prestigious and providing lower-quality education (see Burke and Al-Waked 
1997). At the same time informal interviews with undergraduate students in their last year reflect 
their views of dim job opportunities. Yet, employers complain that they cannot find „good‟ 
candidates, and in one case it took a whole year for the manager to find and hire a junior 
accountant. This mismatch is an expected outcome of the Western elitism explained earlier, and 
typical of post-colonial societies where boundaries of the emerging profession are thus being set 
based on skills that universities do not teach, but as mentioned are present in upper classes of 
society (e.g. Annisette 2000; Bakre 2006; Gallhofer et al. 2011; Yapa 2010).  
As for the second explanation, with the adoption of IFRS, starting voluntarily in the early 90‟s 
and formalized by 2002, the need for new technical knowledge arose. However interviews show 
that no formal training was made available to corporate accountants by the government, 
associations, or academia, outside of large audit firms. University of Jordan, the leading 
university in the country, only offered an elective course in IFRS, largely because the business 
faculty use American textbooks, and the IFRS versions of these books only became available in 
2010. Small companies
19
 were largely unaffected by IFRS, however, in medium and large 
companies ignorance of the standards continues to impact the status of corporate accountants. 
This potential deskilling, while threatening, creates an opportunity for change where actors can 
improve their own status (Loundsbury 2002).  
As to how corporate accounting professionalization relates to other trends like global 
Westernization, it is the contention of this paper that colonial heritage and persisting institutions 
moderate the effects of globalization and amplify them (Gallhofer et al. 2011; Kamla 2012)
20
.  
The findings of this paper show that closure is taking place in corporate accounting as rules of 
membership are being defined which has implications for social equality as jobs become limited 
to individuals from higher socio-economic backgrounds. The consequences of the emerging form 
in corporate accounting are similar to those associated with public accounting professions in 
Western capitalist contexts (Jacobs 2003; McPhail et al. 2010), and suggests that accounting in 
developing nations does not contribute to economic growth as hoped for (Poullaos and Uche 
2012). As these challenges to equality are not strictly related to accounting, it is naive to suggest 
                                                          
19Less than 20 employees. 
20
 Addressed more in depth in the next chapter. 
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that addressing them is in the hands of the accounting field. However, increasing awareness 
among regulators, practitioners, and educators is an imperative step to preserving the interests of 
all accountants. 
Practices examined in this paper are conceivably applicable to many other countries in the world 
sharing the colonial encounter, yet each country has its specificity. Such diversity may limit the 
generalizability of the findings. However, the study hopefully draws attention to the need to 
examine organizational forms in corporate accounting, which has received very little scholarly 
attention. Furthermore, most accounting research in general, and particularly what is published in 
English-language journals, has been conducted on accounting in the West where for historic 
reasons different motivations and institutions may exist leaving numerous opportunities for 
future research. 
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Chapter 3: English and Symbolic Power in the Field of 
Accountancy: Case of Jordan 
1. Introduction 
The continued far-reaching spread of the English language in business is making it important to 
examine how it is influencing the field of accountancy. Very little is known about the 
interrelationship between English and accounting as they relate to non-English-speaking 
societies, and any consequences and implications this may have. The lack of research may imply 
an oversimplification of the complexity inherent in the social factors surrounding the use of 
language in non-native contexts. Bourdieu‟s approach to language, as part of his theory of 
practice, demonstrates that language itself is a social institution and a medium of power 
exploited to secure profit of distinction. Consequently, an examination of the use of English 
among accountants can help researchers understand accountants‟ interests and behaviors that 
influence relations in the work place, identity formation, and work opportunities.  
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This study analyzes accountants‟ attitudes and perceptions to understand how English relates to 
the construction of power relations in the work place and what constitutes good accounting 
skills. In this paper, „accountants‟ refers to individuals of all levels and positions working in 
accounting departments and in audit.
21
 Specifically, the paper has two objectives. First, it pays 
attention to how habitus, or disposition, naturalizes events and practices related to English in 
ways that legitimize it to members of the accounting community in Jordan. We explain the 
market related to language determining what is considered legitimate language in society, and 
the space within which language competition operates, and consequently how capital accrues. 
Second, the paper offers rare insights into the linguistic everyday practice in Jordanian 
accounting domains showing how ideas around English are internalized and used in the 
construction of the social structure. The importance of these insights is increasing with the 
spread of English in business and becomes reinforced „in the most apparently insignificant aspect 
of the things, situations, and practices of everyday life‟ (Bourdieu 1991, p. 51). While the 
influence of English on business practices is recent but not novel (see Nickerson 2005), a critical 
in depth examination of the role of English in the structural definition of the field of accounting 
is a new contribution to accounting research.   
Bourdieu‟s approach expands the use of language beyond that of a mechanism of knowledge and 
communication, to one of power. This power is ascribed by the social institutions, or set of 
existing social relations, that endow individuals with status and resources, and would not be 
effective without complicity from those subjected to it. This does not necessarily mean a 
conscious agreement with the values characteristic of the institutions, rather it is a reflection of 
the ideological predisposition (Malsch et al. 2011). How people perceive the social world is a 
combination of associations they observe with their past experiences, and the symbolic struggles. 
Via the power of suggestion, which can amount to „silent violence‟, symbols are an effective tool 
in the formation of habitus, a key element for power to act, or be acted upon. Symbolic power  
„- as a power of constituting through utterances, of making people see and believe, of 
confirming or transforming the visions of the world and thereby, action on the world and 
thus the world itself, an almost magical power which enables one to obtain the 
                                                          
21
 Although we interview three individuals in accounting positions in the government we limit our focus to 
accounting practice in the private sector. The government interviewees are helpful in confirming that accounting 
linguistic practices in the private sector are different from those in the government. 
41 
 
equivalent of what is obtained through force (whether physical or economic), by virtue 
of the specific effect of mobilization – is a power that can be exercised only if it 
recognized, that is, misrecognized as arbitrary‟ (Bourdieu 1991, p. 170). 
What is clear from the above is the complexity involved in understanding the use of language, as 
it is intertwined with the evolvement of social institutions, and the roles of different actors. 
Bourdieu‟s work allows us to unpack the domination of English and show how it manifests in 
everyday social relations in the accounting workplace in Jordan.  
Jordan is a young nation-state in the modern form, and the construction of the Jordanian identity 
is in a state of constant flux (Baylouny 2008; Brand 2010; Massad 2001). The twentieth century 
British colonization, that carved the state from the Ottoman empire, has influenced social 
relations and identities while implanting hierarchical systems modeled after the British in the 
military (Massad 2001), government, and professions. Colonialism brought with it educational 
organizations that promoted English and European-like thought which gradually produced elites 
being placed at the top of professional hierarchies (Chapter 2). As Jordanians from different 
backgrounds formed the country, meanings related to the English language and its legitimacy by 
the dominant power and social and political elites, became part of the collective habitus. As early 
as the forties, during the colonial era and a time when less than 30% of school-aged children 
were enrolled in modern schools and a select few completed secondary education (Ahmad 1987, 
p. 1) English was the medium of instruction at the secondary level of the Arab College (Harrison 
1975, p. 19). 
Following a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the late eighties, a series of 
actions and legislation demonstrate that the Jordanian State was attempting to position itself as 
an international trading partner open to foreign investments (Makableh 2013). As part of this 
positioning the status of English was upgraded by introducing English in the first grade in public 
schools, when previously it had started in fifth grade (Hamdan and Abu-Hatab 2009). Elitist 
private schools however have consistently had stronger curriculums and affiliation with English 
(Chapter 2). Within this institutional environment and inequality in access to English education, 
higher English proficiency constitutes more linguistic capital and English grows in significance 
with social status. English in Jordan thus denotes how far the social vertical distance is between 
speaker and listener. However, because of its relation to past and present Anglo-American 
42 
 
military and political dominance and a perceived need to preserve Arabic given its association 
with Islam and local and transnational Arab identities (Abu-Hamdiah 2005) there can also be 
forms of resistance to this domination (see Fishman 1998) as English, at least outside work can 
be linked to changes in values away from the closely-connected Arabic language and Islam. 
These all are predispositions expected to be taken into the work place contributing to tensions 
around the expanding English and its meanings. However, our initial casual observations of the 
continuing diffusion of English in the field of accounting indicated little tension around English. 
This motivates our research questions of what explains the role of English in accounting? And 
how does this phenomenon take shape? In narrowing the analysis to the field of accountancy, the 
interaction with English may follow, break away from, or modify the theoretical concepts 
identified, however what we observe and show in our analysis is consistent with English in the 
Jordanian accountancy field increasingly becoming one of the characteristics of the division of 
labor.   
As we explore the increased demand for English in accountancy and given the adoption of IFRS 
as part of Jordan‟s economic changes in the nineties, the close relation between the two 
phenomena becomes relevant as other authors have critically examined the social and political 
consequences of harmonization. IFRS, presented as international standards not belonging to 
anyone (Chua and Taylor 2008) are cemented by the English language and English-speaking 
individuals who enable the translation of not just words but the Anglo-American framework and 
way of viewing economic society (Suzuki 2007). Evans (2010) explains that the introduction and 
success of IFRS, with English as its official language, has made English the international lingua 
franca in all related accounting spheres and elevated its position such that professional bodies 
and academics globally attempt to enhance their prestige by incorporating English terminology 
into their accounting discourse, resulting in unconscious adoption of Anglo-American culture. 
Accounting harmonization is also argued to contribute to social inequality as it displaces 
anything but the capitalist system associated with social inequality (Collison et al. 2010).  
In addition to the above, the few studies that explore parallels between language and accounting 
have concentrated on the applied linguistic dimensions of accounting (cf. Belkaoui‟s 1978; 
1984). For example, Belkaoui (1984) builds on linguistic relativity school that emphasizes how 
accounting as a language with its lexical and grammatical characteristics shapes users‟ 
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perceptions (Belkaoui 1978). Belkaoui‟s work, however, was criticized for his understanding of 
the nature of language as merely a set of rules imposed by regulation (Evans 2004). In the area of 
international harmonization of accounting standards and practices, the majority of studies 
examined the interpretation of specific technical accounting terms by speakers of the same 
language (Archer and McLeay 1991; Davidson and Chrisman 1993, 1994). Evans (2004) 
examined the inherit issues in the translation of accounting‟s technical and legal terms from 
English to another language (German). She argued that a lack of appreciation by international 
negotiators and implementers of the problems of translating technical terms to another language 
can hinder the efforts to harmonize accounting globally and that special care should be taken 
when translating accounting terms as there is often no equivalent words and concepts in different 
languages (Evans 2004; Baskerville and Evans 2011). 
In the theoretical perspective of Bourdieu language is perceived as an instrument constructing, 
maintaining and reproducing social categories and realities (Bourdieu 1991; Sliwa 2008; Janks 
2010; Duff 2010; McGoarty 2010). Our paper mainly incorporates Bourdieu‟s (1991) notions of 
field, habitus, linguistic capital, symbolic power, and profit of distinction in examining relations 
within the accountancy field in Jordan. The paper thus contributes to research by extending 
Bourdieu‟s work on language and symbolic power to a post-colonial context. We show how 
audit and IFRS, among other mechanisms, contribute to the internalization of English, the 
language that has been perceived higher in the linguistic hierarchy in Jordan since the British 
colonization (chapter 2). We argue that with this normalization „symbolic violence‟ takes shape 
as English becomes a source of professional distinction and domination reproducing hierarchy in 
the field of accountancy. To our knowledge this is the first paper that analyzes in depth the role 
of language within accountancy and ensuing social structural changes in the field.  
2. Theoretical framework 
A Bourdieu lens 
While some of the terms or concepts mentioned here date back to others preceding Bourdieu, we 
explain them as we understand them intended in his work compiled in Language and Symbolic 
Power, with some reference to other works. Bourdieu views language as a social interaction 
situated in historic and political conditions, not a neutral tool for communication. „Language is a 
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communication mechanism used by the dominant culture to distinguish the dominant class and 
define social hierarchies and legitimizes the distinction of the dominant class by forcing others to 
define themselves by their distance from the dominant class‟ (Bourdieu 1991, p. 167). This 
approach informs an understanding of users‟ motivations and the relevance of linguistic 
competence in a particular social space and time in which an interaction takes place. Linguistic 
field describes the relations between the different social positions occupied by individuals and 
the underlying power governing these relations in the struggle for the distribution of resources, 
or linguistic capital. Bourdieu thus assumes that actors are predisposed to participating in this 
struggle.  
Habitus is the term Bourdieu uses for disposition or orientation towards perceiving things and 
acting in a certain way without conscious coordination. Habitus underlies preferences, and is 
formed gradually as individuals are socialized. While it depends on personal experience, it is also 
a function of the surrounding social conditions and categories. Habitus determines the properties 
of the language and the members of the social group to which the language corresponds. 
Symbols become an effective tool in the formation of habitus via the power of suggestion, a key 
element for power to act, or in the case of the individual to be acted upon. This power can be 
strong to the extent that it amounts to silent violence. 
Actions are formed as habitus interacts with the market, or conditions in the field. The market for 
language determines the legitimate language or standard forms of it, or the demand. As with 
most institutions, legitimate language is the outcome of social struggles in which dominant 
groups prevail. An individual‟s discourse is one style reflecting the individual‟s predisposition 
and their assessment of the linguistic market conditions, and potential reception to forms and 
content of their language, so while not necessarily deliberately individuals calibrate their use 
accordingly, a form of self censorship. Speaking therefore is a reflection of the social structure in 
which the interaction is set and is a reproduction of this structure. It is similar to how one carries 
oneself, eats, and expresses feelings; all relate to the „ethical or aesthetic expression of the 
necessity inscribed in a social condition‟ (Bourdieu 1991, p. 88). In the presence of a legitimate 
form of language prevailing, and competition among the variety of usages, such as dialects, a 
hierarchy of linguistic styles and corresponding social groups develops.  
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Competence in the legitimate form of language constitutes the linguistic capital, which 
determines the strategies individuals use and the symbolic power by which they can manipulate 
social categories or classification, such as forms associated with groups. This is achieved via 
symbols that „make it possible for there to be a consensus on the meaning of the social world, a 
consensus which contributes fundamentally to the reproduction of the social order‟ (Bourdieu 
1991, p. 166). The institutionalization of a group, such as class, assumes the presence of 
classifications producing criteria that act as boundaries defining who fits and who doesn‟t within 
the group. Groups are therefore sites of symbolic power relations to express the legitimate 
categories largely in language. The concept of capital is relevant only when there is unequal 
access to attaining the standard proficiency in the language or dialect, as it is then that 
competition can produce profit of distinction in social interactions, and dominant groups can 
continue to standardize that language.  
The power to construct reality through symbolic power is effective in achieving physical or 
economic goals, but only if „misrecognized‟, meaning the actor and the acted-upon do not want 
to recognize it is being exercised (Bourdieu 1991, p. 170). Thus, beneath actions and choices lies 
the construction of the social world, the internalization of the objective social structures and 
people‟s sense of self and identity formation (Bourdieu 1985). 
In accounting research Bourdieu‟s writings are increasingly used in interpretative and critical 
research to understand social reproduction processes (Malsch et al. 2011). Bourdieu‟s theory of 
practice has helped explain internal and external power relationships in accounting practices (e.g. 
Annisette and Trivedi 2013; Gracia and Oats 2012; Neu et al. 2013), accounting regulation in 
transitional economies (e.g. Ezzamel et al. 2007; Xu and Xu 2008), inclusion and exclusion in 
the accountancy profession (e.g. Jacobs 2003; Ramirez 2001; Suddaby et al. 2007; McPhail et al. 
2010), the role of accounting academia (e.g. Lee 1995; Cooper 2005; Neu et al. 2001; Owen 
2008)  and institutionalization of corporate social responsibility (e.g. Archel et al. 2011). We 
contribute to this literature by investigating an aspect of domination in the accountancy field that 
has yet to be examined. We are concerned with how English in a mainly Arabic-speaking 
country is naturalized in the accounting community, contributing to increased social capital, and 
how this influences the social structure of the field itself.  
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Until recently, there has been almost no critical research addressing the political influences of 
English in business (Nickerson 2005) and accounting literature is no exception. While there has 
been a mention of the role of English in institutionalizing practices of discrimination exercised 
by colonial powers or subsequent elites in power (e.g. Dyball et al. 2007; Ukwatte and Yapa 
2013; Sian 2011) literature examining the contemporary phenomenon of English as Lingua 
Franca in the accounting field is scarce. Suzuki (2007) highlights the inherent problems in 
translating accounting regulations developed in English into Japanese. Suzuki demonstrates the 
power of language as Japan imported accounting regulations in English limiting the ability of the 
Japanese to participate in decision-making in their own country by giving an advantage to native 
English speakers to argue their views. This facilitated the implementation of new US-preferred 
ideas like external audit in the period of the US occupation, and a hasty series of regulations with 
little attention to suitability to the co-operative trusting environment that was in place (Suzuki 
2007). 
Given that language plays a large role in the social construction of groups and practices, we 
analyze accountants‟ discourses to understand the influences more specific to the accountancy 
field drawing attention to reasons why English is spreading in a largely uncontested way among 
Jordanian accountants. In the next section we offer some background information about Jordan 
to help understand the conditions influencing the habitus of Jordanian accountants and what 
contributes to capital and profit of distinction.  
3. Jordan 
Jordan as a nation-station was formed in the early 20
th
 century as part of the British colonial 
strategy in West Asia. It is a relatively poor country with GDP per capita amounting to 
approximately $5000 in 2013, and less than half of that in the years prior to 2005
22
.  Jordan is 
classified by some as a non-oil rentier state (Gandolfo 2007) dependent largely on external 
financial aid (Baylouny 2008). With debt reaching its heights in the late 80‟s Jordan entered into 
a 15-year economic and financial program monitored by the IMF increasing external influence 
on local policy and demands for privatization of assets and open trade and markets (Baylouny 
2008). Since then, and regardless of coupling between discourse and actions, the state narrative 
                                                          
22
 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD 
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and legislation has aimed at presenting Jordan as an international business partner (see Al-Akra 
et al. 2009) paralleling the course of other Arab States (Ameen 2010).  
With global economic integration attempts came the adoption of IFRS, voluntarily first and 
mandatory in 1997 and 2002. The decision to adopt the standards in full with no exception, was 
in response to pressures from the World Bank, IMF, IFAC, international agreements like the 
WTO and EC agreement, and internal pressures from JACPA in which big auditors are active 
(Al-Akra et al. 2009). While applicable at least in Korea (Arnold 2012), UAE (Irvine 2008), 
Egypt (Kholeif 2010), Bangladesh (Mir and Rahaman 2005), Vietnam (Phuong and Richard 
2011), and Fiji (Chand and White 2007) these pressures have especially been linked to colonial 
and neo-colonial influence (Annisette 2000; Bakre 2008; Gallhofer et al. 2011; Kamla 2007). 
IFRS, originally issued in English are gradually translated into different languages including 
Arabic and made available on the IFRS Foundation and the IASB website. The linguistic gap 
given the lag time between English and Arabic versions is filled by big audit firms even as some 
translations are made by local organizations, but these too take time (Abd-Esalam and Weetman 
2003).  
The spoken language in Jordan is typically one of multiple colloquial versions, while the 
standard written is the classical form of Arabic. Code-switching, or inserting English words or 
phrases in speech, is a more common occurrence with socio-economic status and in business. 
While not an official language, research on English in Jordan documents its use in the place of 
work and outside work and its constant growing significance. Findings from an old survey 
conducted in 1972 using over 4000 respondents sheds some light on the status of English in the 
place of work in Jordan  (Harrison et al. 1975). The authors find that 26% of respondents use 
English at least once every day primarily to communicate with colleagues and superiors, and to 
read materials. What we found interesting is that respondents use English more inside the 
organization than with outsiders suggesting that it is motivated by managers and occupations. 
Findings also indicate perceptions of a positive relationship between knowledge of English and 
job success and less reported use of English outside work. Ninety three percent responded that 
English is very important for their children, yet only 7% felt that children will learn effective 
communication in English given the government system. Overall this survey shows that English 
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in Jordan as early as the 70‟s is perceived positively and used inside organizations, yet 
proficiency in it is not equitable. 
Accounting education starting in the 90‟s has been increasingly shifting to English at least years 
after English was the formal language of instruction in engineering, pharmacy, and medicine at 
the two main public universities, similar to other Arab countries (Zughoul 2003). Our classroom 
observations, discussions with students, and interviews with professors reflect that much of the 
instruction is in Arabic while English is used in terminology. In one cost accounting class at the 
University of Jordan the professor lectured in Arabic, in a class intended to be in English, but 
uttered and wrote accounting terms and numbers in English. Students‟ questions and comments 
followed a similar pattern. The assigned text book was in English and examples were read and 
solved in English while speaking mostly in Arabic. In another private university there are two 
undergraduate tracks one in Arabic and another in English, with majority of students choosing 
the first. Public universities are considered to have better quality education than private ones (see 
Burke and Al-Waked 1997). 
Analyzing change in Jordanian educational policies, Hamdan and Abu Hatab (2009) find that the 
status of English is much more than a foreign language and at times equal to that of Arabic. The 
authors further document the growing trend of English in the commercial sector by comparing 
ads published in Arabic newspapers. They find that in nearly 3000 ads, English ads rose from 4% 
in 1985 to 29% in 2005, while ads explicitly requiring proficiency in English grew from 24% to 
46% respectively. The English ads also grew in size and use of elaborate headlines. The authors 
call for research examining how English is in fact used in the fields that require it in their ads and 
the depth of its penetration.  
In the field of accountancy recruiting tests are increasingly conducted in English favoring 
candidates from private schools or those who have studied abroad (Chapter 2), both indicators of 
more linguistic capital. Class discrimination thus parallels that in big audit firms in Western 
countries (Grey 1998; Jacobs 2003). Job titles in English are becoming more prevalent; examples 
are Accounting manager, Internal Control Coordinator, and CFO, as are English names of 
departments and groups. Parker (2005) argues that titles are a form of branding offering an 
identity and differentiation. Thus, for Arab accountants to contribute to accounting discourses, 
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according to the profession‟s expectations and conventions, they often need to do so through 
English. 
4. Methodology 
Concerns with linguistic ideology, linguistic capital, and legitimacy imply a concern to 
investigate experiences and responses of participants in a „particular social position‟ which in 
this study represents accountants in Jordan. The analysis attempts to reflect the „relevance of 
power relations… and [ask] how essential meanings about language are socially produced as 
effective and powerful‟ (McGroarty 2010, p. 8). We conduct, face-to-face, in-depth interviews 
with thirty-three Jordanian accountants focusing on personal experiences and attitudes. Semi-
structured interviews using accountants‟ perspectives are useful and preferred in examining 
identity in the workplace (Warren and Parker 2009).  
The interviews targeted Jordanian accountants working in different settings to elicit information 
on how accountants in Jordan are dealing with change in light of financial global trends, 
harmonization, and technology. To gain a better understanding and capture multiple 
perspectives, interviewees included corporate accountants, auditors, academics, and regulatory 
officials (Appendix A p. 129). Among corporate accountants and auditors we include 
accountants from entry level to executive/partner level in various size companies and industries. 
We sought to understand the interrelationship between accounting education and language by 
interviewing three academics representing public and private universities, and attending two 
classes at one university. The number of male interviewees is larger than female, consistent with 
the make-up of the country‟s accounting student body. However, in non-accounting disciplines 
females make up more than half of the undergraduate population. 
All interviews were arranged by one of the researchers through personal contacts and 
snowballing, except the ones in academia, arranged by cold calling. Interviews conducted were 
in Amman and its outskirts. While this may constitute a limitation Amman is the business center 
where medium to large companies - with accounting departments of at least two or three 
individuals - are located. The emphasis on these companies enables us to examine and conclude 
on the use of English among accountants inside an organization.  Interviewees were assured that 
their names and the names of their organizations would remain confidential. All interviews were 
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intended to be carried out in Arabic, but many of the interviewees resorted to code-switching 
where they inserted English terms and words in their statements. English terms/words used by 
interviewees are identified with double quotes. The interviews lasted between 40-110 minutes 
and were translated to English and transcribed by one of the researchers and the translation was 
compared again to the recording. Both researchers analyzed the interviews for themes and the 
common ones are what appear in this chapter. 
Interviews typically started with the interviewee‟s background and experiences, and open ended 
questions were modified accordingly. For analyzing the data, critical discourse analysis was 
adopted, where analysis emphasizes how choices and experiences of language in accountancy 
are impacted by the „processes and the social conditions‟ in which Jordanian accountants operate 
(Janks, 2010, p. 45). The study realizes that Jordanian accountants‟ interaction with language is 
not divorced from the socio-historical context they live in and meanings and classifications 
produced in the communities they operate in (Bourdieu 1991).  
The researcher conducting the interviews is familiar with the Jordanian setting, having lived and 
worked in Jordan for many years. This was helpful in gaining access to the field, and providing a 
better understanding of interviewees‟ meanings. However, we do acknowledge that this also 
reflects on the lens through which this research is conducted (Oakes et al. 1998) at the same time 
knowledge of the social and business environment within the country is quite relevant to carry 
out qualitative research (Gallhofer et al. 2011). 
5. Analysis 
We extend Bourdieu‟s theoretical explanations on language production in examining the use of 
English in speaking and writing in the accountancy field in an otherwise Arabic language 
context. We first highlight the main features of the linguistic environment in which Jordanian 
accountants operate. Second, we discuss conditions influencing the linguistic market of English 
in Jordan as it relates to the accounting field. Finally, we analyze how accountants interact with 
English in their daily work and the ensuing issues of power and capital.  
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5.1. The linguistic habitus of Jordan:  
In Jordan the linguistic habitus is a structured outcome of classifications produced by family, 
education, religion, and colonialism, as key institutions. This habitus is also structuring in that it 
organizes how people view the relation between Arabic and English and the social positions 
affiliated with the speakers. Arabic, the language of the Quran, is considered to have special ties 
with Islam, and nationalist movements (Hourani 1962). English, on the other hand, came into the 
country with the colonial forces and missionaries and has been expanding since then. English, in 
the capital Amman specifically, is affiliated with more social capital associated with those who 
can afford US, UK, or local expensive schooling (Chapter 2). Linking proficiency of English 
with class categories in Jordanian society becomes obvious with the following comments that 
reflect accountants‟ views of how English distinguishes those that come from West Amman 
where incomes are higher. 
...yes there are many mothers and fathers whose kids speak English in a way as if they 
were born in the United States or the UK even though the parents don't have good 
English skills. This is more the case in West Amman... Maybe I shouldn't speak about 
Jordan; I should just speak about West Amman and the people I know around me. But 
that's what I see, people trying to sound as if they know English and trying to teach their 
kids wrong English. (Sanad) 
At the personal level Arabic is used, and being bilingual depends on the culture and 
setting, it is part of the “image” and you find in general both.  In East Amman 
everybody speaks Arabic, no one uses English, it has to do with the standard of living, 
“lower-class, middle-class, upper-class” and as you go up English plays a larger role in 
the “image”.23 (Fahed) 
Via language individuals construct social processes, so as individuals use English in an Arabic 
speaking country they are modifying the meanings associated with the language (Charles 2007). 
While language is uniting because it enables communication, meanings associated with it can be 
dividing as well. The spread of English is largely associated with social class, age, and 
profession (Fishman 1998) so a shift from Arabic to English among Jordanians is a modification 
of the social identity into one that is perceived as „upper class‟, young, and „professional‟. Owens 
(2001) contends that class-based variations in the Arab world are often denoted in the use of a 
                                                          
23
 Words in double quotes are those spoken in English by the interviewee. 
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„prestige foreign language‟ like English (French in Arab North Africa). The quote reflects that 
the emphasis of the language users is more on the strategy of using English, rather than the skill 
itself. This may be construed as liberty to take license with the language, a form of distinction 
that nevertheless remains restricted by the boundaries of the existing market (Bourdieu 1991).  
A second point is showing off (Fantaza), people who went abroad feel that if they speak 
English they belong to a certain "group" ... Even in Lebanon where French was the 
language of the elite we see it now shifting to English and English is recent to them, but 
everyone who wants to show off uses English. (Khaled) 
And there is a third group of people who just wants to throw a few words of English in 
the conversation, even if they are wrong, just so they come across as if they know 
English but then it becomes clear that they don't... As I mentioned it's the mentality of 
having more respect for those who speak English, “too bad” but these are “facts” and 
there's nothing we can do about it. (Nayef) 
English thus distinguishes those from the city: 
Of course, I am from a rural community in Irbid and my relatives don't speak English at 
all, if for example you are speaking to them and you inadvertently use an English word 
they frown upon this and think that the person is trying to show off. They see it as if the 
person speaking wants them to feel inferior.  (Rania) 
And those who are progressive: 
English is very important so if you don't have good English then it‟s as if there is a 
problem with you… In many aspects in Jordan Arabic is not being used anymore so if 
you do not keep up with that you may be seen as someone who is backwards. (Azza) 
And winners and achievers: 
Looking at the people who graduated with me those who have better English skills had 
better financial and social positions than those who have limited skills. One of my 
friends who graduated with me went to work for a construction company. He was one of 
the top performers at the university level and his English skills are good. He became the 
manager of the accounting department in the construction company, and I am still an 
accountant here… he started his own audit firm and can do business both in English and 
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in Arabic. He was able to do that because he has the good English language skills. 
(Ammar) 
As a country to develop and grow “we have two options” people either make the effort 
to move ahead or not so there are those who “can compete and others who cannot 
compete” … “He who is not going to compete will find himself out”. It is not the 
“system” that is turning him into a “loser”, he is a “loser” because on the other hand 
there are others from the same university who are “willing, able, and deliver”. (Walid) 
In Bourdieu‟s terms this institutionalization of social groups presupposes classifications that 
produce criteria determining the extent of fit within the groups. These criteria can also function 
for other classifications and are at the core of social struggles (Bourdieu 1991).  
The linguistic market:  
The everyday working environment set in the larger social space is the linguistic field of 
Jordanian accountants through which they internalize the conditions that legitimate the use of 
Arabic and English. Market conditions influencing English in accounting have their roots in the 
historical and political environment and contemporary global factors.  
5.2.1. English historically 
According to Bourdieu the sources of symbolic power depend on the properties of the discourse, 
the person producing it and the institutions authorizing this act. A property of contemporary 
Jordanian society and the field of corporate accounting relates to the institution of colonialism 
(chapter 2). English, in the earlier years of the Jordanian state, was spoken by those in power in 
the military and government (Massad 2001); arguably, in the collective Jordanian mind it 
became associated with hierarchy and coercive power. Language has often been perceived as a 
project that divides and defines the colonized as well as creates hierarchies between people and 
nations (Phillipson 1988; Pennycook 2010) distinguishing the elites from everyone else. 
Consequently, as suggested in section 3, individuals define themselves in relation to the 
dominant British culture and language. Thus the power of suggestion affiliated with English is 
involved in the inclusion and exclusion of social groups as part of the Jordanian individual‟s 
habitus (Bourdieu 1991).  
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We focus too much on English in Jordan…The intellectual, cultured, and advanced 
person is the one with good English skills; the person who is well read but in Arabic is 
not seen as cultured, so as you can see it is very important. (Luma) 
Using Bourdieu‟s concepts, the above quote like others before it reflects the ongoing struggle in 
society as well as in the accountancy field over classifications, „struggles over the monopoly of 
the power to make people see and believe to get them to know and recognize, to impose the 
legitimate definition of the divisions of the social world.‟ (Bourdieu 1991, p. 221) 
5.2.2. Global trends 
As mentioned, increasingly since the 90‟s the rhetoric related to foreign investments was on the 
rise. The perceptions expressed by interviewees of English as a condition to attract foreign 
investments and terms like „global‟, „international‟, and „common language‟ shape English as a 
neutralized language belonging to nobody and everybody and increasingly distanced from its 
cultural and imperial roots (Phillipson 2008). In this market the dominance and significance of 
English is „permeated by the simplicity and transparency of common sense, the feeling of 
obviousness and necessity which this world imposes on them‟ (Bourdieu 1991, p. 131). The 
needs of international investors emerge as a driving influence for the use of English among the 
interviewees: 
“We are now issuing two sets [of financial statements] English and Arabic. Arabic for 
the tax and statutory reports and English because if you have a foreign investor who 
wants to invest in the company you have to present financials in English, so I hired 
Deloitte to do the translation… I distribute the English ones [to senior management] I 
don't distribute the Arabic”… Seriously, we started to get more interested potential 
“investors” requesting “financials” and if we only have the Arabic ones that doesn‟t 
work... “Many investors are coming from the Cayman Islands and they all speak 
English, so they need to see numbers in English, that's probably the main reason I 
actually did it”. (Maher) 
It is mainly the presence of foreign investors and communicating with them that creates 
the need. Otherwise people can be trained on what they need to perform their work from 
the beginning. (Sanad). 
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The interviewees define their social order as one in which the investor and market logic 
dominate; thus invoking the „foreign investor‟ in the name of economic reform, is the 
rationalization for a „must‟, or a „need‟. By positioning their field closer to the international trade 
partner Jordanian accountants‟ are aligning themselves with how the State is engaging with the 
global discourse (Bourdieu 1991).  
Although it would seem that English facilitates foreign investment, we argue that the „foreign 
investor‟ Anglo-American discourse standardizes practices in ways similar to how rhetoric 
standardizes accounting regulation, i.e. by garnering support and limiting objection to future 
importing of any form of English-speaking knowledge (Suzuki 2007). „Foreign investor‟ here is 
used in a manner reminiscent of the „client‟ in audit firms (Grey 1998) both serving as pacifying 
rationales to practices that may otherwise raise social contradictions while being reproductive of 
the meanings associated with knowledge.  
English is now the language of “business” and that's where accountants go to work, so 
it is a major requirement. (Nassar) 
Foreign investment rationalization is conceivably how Jordanian accountants manage 
inconsistencies or tensions between English and social and political associations stemming from 
the historic and current conditions in Arab countries. Accountants further expressed how English 
enables them to communicate globally: 
Globalization requires that everything is done in English. (Ammar) 
There is a minimum, we are in 2013 and all countries in the world are open to each 
other and English is the "common language". (Kasim) 
Employers, especially in multinational corporations, require their employees to be fluent in 
English and sometimes even consider fluency in English to be more important than other 
qualifications (Sliwa 2008, p. 236): 
 “Large companies with people in higher positions require them to speak good English 
and to have good command of English language because they will deal with investment 
bankers and auditors from outside the country, so they have to know English.” (Maher)  
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Charles (2007, p. 260) argues that the English language as the dominant language of business 
globally is allowing for power to be „wielded in multinationals‟. In this context, perceptions of 
self and others are created, depending on and informed largely by the level of proficiency in 
English. Indeed, as Khaled explains, using English in communication distinguishes a global or 
regional company from a local one: 
We are a "regional" company not just Jordanian so when we communicate with others 
or send an “e-mail” we cannot use two languages every time so we use English to make 
things easier and it works. (Khaled) 
Changes to economic structures in countries moving towards economic liberalization are 
„reflected and reinforced by the way in which the English language spreads in society, 
contributing to the linguistic capital, earning capacity and position in society‟ 
(Bourdieu, 1991).  
Perceptions of accountants also reflect the changing definitions of a skilled accountant.  
English is a major consideration, in particular in our case because we deal with 
businesses that do not know Arabic and we do not speak their language, for example in 
Iran they don't speak Arabic and we don't speak Farsi so the only common language is 
English.... Our "chart of account" is in English, the "communication" is in English, our 
"policies" are in English, "almost 95%" of our "communication and e-mails" is in 
English. (Khaled) 
In some cases you need English, for example here our “regional office" is connected to 
all our offices worldwide, almost 170 branches… so we need to enable 
"communication", it‟s a must. (Kasim) 
Yet, the following quote suggests that there is more to the investor argument: 
At the [organization] all “the board members” were “Palestinians, Arabs” and “the 
employees” were Arabs… “So I didn't think the English language was really important 
in that job... The only thing is that the DG [director general]… was a graduate of the US 
or maybe Germany and he did everything in English which suited me fine”... but “the 
employees didn't know good English really… they managed, I mean it was difficult, it 
was challenging for them and for us” but “they managed” because we could accomplish 
all the work in Arabic and the director can speak Arabic well, yet he liked to write all 
his “e-mails” in English. (Maher) 
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In the context of globalization, Jordanian accountants need to consider „which languages, whose 
languages, which texts and discourses will be privileged and promoted to forge new critical and 
contingent relationships with globalizing economies and mass cultures‟ (McGroatry 2010, p. 5). 
The above quote shows how, consistent with Harrison et al. (1975), linguistic decisions in 
accountancy are internally employed in the pursuit of the English linguistic capital accumulation 
marginalizing other languages (Phillipson 2008). 
5.2.3. World Bank and company 
Jordan‟s poor economy and increased dependency on Western donor agencies awards 
transnational organizations the „soft power‟ in shaping identities (Suddaby et al 2007). This 
context legitimizes English in written and spoken communication in accounting: 
We receive considerable grants from “USAID” and the “European development Bank”, 
we have “lots of donors” and loans and credit facilities from international 
entities…“they can only do so” if you have “reliable financial reporting standards” that 
would guarantee reliability of the data... There are new “investors” like American 
hedge funds and “pension funds”... At the governmental level there are “IMF, IFC, 
World Bank” and their gang. With the “European Development Bank” there is now a 
“program” involving five countries Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan, so “they 
earmarked considerable amounts of cash” to be invested in these countries... Also the 
“OPIC USAID” has big “projects.” (Nasser) 
An interviewee shares his views on how USAID operates: 
I worked at the USAID … we would give a 10 million JD grant for the “banking sector” 
for “training”, so we give you the grant provided you apply our standards. The ministry 
of planning would just sign. (Imad) 
Another interviewee expresses his views on the involvement of the World Bank in tax policy: 
 The World Bank required that we have two tax brackets only ... They were supposed to 
implement a 35% bracket for public shareholding companies but they were not able to 
do that and decided it would be 20% and 14%  for individuals. Today everyone is 
concerned with this issue because there is a need to have 3-4 tax brackets even though 
the World Banks says two brackets and we cannot make a decision on how to deal with 
this. (Mamdouh) 
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And another interviewee informs on the bank‟s involvement in the accounting profession itself: 
 [JACPA] received a $250,000 grant from World Bank six months ago to develop the 
audit and accounting profession in Jordan. (Hisham) 
A review of The World Bank‟s 2004 Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) 
confirms these perceptions. For example recommendations in the report state, „There is a need to 
repeal the specific provision of the Accountancy Profession Law requiring that the finance 
manager of a public interest entity must be a member of JACPA‟ (p. 3) and „The requirement 
that listed companies should file with the JSC preliminary unaudited financial statements within 
45 days from fiscal year-end, may give rise to significant problems‟ (p. 5). A review of news 
websites, IMF website, and international agreements with Jordan, shows that the IMF has 
influenced growth rates, interest rates, external debt, privatization, pension policies, subsidies on 
goods, tariffs, banking and financial markets, the power sector, and taxes, in addition to social 
policies affecting health and education. 
24
 Regardless of the rationale, the point being illustrated 
is how these organizations become dominant soft actors in the habitus of Jordanian accountants.  
According to one auditor, who has been practicing for over thirty years, work commissioned by 
the World Bank, IMF, USAID, among others, is likely to require financial statements audited by 
one of the known big firms and expected to be in English as interviewees indicated.
25
  
If they want to “audit” how the “donation” is being spent they require one of the “big 
five or big four” audit firms to perform this “audit”… This is applicable to all 
contracts....  The “World bank” selects 4-5 audit firms every year and these are the ones 
authorized to give an opinion. You can always ask the World Bank who their preferred 
auditors are and they give you the information… If a donation is given for the 
development of the public sector one of the stipulations is to have the accounting done 
according to IFRS so if there are European donors they can understand the financial 
statements. (Mamdouh) 
The above reflects the perception of the close link between the World bank, IFRS, and big audit 
firms, which we suggest are linked in the legitimation of English. 
                                                          
24
 http://www.imf.org/external/country/jor/.  Also, „Evalution Report IMF Support to Jordan, 1989-2004‟. Available from 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/2005/jor/eng/pdf/report.pdf . 
25
 Companies, except partnerships, are required to submit audited financial statements in Arabic to the Company Controller, and 
to the Securities Commission as well, if listed, with a copy to the Income Tax department in all cases. In addition banks are 
required to submit Arabic financial statements to the Central Bank, and insurance companies to the Insurance Commission.  
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5.2.4. IFRS and Big Audit 
English speaking nations, in particular the UK and the US have an imminent role in accounting 
standardization (Botzem and Quack 2009). „Accounting regulation is an important arena where 
contested political ideologies are played out‟ and ideologies are reflected in language (Ezzamel 
et al. 2007). The choice of English as the first language of what becomes global standards is a 
significant endorsement for English and its legitimacy leading to its incorporation into 
accounting discourse and the unconscious adoption of Anglo-American culture (Evans 2010).   
The most recent IFRS are now available in English for 2012 but they are not available 
in Arabic yet, why should I have to wait for the translation to come out? … You have to 
be able to keep up. (Kasim) 
In the views of some accountants English, IFRS, and hierarchy are closely intertwined as the 
following quote reflects: 
 Of course the positions of a financial controller and or a CFO require English 
proficiency; it helps them stay abreast of the changes that start in other countries like 
IFRS by using the internet and looking up the original text, because these changes are 
not translated. (Ahmad) 
Becoming major actors in accounting enforcement and subsequent accounting changes in the 
country (Cooper and Robson 2006), big audit firms urged their companies to comply with the 
international accounting standards since the 1980‟s. IFRS together with statutory audit were then 
mandated (Al-Akra et al. 2009). The case of Jordan parallels the case of Egypt where an IMF 
agreement triggers an early adoption of IFRS with lag in the limited access Arabic translations 
and an opportunity for big audit firms to fill the translation gap (Abd-Elsalam and Weetman 
2003). Furthermore, and paralleling practices in Ukraine (McGee and Preobragenskaya 2005) 
IFRS training in Jordan is largely limited to big audit firms who conduct much of their training 
in English. In addition, the audit process itself is involved in the spread of English: 
Arabic is used very rarely, "since you are dealing with big firms they are going to be 
having, let's say customers with a specific criteria, like they are willing to pay a huge 
amount of money for getting the reports and that's the reason for being audited by a Big 
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Four company. Of course they're not going to be using a cheap accounting system, so 
it's gonna be all in English.” (Salim) 
This quote reflects how the big firms‟ practices are gradually devaluating Arabic. While many of 
our interviewees view the world of business as distinct with regards to linguistic practices „The 
elimination of a language from certain domains can threaten social cohesion and the vitality of a 
language‟ (Phillipson 2008 p. 252). In this quote the auditor awards more value to English 
accounting/auditing systems while reproducing its status by speaking mostly in English as 
indicated by the double quotes. Using the English language in multinationals can be viewed 
similar to their investment decisions that create and impose their own nationalist environment 
and views of others linked to imperialism and globalization (Cooper et al. 1998).   Yielding 
extensive power and restructuring the field of accountancy, big auditors even put a premium on 
work in Arabic, in an Arab country: 
They [policies and procedures] cost us more because the “auditors” use “mainly” 
English. So when we discussed “fees” they wanted us to have them in English otherwise 
they pay for translation costs which they pass on to us so our fees are higher. To have 
them in Arabic cost us more than to have them in English. (Fahed) 
For the auditors, English is perceived as a survival mechanism, even as the demand is generated 
by the auditors themselves. Contributing to harmonization of accounting, and in this chapter, to 
the spread of English, multinational auditors “themselves are international organizations which 
invest in the systems of global coordination and control” with continued allegiance to the 
countries they originated from (Cooper et al. 1998, p. 531 - 532).   
The framework is in English now, the references, the “database”, the “network”, it's all 
in English. If you don't have English you “cannot afford” stay in the [audit] “business”. 
(Mamdouh) 
5.2.5. Accounting education 
Among the 30 universities in Jordan most offer accounting programs, and unlike most the 
language of instruction at a few leading universities is English. This parallels the Egyptian 
context where the British colonial powers perceived English as the language of scientific 
advancement and not Arabic (Schaub 2000). English then becomes central to science and to any 
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discipline that wishes to be presented as such in individuals‟ habitus. Following the earlier 
English instruction in life sciences, medicine, and engineering at the University of Jordan the 
accounting discipline increasingly switched to English. English thus becomes „normal‟ in 
accounting education programs together with the knowledge and the differentiation based on the 
language. „The educational system has the major immediate responsibility for differentials in 
access… differentiation follows social class lines‟ (Fairclough 1989, p. 65).  This is reflected in 
the following quote,    
…the two best universities, University of Jordan and Yarmouk University, teach in 
English only. (Adel) 
English among what is perceived as top local schools, and among UK and US graduates 
reinforces its prestige regardless of the institutional decoupling (Meyer and Rowan 1977). In the 
English instruction Arab students can feel challenged and alienated (Phillipson 2001) so 
professors feel obligated to make adjustments.   
Their first year is very difficult, some students come from schools that are strong in 
English but others can barely read and really struggle, so in the classroom the professor 
mixes English with Arabic and they even use two thirds of Arabic and one third of 
English. (Majed)  
These comments are consistent with a cost accounting lecture observation at the University of 
Jordan, mentioned earlier. Despite the partial decoupling and consistent with post-colonial 
societies, Arabic is gradually being displaced as English takes over, at least with business 
terminology, becoming the language identified with knowledge in this specific domain 
(Phillipson 2000).   
5.2 How English is shaping/shaped by accounting work 
Given the above power relations related to influences of globalizing finance, international 
investors, international accounting firms and international accounting standards, this section 
discusses how the spread of English and replacement of Arabic is increasingly a characteristic of 
the Jordanian accountancy field, largely in the service of the division of labor. The symbolic 
power and authority of the English language is shaped and re-enforced by a „combination of a 
62 
 
systematic set of interdependent conditions which constitute social rituals and shape dominant 
discourses‟ (Bourdieu 1991, p 111).  
5.3.1 The symbolic power of English and division of labor 
In this study communication relations (including choice of language) in Jordanian accountancy 
are understood as power relations. Here, the accountancy field is one example of a „microcosm of 
the symbolic struggle between classes‟ where the different groups, represented by management 
and staff are engaged in a „symbolic struggle … one aimed at imposing the definition of the 
social world that is best suited for their interests‟ (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 167). Managers, often 
fluent in English, impose it as they reinforce occupational and social positions and reproduce the 
market for English. In this, they define the accountants‟ social world in terms of their own 
linguistic capital. As shown in chapter 2 much of this linguistic capital is acquired in schools 
related to the colonial history of Jordan. Our analysis reveals the power and struggle that inform 
accounting interaction with English. English is playing a symbolic role rather than a necessary 
tool for communication (McKay, 2010) where Western educated senior level accountants are 
instrumental in providing an environment where English is considered key to accounting tasks: 
Also the executives within the organization make us, or actually they don't make us but 
they themselves are used to English and they don‟t know how to type in Arabic so they 
“e-mail” us using English which means we have to respond in English…They are all 
Jordanians…but they cannot type in Arabic and they are more comfortable with using 
English because they graduated from British or American universities and are used to 
communicating in English, so this makes it essential for us to use English. (Ahmad)  
Symbols like English in this case are an effective tool in the formation of habitus, a key element 
for power to act, or be acted upon (Bourdieu 1991).  In the above quote the interviewee is acted 
upon when he accepts that English can be used by his superiors and justifies their choices of 
language largely because of his habitus. He is predisposed to the idea that English can take 
precedence over Arabic in his workplace given the multiple influences, introduced earlier, that 
have combined to achieve that predispostioin, including the colonial history of Jordan, global 
trends, the role of the transnational institutions, IFRS, and big audit firms, among others. 
Responding to a question on why English is used widely in his company when all the owners are 
Arabs here is the response of the CFO 
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“Why do we use English primarily? …That's a good question, actually I never thought 
of why. I think it's the language of the century or the economy [pause] I‟ve never 
actually [pause] I don‟t [pause] probably because I don't know how to write [type] in 
Arabic and I learned the accounting and finance in English, so that's probably why we 
use it”…But why we use English I don't really have a good answer, it's a good question. 
(Maher) 
At a conceptual level language influences mental categories that are embedded in the specific 
culture (Evans 2004). A decision to seek education in an English speaking country very likely 
reflects an association with better quality education securing better future opportunities. We 
suggest that subsequent exposure and education in an American or English system for a few 
years, likely strengthens the mental association between the subjects of study, knowledge in 
general, English. This then motivates actions such as switching the language of financial 
reporting from Arabic to English in an attempt to signal better quality as done by a number of the 
CFO‟s we interviewed. In addition to those educated abroad one CFO with considerable big 
audit experience following his schooling at University of Jordan, echoes others: 
“Actually I must say that I issued the first set of English financials, we did not have 
English financials”. (Yazan) 
Bourdieu (1991, p. 21) explains that „individuals from upper-class backgrounds are endowed 
with a linguistic habitus which enables them to respond with relative ease to the demands of 
most formal or official occasions. There is a concordance or congruence between their linguistic 
habitus and the demands of formal market. It is this congruence which underlies the confidence 
and fluency with which they speak‟. English-educated managers and employees draw on their 
symbolic power of English to reshape their social world. They are switching their reporting to 
English because they have the support of institutions in Jordan (chapter 2 and section 5.1). With 
this shift to English reporting we view multiple changes taking place. First managers are 
reshaping Jordanian accountancy as one that is closely aligned with the State rhetoric of trade-
openness. Second, accountants are also shaping their own social identity as „progressive 
professionals‟ leading and improving accounting practice and the business environment in 
Jordan. Third, managers are reestablishing hierarchy in their occupation based on English capital 
transforming the social capital accumulated outside accounting to assets in the accounting field 
(Chapter 2). Centrality of English for upper level accounting positions, and therefore, the 
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suitability of those who command English for promotion and higher level jobs thus becomes 
unquestioned: 
A person who is not strong in English cannot make it to the CFO level; I don't think 
there is a CFO who does not have good English skills... Even the finance director has to 
know English, because there is a lot of dealing with people abroad, the person has to at 
least be able to read a letter of credit. Without English a person will not get past "chief 
accountant" … regardless of the accounting technical strength. This is the case 
nowadays, in the past it used to be different, in the 70s and 80s. But English has become 
a must. (Sanad) 
Of course the financial controller or CFO positions require good English skills.  English 
proficiency helps them stay abreast of changes that start in other countries like IFRS 
using the Internet and looking up original text, because these changes are not 
translated. (Ahmad) 
The last interviewee highlights the link perceived between English, IFRS, and managerial 
positions in accounting. Applying Bourdieu‟s concepts, managers are redefining the social order 
of accountants by maintaining English as a criterion for success based on their acquired linguistic 
capital. In strengthening the symbolism of English they are reproducing the taken-for-granted 
beliefs around English, influencing accountants‟ way of thinking and being; or their habitus. The 
social order is redefined „through principles of division which, when they are imposed on a 
whole group, establish meaning and a reality of the unity and the identity of the group‟ 
(Bourdieu, 1991, p. 220). At the same time managers are strengthening their social as well as 
organizational position. This is evidenced by quotes throughout the chapter, regardless of rank, 
age, and proficiency of interviewees.  
English is extremely important in all areas but at the same time there are people who 
are geniuses and excel at what they do but their English skills are not advanced for 
some reason or the other so they lose out. What you need for a good career in Jordan is 
English and “computer” skills regardless of what your major is… I think they should 
focus on it more in the University. At the same time it is holding back people who are 
good at what they do but don't have the required English skills. (Luma) 
The above quoted interviewee is a recent accounting graduate and her evaluation of skills reflects 
her own conditioning. This interviewee, after attending government primary and secondary 
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schools, studied accounting at the University of Jordan where officially the language of 
instruction and many accounting text books are in English. In the interview she had narrated how 
she lost a number of work opportunities largely because of English language screening (Chapter 
2). With less than a year in her first accounting position, her perception is that English is one of 
the two most relevant skills in general. Given the socially taken-for-granted notions surrounding 
English advanced earlier her discourse can be seen as an example of how symbolic violence 
works in the field of accounting. She, as well as other juniors interviewed in the field talk about 
the importance of English skills in a way that restricts their view of their own career possibilities 
in the occupation given their limited proficiency. Examining intra-corporate communication in 
multinational companies Charles (2007) argues that communicating in a non-native language 
disempowers employees while creating power struggles based on linguistic proficiency and 
limiting transfer of knowledge. Not only that, but this interviewee, and others, are contributing to 
their own domination by reproducing the normalization used in facilitating it. Even though there 
is some recognition of this domination, as seen in the last sentence, there is also a resignation to 
it and a perception of this as the natural way and even a call to advance English further in 
university education. The socialization continues as reflected in the quotes of more-experienced 
interviewees who see English as a required credential for development.  
The first thing people look for now is English... You can have a job and stay in it for as 
long as you want but if you want to move ahead you will need English. (Lara) 
When I first started my English skills were weak, I felt I could face a problem if I do not 
learn English and it could be taken against me for not being able to go along with the 
developments happening in the workplace and I would be let go. I felt this was a 
problem but at the same time it motivated me to learn, so I tried to go to English centers 
and also to teach myself by listening to others and I managed. (Ahed) 
Applying an explanation offered by Bourdieu (1991), in the constant struggle between classes, 
symbols - in this case English - are a way for the dominant group to establish social order 
according to its view of the world. As seniors in Jordanian large companies and big audit firms 
are mostly fluent in English and from upper social class they view English as a significant 
component of the social capital and are likely to protect it and accumulate it by improving its 
position in the workplace to the extent it becomes „common sense‟:  
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Because "again" a fundamental aspect of any "high-ranking position" is 
"communication"…. I am not doing “debits” and “credits” now, I am mostly in 
meetings… you need the ability to speak and listen and if the world around you is using 
English and you don't know English then you are lacking the "skills" required for your 
job. (Khalid) 
The function of division played by the English language is concealed in the dominant culture in 
the accounting domain. Distance from this dominant culture defines the person‟s prospects. 
Indeed, it seems that the groups that posses competence in English holding managerial positions, 
realize  that securing and maintain their „profit of distinction‟ requires the „unequal distribution‟ 
of access to English language learning remains.  
For management English is a must but at the lower levels English may sometimes be a 
liability actually rather than an asset and I personally may hire the one with lower level 
of English because if …someone is well educated and presentable as I mentioned earlier 
they may require a career path otherwise they will leave quickly  … At the same time if 
someone has good English skills and very good schooling then I actually would face a 
problem with that person because he will leave unless there's a specific career path 
defined for him.  (Fahed) 
You don't say I won't take an “entry-level” accountant because he doesn't speak 
English, even though English is fundamental but at that level you can forgo that 
requirement and manage, but this person will not move up unless he develops himself (in 
English). (Khaled) 
Other interviewees argued that the majority of the accounting work in Jordan does not require 
good command in English. Despite this, even small companies insist on it, for prestigious 
reasons: 
I do not think that English is required, I have worked for eight years and I have not used 
English. Unless it is a German company for example or an international company, then 
they would need English but the large local company… they may just put in their ad that 
they require English for prestige…They probably have 100-200 English terms that they 
use regularly, that‟s it. (Mohammad) 
Distinction based on the proficiency in English is providing a principle of „logical division‟ 
based of the positive properties that those that have command of the language would have 
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(Bourdieu 1991, p. 131). The symbolic power of English contributes to positioning members of 
the accounting community in superior/subordinate categories and hierarchy. The status‟ 
differentiation between those that are fluent in English and those who are not is becoming 
integral to accountants‟ identities and their appreciation of their abilities and opportunities within 
the accounting occupation. 
5.3.2. E-mail and division of labor  
Seniors‟ actions contribute to redefining the legitimate language and social categories in the field 
of accountancy via their written communication. While meetings and financial statement can be 
in English or Arabic, electronic communication is mainly in English mostly to Arab recipients at 
the risk of reducing work efficiency. : 
English is used almost 90% of the time in emails. We may speak in Arabic, but work 
requests are made in English.  For example, when my manager calls me we speak in 
Arabic but then I am surprised because the e-mail is in English and I have to respond in 
English, so I do that. (Ahed) 
Communication via e-mail is mainly in English… The "financial manager" usually 
emails me in English, as he has good command of English… Now if he calls me on my 
“mobile” he speaks in Arabic, and our meetings are in Arabic , but when he sends me 
an e-mail it's in English, I don‟t know why!. (Kasim) 
The written word enjoys more prestige than the spoken one as societies increasingly value 
literacy (Fairclough 1989). However, while it can be seen as a strategic decision to use English in 
emails in an Arabic context it is at least initially, less deliberate than that, even though it is no 
less discriminating. Managers at least in their 50‟s likely learned to type when keyboards on 
personal computers were in Jordan limited to English. However what many, according to the 
interviews, have not done, is learn typing in Arabic when shortly after English/Arabic keyboards 
became available. The decision not to learn typing in Arabic is reproductive of the dominance of 
English, supported by the institutional environment in which linguistic capital is aided by the 
uncontested technology in the form of English keyboards. English emails, particularly with 
subordinates, are a manifestation of the power to communicate a joint message of social as well 
as organizational distinction (Oakes et al. 1998). Using discourse in analyzing identity (De Fina 
2006) we suggest that the symbolic linguistic choice in the emails can be interpreted as 
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constructing an identity that is associated with powerful technologically advanced English 
speaking societies. In accounting like elsewhere in the organization, the tone is set at the top: 
I haven't seen an e-mail [from the owners] in Arabic so far. (Maher) 
English is maintained and enforced through a belief in the authority of people, groups, 
institutions, and nations who are best able to communicate in English , or in other words 
„entrusted with delegated authority‟ (Bourdieu 1991, p. 109), an authority that comes from 
outside the language. Language and the way it is spoken is „no more than a testimony‟ to the 
power held by the person, the group or a nation (Bourdieu 1991, p. 107). As mentioned the 
predisposition of the Jordanian accountant is shaped by the dominance of World Bank, IMF, 
international accounting harmonization, big auditors, not barring the history of British 
colonization, and the Western current military presence in the area. English in this context is 
indicative of the symbolic of the power of its users.  
“The problem I have” is that I write an “e-mail” in English and it goes to someone who 
reads it but does “something totally different from what I wrote”… “They don‟t know 
English to interpret what‟s needed”…this happens frequently … “so I repeat the whole 
thing in Arabic anyway…verbally” (Maher)  
This quote is indicative of the English language as a site of social struggle for social categories 
present in all discourse, and how the individuals who exercise power through English defend 
their position against threat (Fairclough 1989). Even though the situation mentioned is frequent 
the CFO using English is not relenting even at the risk of more effort and time. Alvesson and 
Willmott (2002, p. 13) explain that developing social categories in organizations to which 
individuals belong is a „powerful way of regulating identity‟ and the view of the social world 
with distinctions and boundaries.  
5.3.3. Software normalization 
 Linguistic practices are subject to legitimating practices, i.e. the practices of those who are 
dominant and by „market conditions‟ that impact the provision and demand for linguistic capital 
(Bourdieu 1991, p. 53). In this context, interviewees explained that the demand for the English 
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language is increasingly impacting their everyday practices often related to accounting software 
to an extent that sometimes sounds chaotic: 
The “vendors” in our system are in Arabic but the “customers” are in English and the 
“general accounts” are in English. The ACCPAC system has dual language and you 
can enter data in Arabic or in English, you do what makes sense, if the invoice is in 
Arabic then we do the voucher in Arabic and if it's in English we use English... we may 
enter the description in Arabic for clarity. However, the amounts are in English... Most 
account statements will be in English so for example the vendor name and invoice 
number will be in English, but let's say we are reversing a Journal entry then we might 
enter it in Arabic. And let's say we buy an asset such as a TV or a “laptop” then most 
likely we will record that in Arabic but sometimes in English. So the statements will 
show each “amount” and the “description” next to it either in Arabic or in English. 
(Luma) 
The “audit software” is in English...so are the “working papers”…so, sometimes it‟s 
hard to translate the “descriptions”. (Kasim) 
Arabic accounting software is available on the Jordanian market and some of ERP systems are 
translatable to Arabic, yet English accounting software appears to be the choice among an 
increasing number of companies. Decisions on what software to use are typically made by heads 
of accounting departments and the senior management team to whom an English medium of 
work gives an advantage and a distinction. The English software contributes to the reproduction 
of the social order while having the power to construct a reality in which English prevails in 
accounting (Bourdieu 1991). This reproduction of the role of English and linguistic hierarchy 
(Errington 2001) is one aspect of colonization that continues to play a role in the accountancy 
field: 
I worked at (an international company) for nearly two years and it was all in Arabic... 
As I was leaving the company they were implementing a new (accounting software) 
“system” and changed everything to English. (Lara) 
In "local” companies most of the "communication" and "reporting" is in Arabic, but the 
new [English] "software" has prompted the use of English. (Kasim) 
Before ACCPAC [the company] used another program called Ingus which was an 
English program originally, but we used it in Arabic so the journal entries were entered 
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in Arabic using Arabic letters and Arabic words for account names such as purchases 
and payables, and the “trial balance” printout was in Arabic.. Then we switched to 
ACCPAC… For “vendors” outside the country, we used English so that their account 
statements were in English completely, but for “local” vendors we used Arabic... we still 
use ACCPAC but now we use English 100%. All the reports submitted to the 
administration are now in English while previously they were in English and in Arabic... 
Management requests everything in English and we respond in English. (Ahed) 
Discourses on the demands of globalization, technology, international firms and global finance 
for the English language, are implying personal and professional qualities and values in the 
workplace and outside it (Alvesson and Willmott 2002) and promoting a distinct set of rules. By 
learning and acting upon such „rules‟, a collective sense of identity and purpose may be forged‟ 
(Alvesson and Willmott 2002). 
5.3.4. Misrecognizing power  
According to Bourdieu (1991) symbolic power, is a power of constructing reality. One element 
of it is that both those exercising it and those being subjected to it do not want to be aware that 
this power is being exercised. The following quote and others in this chapter exemplify this as 
English is removed from any context of power even in the preceding and following parts of the 
interview:  
It makes things easier because everyone now speaks the same language. Actually it is 
better if everyone uses the same language. (Fahed) 
But how common is English among all accountants in Jordan? Does everyone have equal access 
to it? Changes in work vocabulary and terms within the same language is challenging enough 
(Oakes 1998) let alone switching from one language to another. Yet among the interviewees 
there is little acknowledgement of that. Even those disadvantaged showed little reservation about 
the spread of English in accounting, while many expressed reservations related to its use outside 
work. Given the institutional environment English appears to have legitimacy in the accountancy 
field even beyond that enjoyed in broader society. Ameen (2010) contends that globalization is 
viewed as deterministic, as is the case in the above two quotes, only when perceived as neutral 
and not as the globalization of a specific culture, namely the Western one. Again, this perceived 
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neutrality of English in accounting is likely how many Arab accountants distinguish between 
English in their world of business and the non-neutral English outside the place of work.   
Take a look at this binder here, you will find that part of it is in Arabic and part in 
English.  The applications for funding are all in Arabic, while the "presentation" of the 
results of operations is in English. There is not a single foreign employee in the 
bank…the person who did it, did it in English and no one said let‟s do it in Arabic. The 
person who did it expected that everyone understands English and no one protested. 
(Khaled) 
The quote is a good example of how the authority awarded to some by the social institutions is 
reinforced by the „misrecognition‟ and collaboration of those governed by this situation 
(Bourdieu 1991). This lack of objection is either because others are equally fluent in English 
which reinforces their own authority, or if not then they are likely reluctant to reveal their 
disadvantage which threatens their work and social status in an environment where less English 
proficiency is synonymous with lower level accountants.  
Another senior interviewee at a bank, where the central bank limits the use of English, 
demonstrates the struggle and negotiation for linguistic capital in the field to secure more capital 
at the individual level, and the soft imposition of English even as the official requirements are in 
Arabic. 
Internal policies have to be in Arabic, even if they were originally done in English there 
needs to be a “copy” in Arabic to meet central bank requirements. For example, at some 
point we developed an “investment policy”, it was a “sophisticated investment policy” 
done by someone working for us who had spent many years in foreign “investment 
banks”, “so it was easier” for him to do it in English…. When the Central Bank audited 
the policy they noted that it should be done in Arabic so we translated it to Arabic. The 
official documents in the bank, the reports to the board of directors are all in Arabic 
anyway... However, internally between me and the bank‟s general manager or the board 
members who may have requests, that‟s a different story. For example if we need to do a 
research “paper” for anything I can do it either in English or in Arabic, yet official 
government documents have to be in Arabic… But to restrict internal communication to 
Arabic! It is “good” to preserve the Arabic language but this is unnecessary 
complication. (Nasser) 
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This quote is another good example of the misrecognition of the power of English. Drawing on 
Bourdieu (1991) we suggest that the authors of the investment policy and the presentation in the 
two above quotes assess the linguistic situation, and decide that the institutional environment 
authorizes them to use English so they take liberty with the language choice revealing their 
Western educational background and securing more capital. The above two quotes combined are 
also examples of how habitus is „structuring‟, in its positioning of English as a preferred medium 
of communication, and a „structured structure‟ in that the role of English in the Jordanian 
accountancy field is internalized as others read the policy in English and participate in its silent 
endorsement by not giving the linguistic medium attention, or in other words „misrecognizing‟ 
the power of English.  
While, „natural‟ and „inevitable‟ the demand for the English language for those that do not have 
a high level of English proficiency is causing a sense of „shame‟ and „intimidation‟: 
Here‟s a “story” there was a problem with an “account” and they were communicating 
with my predecessor and sent him “emails” in English. When I joined, the problem had 
been going on for three years and no one was able to communicate with anyone because 
they sent him “emails” in English and he didn‟t understand English and would set the 
“emails” aside. (Imad) 
In the context of applying for a job in an international accounting firm: 
Perhaps I am intimidated a bit because they all speak English and I wonder how I can 
manage. But maybe I would apply nevertheless to find out what my opportunities are.  
(Ahed) 
[Work] is all about talking to people, having conversations, and not shying away from 
speaking [in English] for fear of being made fun of. This is something that holds us 
back, pronouncing a word and having someone make fun of you, so I prefer not to even 
say anything. (Sanad) 
As Charles (2007, p. 274) explains „Language is a very personal thing. If people, on a daily 
basis, face situations where they feel deprived of their ability to communicate and express 
themselves adequately, there is… a sense of frustration, and a struggle to maintain dignity‟. This 
feeling intensifies when individuals are not able to communicate in the place of work (Charles 
2007). On the other hand, the use of the local language is found to foster school success, 
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participation in local government, informed citizenship and knowledge of one‟s culture, history, 
and faith (Fishman 1998). 
In non-quoted parts interviewees show a general tendency to resist cultural imperialism 
influencing their values and beliefs, yet in relation to English language in their accounting 
domain the spread is left unchallenged, indeed largely welcomed. There appears to be little 
problematization of the way this is reproducing social inequalities along the linguistic divide and 
most do not, at least explicitly, challenge it. It appears that many see they have to accommodate 
English regardless. 
Nowadays if you use the “Internet” you need to know English, if you want to send a 
“message” you need to know English, the world around is requiring us to know English, 
it's not a choice. (Khaled) 
At the beginning there was no Arabic operating system so we got used to the English 
terminology. (Sanad) 
One way in which Jordanian accountants misrecognize the symbolic power of English and 
contribute to it is by perceiving the lack of English skills a deficiency. With such power of 
English in the accounting profession, it resembles the way that Phillipson (2008) refers to it as 
lingua divina. Interviewees, with limited English skills discussed their efforts to overcome what 
they perceive as a problem: 
At the beginning of my career, I took a class at the British Council...for 2- 3 months. 
(Sanad) 
I took classes at the “British” Council for a year and then took classes at another centre 
in order to improve my English skills because that is a market requirement. If I … apply 
somewhere else, I am hundred percent confident that they will ask me about my English 
skills. (Ahed) 
I studied English at the British Council a long time ago and I continued to a “level” 
where I felt I was not getting additional benefit. (Kasim) 
Jordanian accountants here act on the belief that if they invest in English learning, they will 
increase their cultural as well economic capital as they invest in their changing social identity 
(McKay 2010, p. 96; Pierce 1995). Yet, these discourses and perceptions, for Phillipson (2000), 
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act in the economic and political interests of the UK and US. The British Council in Jordan 
arrived with the British presence and continues to be quite active today in promoting British 
interests. Phillipson (2000) shows that one explicit goal of the center in 1940 was to foster „a 
sympathetic appreciation of British foreign policy, whatever for the moment that policy may be 
and from whatever political conviction it may spring‟ (Phillipson 2000, p. 139). More recently 
the center in Jordan aims for the creation of “long-term relationships that provide cultural, 
diplomatic and economic benefit for the UK… We place the UK at the heart of everything we 
do. We are working for the UK where it matters”.26 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
This study shows that the use of English in a non-English speaking society is „a delicate and 
complex issue requiring more management attention than frequently given‟ (Charles 2007, p. 
261). Our arguments may be summed up in two points. First, English in the accounting domain 
in Jordan is being naturalized becoming a category in the social order organizing relations in the 
field (McGroatry 2010). That rewards will accrue to those with knowledge of English, 
contributes to the spreading perception that English is a significant part of „knowledge‟. Second, 
congruence between seniors’ linguistic proficiency and the institutionalization of English 
enhances their capital and opportunities of more desirable jobs while inequality in the field 
increases as individuals with little English proficiency are restricted to the lower jobs. Keeping 
things in context however, the authority of those proficient in English comes from the 
institutions conferring on them the right to use the language. „What creates the power of words 
and slogans, a power capable of maintaining or subverting the social order, is the belief in the 
legitimacy of words and of those who utter them. And words alone cannot create this belief‟ 
(Bourdieu 1991, p. 170).  
Thus the increased institutionalization of global trends impacts not only work opportunities of 
foreign labor (Annisette and Trivedi 2013) but local labor as well. Arguing that inequality is 
increasingly becoming characteristic of the accountancy field, and likely other occupational 
fields, may imply threats to the social well being of the country especially as professional 
identities and „citizen‟ become more intertwined in contemporary societies (Annisette and 
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From http://www.britishcouncil.org/jordan-about-us-who-we-are-2.htm   (accessed on July 21, 2013) 
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Trivedi 2013). The analysis of Suzuki (2007) supports the idea that the institutionalization of 
foreign language limits the participation of individuals in the decision making.  
From the interviews, it seems that some interviewees perceive the English language to represent 
the „ultimate qualification for leadership‟ and progress in the accounting domain. Proficiency in 
English is not only seen as bringing about „wealth and prestige‟ but also „new levels of mental 
capacity‟ (Phillipson 2008, p. 263). Thus, it is clear that the English language accompanied with 
assumptions about level of education and prestige, is undergoing normalization, in the sense that 
western accounting standards, education, software are now perceived to be the normal methods, 
ways of thinking and acting (McGroatry 2010, p. 4).  
The accounting education and training system also seems to establish English as the „legitimate 
language‟, this is often resulting in students from subordinate classes either not having access to 
learning the „legitimate language‟ or being challenged at the university level to learn accounting 
in English. As advanced, in Jordan language education policies favor increased incorporation of 
English yet a holistic view with attention to developing Arabic, and respect for the basic rights to 
equal access to English appear to be missing. English remains a dividing factor along Jordanian 
class lines, and as we show the accountancy field is contributing to it. Discourses and arguments 
portrayed by interviewees in this study seem to reinforce the status of English in the sphere of 
accounting institutionalizing inequality and reshaping identities.  
It is evident from the study that in the accounting profession those who have access to better 
English skills are more advantaged. By accepting that the English language is the main 
instrument of knowledge and communication in their field accountants are making it possible to 
reproduce a social order dominated by the English language and its ideology (Bourdieu 1991).  It 
is in a sense shaping the identity of Jordanian accountants and constructing the definition of what 
constitutes a successful accountant. Its overall acceptance by members of the accounting 
community in Jordan is providing an authoritative definition of what an accountant is and what 
an accountant must be (Bourdieu 1991). The „sense of limits‟ linked to English allows some 
Jordanian accountants to gain rank and distinction in the profession and „others to know their 
place and be happy with what they are, to be what they have to be, thus depriving them of the 
very sense of deprivation‟. Proficiency in English is allowing those that possess it a „sign of 
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distinction‟ dividing accountants in Jordan and convincing those in managerial levels that their 
distinction and authority is justified (Bourdieu 1991, p. 123).  
There appears to be little questioning of the „arbitrariness‟ of the foundation of this status of 
English in accounting practice. The „reappropriation of the social identity‟ of Jordanian 
accountants is making it less likely to bring change to class and exclusion issues. This is because 
the majority of accountants „accept the dominant taxonomies‟ related to the limit that the English 
language imposes on their access and progress. As the disadvantaged group within the profession 
are „dispossessed of the economic and cultural conditions necessary for their awareness of the 
fact that they are dispossessed and enclosed within the limits of the knowledge authorized by 
their instruments of knowledge‟ (Bourdieu 1991, p. 131). Our analysis brings to the fore these 
power relations in the accountancy field, specifically as they relate to English and suggests that 
the current communication and linguistic patterns among accountants will unlikely enhance 
accounting knowledge or practice. Our critique of the practices that undermine some individuals‟ 
opportunities is in the spirit of Bourdieu‟s work and aims at „exposing the fictions of the present‟ 
in the interest of opening new possibilities for change (Malsch et al. 2011).    
Power also involves shaping values (Oakes et al. 1998),  yet a limitation of our work is that it 
touched little on the subject of how the use of language, words, presenting the self or the work in 
a language different from the mother tongue, can change the values closely associated with the 
mother language. We mostly addressed the process of using English rather than the content. This 
can be the subject of future research. Another interesting area of research is the use of code-
switching which is extensive in our data. It would be interesting to isolate the contexts in which 
the phenomenon is used and understand the underlying motivations for it.  
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Chapter 4: Colonialism, Institutions, and Accounting Quality 
Around the World 
1. Introduction 
Extant prior research provides evidence of international differences in accounting quality (Ball et 
al. 2000, 2003), which have persisted despite significant regulatory efforts towards accounting 
harmonization (Nobes 2013). This prior literature recognizes the role of institutions in shaping 
economic incentives, resource allocation decisions, and ultimately, accounting practice.
27
 
Primary institutions explaining the aforementioned international differences are enforcement of 
legal rights, rule of law, and property rights protection (Leuz et al. 2003; Daske et al. 2008). 
Because institutions are likely to be endogenous as they serve society‟s key economic and 
political actors, studies use the origin of the legal system to proxy for differences in institutions 
affecting investors given its distance in time (La Porta et al. 1998, 1999, 2006). Against this 
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By institutions we mean, the rules organizing and governing social interaction. 
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backdrop, the seminal work of Leuz et al. (2003) (hereafter LNW), shows that differences in 
accounting quality across countries are associated with differences in the regulatory 
environment, as proxied by differences between law traditions, and fundamentally, in investor 
rights protection, and law enforcement. Subsequently, a large literature analyzing international 
differences in accounting quality uses these institutional proxies even though they may not be 
informative in all samples.  
In this chapter, we argue that these institutional classifications should be revisited as their 
categories are mostly relevant to larger economies in which stronger capital markets determine 
the use of accounting information and managerial incentives, and not always useful in explaining 
differences across countries. Furthermore, albeit seldom acknowledged in the accounting 
literature, commonalities among legal systems are largely due to European colonial influence, 
with the wide-spread of the Napoleonic code and the English common-law as main examples 
(e.g., Evans 2004; La Porta et al. 1998; Djankov et al. 2008).
28
 For example, the widely used 
classification that splits the world into civil-law and common-law places the UK, US, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand, in the latter category that is typically associated with large 
importance of capital markets and property protection (LNW; Burgstahler et al. 2006; Francis 
and Wang 2008). This strict application also fails to account for the hybrid legal systems in many 
countries, resulting from the interaction of the imported with the existing rules such as local 
customary and religious laws influential in Malaysia, Bangladesh, South Korea, Philippines, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Cyprus, Norway, and most of Africa including Egypt and South Africa 
(e.g. Barth et al. 2012). Similar to law systems, the economic and political ideas sweeping 
Europe with the Enlightenment and industrial revolution made their way to countries outside 
Europe with the colonial settlers, as is the case with the concept of true and fair value that started 
in the UK (Evans 2004). Examining the influence of the colonial experience may thus provide 
better explanations for differences and similarities in institutional environments beyond the legal 
environment, and may impact accounting quality. 
The literature exploring economic development across nations argues that colonial heritage is a 
critical juncture in the history of institutions influence their trajectory, and is therefore key in 
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Modern European colonialism, is the operational system put in place between the 16th and 20th centuries to serve the outward 
domination of European interests. 
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explaining differences in economic outcomes, such as GDP growth and income inequality. In a 
series of papers illustrating how colonialism explains cross-country variation in economic 
development, Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Acemoglu et al. (2002) conclude that colonialism 
impacts institutions negatively in extractive societies, and positively in settler ones. In the former 
type, colonizers mostly extracted human labor and natural resources, and set up or transformed, 
institutions that were of benefit to themselves and the local elites who administered on their 
behalf. The presence of strong property rights would have restricted their endeavors, of which 
the colonization of India, Nigeria, Algeria, Congo, and large parts of South America are good 
examples. In settler colonies, on the other hand, Europeans established economic and political 
institutions modeled after the framework of the metropolis. These institutions secured their land 
acquisition and privileges, and produced governments that continued to promote and defend 
private property rights, as was the case with the British colonization of the US, Australia, and 
Canada.  
We examine if colonialism proxies for institutions that influence financial reporting and how. In 
our analysis, we expand the LNW sample by an additional 17 post-colonial countries and 
examine the relationship between colonialism and earnings quality, as measured by aggregate 
earnings management. We provide evidence that the institutional factors considered in prior 
research fail to explain differences in earnings quality in post-colonial countries. Based on the 
evidence indicating a positive correlation between colonialism and earnings management, we 
explore whether settlement (among other) patterns can explain cross-sectional country 
differences in financial reporting quality. We find that countries that were extractive colonies 
primarily exploited for labor and resources, exhibit higher levels of earnings management, while 
countries in which Europeans settled in larger number and established institutions consistent with 
modern economic development exhibit lower levels of earnings management. We also examine 
the possibility that what we observe is the effect of changes in institutions over time but we find 
no such effect.  
Our work contributes to research in three ways. First, we provide evidence on the need to 
reexamine the widely used institutional categories in the international accounting literature by 
showing that the colonial experience is relevant to a large subset of countries. The absence of 
this classification may bias the data in favor of larger developed countries. Second, we provide a 
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better set of explanations for the variation in accounting quality in those countries impacted by 
modern European colonization. This chapter shows for the first time that the colonial experience 
influences institutions driving accounting quality in post-colonial settings. Based on this, future 
cross-country research on accounting outcomes can include measures of colonial influence to 
explain institutional differences. Finally, the colonial measures provided can be used as 
instruments to minimize the endogeniety of institutional proxies arising from the likelihood of 
proxies for both institutions and accounting quality being commonly predetermined. The widely 
used law system has been implanted in colonized countries with other institutions, however prior 
literature has deemed it the closest thing to an exogenous variable because of its distant past (La 
Porta et al. 1998; LNW). Instrumenting institutions with one or more proxies for colonialism can 
address this identification problem as colonialism can explain the institutional environment and 
clearly pre-dates modern institutions. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follow. Section two analyzes the prior literature on 
institutions and earnings quality while section three discusses the prior literature looking at the 
association between colonialism and institutions. We combine the literatures in sections two and 
three to form our predictions. Section four describes the research design, while section five 
presents our empirical results. Section six concludes with a summary and implications for 
research.  
2. Institutions and accounting quality 
There is compelling evidence that institutional quality variation across countries matters for the 
scope and quality of financial reporting, as it directly or indirectly bears influence on the 
incentives of preparers. Institutions as defined by Hodgson (2009) are „systems of established 
and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions‟, in other words they influence 
thoughts and actions, and have multiple dimensions, some of which relate to the political and 
economic power in society, presence of elites, education, language, civil society, law, and firms. 
To account for institutional variation among countries, much of the international research on 
accounting quality determinants incorporates the two division civil and common-law from La 
Porta et al. (1997, 1998). This research analyzes earnings management variations (Burgstahler et 
al. 2006), financial reporting comparability (Barth et al.2012); earnings quality (Francis and 
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Wang 2008) and persistence of earnings (Atwood et al. 2011).  Other studies use the four-
division law system in analyzing different types of earnings management (LNW; Li et al. 2011), 
financial reporting transparency (Bushman and Piotroski 2004), and conservatism (Ball et al. 
2008). The last group of studies split countries according to their English, French, German, and 
Scandinavian origins. The argument put forth by this international accounting research builds on 
Ball et al. (2000, 2003) where accounting quality is largely attributed to firms‟ reporting 
incentives reflecting the politicization of accounting. This politicization is characterized in civil-
law countries by the larger role of the government versus the private sector or professional 
bodies in the standard setting, enforcement, and accounting practices, but in common-law 
countries markets demand higher quality financial reporting. However, Lindahl and Schadéwitz 
(2013) criticize this argument pointing that political groups influence accounting standards 
regardless of law tradition. The authors contend that even in common-law U.S. „the 
government‟s influence is more than „relatively small‟ when the FASB cannot impose any 
standards without approval of the SEC‟.  
Other accounting quality researchers attribute their findings to the legal origin of the country 
without it being part of the identification strategy; typically in fewer-country samples. For 
example García Lara et al. (2005) find that conservatism is less in Germany and France than in 
the UK, after controlling for downward earnings management. The authors ascribe their findings 
to the different legal systems which they argue proxies for a country‟s capital market structure, 
investor protection, and ownership structure that in turn influence managers‟ reporting decisions. 
Similarly, Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) attribute their findings that accounting quality post-IFRS 
declined in France but remained the same in the UK and Australia, to differences in the legal 
tradition. Jeanjean and Stolowy only offer a very brief statement on the importance of equity 
markets to clarify why the legal system in their sample may explain the differences in earnings 
management. 
The legal research of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000, 2006) and Djankov et al. (2008) argues 
that much of the institutional differences between countries, and particularly the protection of 
investors, emanates from their legal origin, distinguishing between the English common-law, 
which relies largely on precedents in deriving rules, and civil-law on the other hand with its 
French, German, and Scandinavian groups which relies on codes and statutes. La Porta et al. 
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(1997, 1998) argue that common-law countries provide the most protection to shareholders, and 
French civil-law countries provide the least, while law enforcement is highest in German-law 
and Scandinavian-law countries. Countries with more shareholder rights are those with 1) option 
to mail proxy votes, 2) no requirement to deposit shares prior to meetings, 3) cumulative voting 
or minority board representation, 4) minority judicial rights, 5) minority preemptive rights, and 
6) procedures for calling extraordinary shareholders‟ meeting. Creditor rights in the same 
research are measured focusing on reorganizations with 1) lack of procedures for automatic stay 
on loan collateral, 2) prioritizing secured creditors, 3) restrictions on management for 
reorganizations, and 4) the right to dismiss management. The authors also add to their indexes 
the accounting measure developed by Center for Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR) as 
one indicator of investor protection. In these earlier papers, commonly cited in the accounting 
literature, La Porta et al. include investor protection rules from securities laws, and only consider 
company and bankruptcy laws. In a later stage (La Porta 2006) the authors incorporate securities 
laws, another source of investor protection rules that is missing from their earlier measures. 
Quality of law enforcement in (La Porta et al. 1998) and the authors‟ future work is measured 
using indexes from multiple sources related to 1) efficiency of judicial system 2) rule of law 3) 
corruption 4) risk of expropriation 5) risk of contract repudiation.  
In the accounting quality literature LNW was one of the earlier papers to use the measures 
developed by La Porta et al.  (1997, 1998). LNW conclude that earnings management is lower in 
countries with stronger investor protection, and law enforcement, proxied by anti-director rights 
and three rule-of-law indices, respectively (La Porta et al. 1998). Better institutions for LNW are 
larger and deeper capital markets, less ownership concentration, stronger anti-director rights, 
more disclosure, efficient judicial system, stronger rule of law, and less corruption. Their idea of 
better institutions is what is determining the measures being used or the other way around. They 
explain their results based on the premise that in low investor protection and law enforcement 
countries, managers are less likely to be able to hide any benefits they may extract from the firm 
by masking the firms‟ financial performance. Using similar proxies, Lang et al. (2006) compares 
earnings management in reconciled accounts from non-US countries with US firms and finds 
that firms from lower-rated investor protection countries exhibit more earnings management. 
Burgstahler et al. (2006) confirm LNW‟s finding, in public but not private firms, arguing that 
capital markets improve the informativeness of earnings. It is worth noting however, that the 
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anti-director rights index used in these studies and others has been criticized because of its ad 
hoc nature, coding mistakes, and ambiguity in the definitions of some components (Djankov et 
al. 2008).  
What is not clear in the accounting literature is the theoretical considerations behind 
incorporating or excluding indices. For example, the investor rights indices in (La Porta et al. 
1998) include measures for creditor rights as well as shareholder rights, however LNW construct 
their „outside investor rights‟ measure using only the shareholder rights index, as do other papers 
(e.g.  Chaney et al. 2011; Wysocki 2004) possibly biasing results in favor of countries with large 
equity markets. Equity markets do not hold the same level of importance across countries as the 
LNW study itself reflects, as such it can be expected that shareholder rights are a good 
explanation for earnings quality only in countries where equity markets hold more economic 
importance. LNW also construct the law enforcement variable as the country average of three 
out of the five measures, legal system efficiency, tradition of law and order, and level of 
corruption and exclude expropriation or outright confiscation, and repudiation of contracts by 
government even though according to La Porta (1998) these two measures combine with the 
corruption measure to determine the overall level of corruption in the country and the 
government‟s facilitation of business. In both cases LNW do not clarify the basis for the 
selection or exclusion. Defond and Hung (2004), Brown et al. (2014), Li et al. (2011), Wysocki 
(2004) are among the authors who follow LNW with their selection of law enforcement proxies, 
and none of them explain why they exclude two of the five variables.  
In the context of international accounting research, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) have been 
criticized by Lindahl and Schadéwitz (2013) on at least the following bases. First, „force-fitting‟ 
is needed to group countries in the historic categories, as for example the case of categorizing 
Japan as a German-law country, while Belgium and France (classified as civil-law countries), 
use case law for their shareholder protection rules. Second, the classification ignores large 
differences that may exist between countries within the same law family. Third, the differences 
between the legal systems are not as black-and-white as they are made out to be with the 0 or 1 
scoring for most variables, and many times the reality of what happens rather than the existence 
of a rule is what determines investor rights. Finally, rules that La Porta et al. (1998) deny exist, 
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may in fact be present but not in the specific statutes that the authors are looking into, i.e. 
company law and bankruptcy or reorganization law.   
In future work, Djankov et al. (2008) develop a new index for investor protection, and improve 
the 1998 anti-director rights index. They use the new anti-self-dealing index to support their 
earlier 4-group law system division and still find that common-law countries provide more 
investor protection than the other three civil-law countries. In relating financial development to 
the ex-anti and ex-post controls of self-dealing indices the authors point that one concern may be 
endogeniety, and for that they employ legal origin as an instrument even though they 
acknowledge the criticism that legal origin may influence other laws that in turn affect financial 
development. The authors declare that there is no solution to this problem even though in their 
prior work they suggest that “most countries have adopted their legal systems through 
occupation or colonization by one of the European powers to which they owe the origin of their 
laws.” (La Porta et al. 1997, p. 1131). One further issue remains with the law indexes is that they 
are based on the presence of laws and regulations rather than what is done in practice. For 
example in Italy the ex-post right to sue by shareholders is present in the law, yet shareholders 
are unlikely to sue (Djankov al. 2008). One might also question the likelihood of shareholders in 
the UK exercising their right to pre-approve a transaction, even though it exists on paper. The 
premise in the accounting literature has been that rules themselves don‟t always achieve the 
required results, so incorporating indexes based on rules from the law literature, and not their 
practical application, may not provide enough indication of the institutional differences among 
countries. 
Apart from La Porta et al.‟s contributions, accounting research incorporates legal enforcement 
measures from Kaufmann et al. (2007). The two sets of law enforcement measures appear to be 
very similar as indicated by the 96% correlation documented by Ahmed et al. (2013). The 
Kaufmann measures, based on expert and citizen surveys, are six: voice and accountability, 
political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of 
law, and control of corruption. Again, we find that there is inconsistency in how the accounting 
quality literature incorporates the measures. Chen et al. (2010) include the aggregate of all six 
measures of legal enforcement and the individual measures in their analysis finding that most of 
these measures do not explain the largely improved accounting quality post-IFRS. On the other 
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hand many papers operationalize legal enforcement only with the rule of law as in Ahmed et al. 
(2013) who conclude that it is associated with more smoothing, more aggressive reporting, and 
less conservatism post-IFRS. Similarly the rule of law only, sometimes combined with other 
non-Kaufmann et al. measures, is used to proxy for institutional environment in analyzing value 
relevance post-IFRS (Landsman et al. 2012), comparability Wang (2014) and in measuring the 
effects of capital markets around IFRS (Daske et al. 2008). These papers collectively conclude 
that more law enforcement is characteristic of countries with better earnings quality and liquidity 
benefits because stronger enforcement of rules influences the reporting incentives of preparers. 
The law enforcement measures developed initially by Kaufmann et al. (1999) are also positively 
related to a country‟s wealth (Easterly and Levine 2003), which may shed doubt on their 
explanatory power for accounting quality unless possibly instrumented with GDP, as in LNW or 
exogenous variables like our colonial ones. 
3. Colonialism and institutions 
Even though influential literature in other disciplines asserts that institutional frameworks are 
shaped historically via colonial conquests (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Easterly and Levine 2003; 
North 1993), accounting research providing empirical evidence on the role of colonialism in 
institutions influencing accounting practice barely exists. The relevant studies are that of Zeghal 
and Mhedhbi (2006) finding that being affiliated with the UK or USA as a past colony or a 
member of the commonwealth or a trade agreement increases the likelihood of the adoption of 
IFRS in developing countries. Building on that Ben Othman and Zeghal (2010) find that 
transparency and disclosure levels in 13 Middle Eastern and North African countries are 
attributable to the inherited Anglo-American versus French business culture. Apart from these 
studies the accounting quality literature appears mostly quiet where other disciplines have not.  
As European law systems have been imposed by colonial powers in large parts of the world, 
proxies for colonialism are likely stronger explanatory factors for the quality of institutions in 
post-colonial countries including law system, and certainly pre-date accounting outcomes 
commonly used in accounting research. Over time, the incentives of colonizers, and those who 
take over the power shape the evolvement of economic institutions (Acemoglu et al. 2002).  
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Empirical evidence on the causal relationship between the strategy followed by the colonial 
power and quality of institutions for economic development is provided by Acemoglu et al.  
(2001), and Acemoglu and Johnson (2003). Acemoglu et al. (2001) relate the quality of 
institutions in post-colonial countries to whether Europeans set up settler colonies or extractive 
states during the colonial period. Where there were large percentages of settlers, Europeans 
generally replicated the institutions in the mother country, using whatever means deemed 
necessary. Thus in British settled colonies in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 century, these institutions included 
property and political rights. In Latin America, Africa, and Asia, however, the objectives of 
colonialism focused mostly on the extraction of labor and natural resources. Accordingly, the 
type of institutions set up by the Spanish in Latin America were oriented towards the extraction 
and appropriation of resources. These continued over time to work against pressures for 
changing or reversing such actions, and endure because of replacement cost, incentives of elites 
to maintain the political and economic power, and the continued involvement of the colonizer in 
the affairs of the colonized post-independence (Acemoglu et al. 2001).  
 Elaborating more on how institutions persist, Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) argue that in Latin 
America and the Caribbean the availability of local slave labor concentrated the power in the 
hands of an elite mostly European group, in what developed into hierarchical societies. Elites 
ensured that the law protected their wealth and privileges by institutionalizing inequality and 
restricting the participation of labor, in economic activities. One such strategy was limiting 
voting rights to land owners, while another was restricting migration from Europe, as was the 
case in Mexico, Peru, and Chile in 1800. This inequality, some of the highest in the world, was 
guaranteed post-colonialism with Latin American government policies reproducing it by 
restricting literacy and voting as late as the early 20
th
 century. In contrast, in North America, with 
the exception of southern colonies, European migrants provided the labor themselves and where 
thus a more homogenous group. Consequently the rules developed provided more equality and 
opportunities for more members of society to contribute to the political and economic 
development. The US and Canada were the first in the Americas to remove the wealth 
requirement from the right to vote. 
Treisman (2000) confirms the effect of colonial institutions by showing that corruption levels 
vary in the presence of British colonialism. The author argues that the importance given by the 
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British to rules as opposed to authority, can explain less corruption in British colonies. Although 
his results are generally consistent with this prediction, the British colonial indicator is not 
always significant and becomes much more influential when controlling for GDP, suggesting 
that the richer post-colonial British settlements like New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and US are 
influencing the results. 
Research argues that another mechanism through which colonialism influences the development 
of institutions is the influence of ethnic fragmentation of the population in hindering economic 
growth. European colonialization changed the demographics by importing labor, inflicting 
disease, eradicating populations at times, and constructing countries that did not exist. Cohesive 
groups were separated, and unrelated groups were formed, reducing consensus on evolving 
national identity post-independence and increasing the likelihood of struggles for power and 
suboptimal social and economic policies. Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina et al. (2003) 
provide empirical evidence that this diversity, acting via social and economic policies, is 
inversely related to long term growth. According to Easterly and Levine this relation manifests 
through policies inducing high black market premiums, poor financial development, low 
provision of infrastructure, and low levels of education. The polarization of ethnic groups likely 
results in struggles for power, suboptimal policies, more bribery and corruption, and less 
attention to the welfare of society at large. For example in Kenya, which has 40 ethnic groups, 
the share of road-building investment and share of health expenditures by ethnic region drops or 
rises depending on which group is in power. According to the authors, ethnic diversity accounts 
for nearly 28% of the economic growth difference between African and East Asian countries. 
The authors also argue that ethnic fragmentations persists post-independence limiting 
competition in favor of some groups and consequently economic development. 
Other research on effects of ethnic fragmentation induced by colonization includes the work of 
Alesina et al. (2011) who test the relation between what are likely colonial powers negotiated 
artificial state borders and GDP per capita.
29
 The authors‟ fragmentation proxy measures 
closeness of state borders to a perfect square with straight lines, or state artificiality. Countries 
considered most artificial in their sample that overlap with our sample are Jordan, Morocco, and 
                                                          
29 One example is the Franco-British agreement of 1920 which defined the borders of the British mandate of Palestine and Iraq 
(Mesopotamia back then) and the French mandate of Syria and the Lebanon. 
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Pakistan. Other relevant research includes Angeles (2006) and Olsson (2009) who confirm the 
negative influence of colonialism on institutions via income inequality over time, and 
democracy, respectively. 
While prior empirical research on accounting quality has not yet explored the influence of 
colonization on scope and quality of accounting practice, the literature on the accountancy 
profession in post-colonial societies provides explanations showing how the colonial experience 
determines the path of the accountancy professions and accountants‟ incentives in many 
countries (see Cooper and Robson 2006 for a review). This suggests that there may be systematic 
differences in institutions influencing accounting in countries exposed to the colonial experience 
and supports the suggestion made by Nobes (2011, page 11) that „colonial inheritance is 
probably the major explanatory factor for the general system of financial reporting in many 
countries outside Europe.‟ 
We concur with the argument put forth by Ball et al. (2000, 2003) that the politicization of 
accounting in the different countries influences managerial incentives and the production of 
financial reporting. In an example on how ethnic tensions may influence accounting outcomes 
Ball et al. (2003) relays how attempts to redistribute the wealth in Malaysia induces the 
influential Chinese Malaysians to keep low profiles and consequently report lower profits. 
However, in terms of measurement, we believe that the proxies for institutions used in the 
accounting literature, for example shareholder protection, restrict the discussion to countries 
where equity markets play a significant role in economic development and may not be adequate 
for all countries. As the literature in section two provides evidence on the causal link between the 
colonial institutional environment and the economic development of countries and relates the 
variation in property protection to patterns in the colonies, we predict that in the presence of 
colonial influence protection of investors may not be a good explanation of accounting quality 
variations.  
According to the literature above levels of colonial settlement reflect whether institutions in 
colonized countries were planned after the mother country in contrast with extractive settings 
where institutions are determined to the benefit of those in power (Acemoglu 2006; Engerman 
and Sokoloff 2000). Further support for the colonial influence on economic outcomes is provided 
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by Kaufmann et al. (1999) who employ the percent of the population speaking a European 
language in a country, indicating colonial origin, as an exogenous variable explaining 
governance. Therefore, we also predict that colonial strategies, while exogenous, determine the 
path of institutions that influence preparers‟ incentives and consequently explain accounting 
quality.  
4. Research Design 
We examine if colonialism results in institutions that have an influence on accounting quality. To 
do so, we follow LNW in linking accounting to institutions. First, we provide an earnings 
management ranking by country using proxies for earnings smoothing and small loss avoidance. 
We then present a number of colonial influence variables from different sources, and alternate 
them in multivariate regressions to determine the role of colonialism in accounting quality, while 
controlling for institutions shown in prior literature. We further combine these variables 
conceptually and in an overall index and examine if these combined factors influence accounting 
quality. In further analysis we explore if the identity of the colonizer has influence over 
institutions and accounting quality. While Treisman (2000) argues that the legal system is more 
effective, hence there is less corruption in British post-colonial countries, Acemoglu et al. (2002) 
argue that while European colonization results in reversal of country wealth due to institutional 
changes, it is not driven by the identity of colonizers. Finally, in sensitivity analysis we proxy for 
law enforcement using the latest set of measures based on Kaufmann et al.‟s work for the 
available on the World Bank‟s website.30  
We use the following equation to assess the relationship between colonialism and earnings 
management  
AccQualityj = α + β1InvRightsf + β2Enforcementf + δ ∑Colonialismf+ ε (1) 
AccQuality is our proxy for accounting quality in country j. As noted above, we follow LNW in 
using earnings management measures to proxy for accounting quality. We also include in all our 
models their institutional variables InvRights and Enforcement drawn from La Porta et al. (1998). 
Colonialism is the variable or variables we introduce that capture the colonial influence 
                                                          
30
 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home. Accessed on April 18, 2014. 
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determining a country‟s institutional environment. Our expectations of this relationship are 
presented next with our proxies. 
Accounting quality proxies  
Following LNW we measure quality of the financial reporting system using four earnings 
management proxies: Two measure earnings smoothing, the third measures the level of accrual 
manipulation, and the forth measures managers‟ tendency for loss avoidance.   
The first smoothing measure EM1 is the ratio of the variability or standard deviation of operating 
earnings to the variability or standard deviation of cash flows from operations. As consistent 
earnings are valued more by analysts and investors (Dechow et al. 2010), managers may resort to 
masking the volatility of current economic earnings, relative to the firm‟s historic earnings. 
Therefore, lower values of this measure indicate more smoothing (Barth et al. 2008).  
The second earnings smoothing measure EM2 is the correlation between changes in accruals and 
changes in cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets. This measure indicates the 
extent to which a firm is manipulating current earnings using accruals. While a negative 
correlation is a normal outcome of accrual accounting (Dechow 1994), larger negative 
correlations indicate more smoothing as managers use accruals to hide poor cash flow (LNW; 
Barth et al. 2008).
31
 
The third measure EM3 examines the use of accruals over time to absorb economic performance 
fluctuations, and overstate or understate earnings. However, as cash flows are unaffected by this 
process, the measure is the median of the absolute value of firms‟ accruals scaled by absolute 
cash flow from operations. The final measure EM4 captures managers‟ tendency to turn losses 
into profits. However as managing large losses is more challenging and less likely, Burgstahler 
and Dichev (1997) designed the measure to capture small loss avoidance, or the ratio of small 
profits to small losses. Small losses are values of net earnings scaled by lagged total assets 
                                                          
31
Following Dechow et al. (1995) accruals are calculated as follows: Accruals = (△CA - △Cash) - (△CL -△STD - 
△TP) – Dep. Where △CA = change in current assets, △Cash = change in cash and cash equivalents, △CL = change 
in current liabilities, △STD = change in short-term debt, △TP = change in income taxes payable, and Dep = 
depreciation and amortization expense. Short term debt is excluded from current liabilities because it relates to 
financing transactions, while taxes payable are excluded for consistency with the after tax calculation of earnings. 
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falling between (-0.01, 0.00) while small losses are those falling in the range between (0.00, 
0.01). 
All measures are computed for each firm and year within each country. An overall ranking by 
country is then created based on each country‟s average of the four measures.  
Institutional proxies 
Investor rights, following LNW, is measured as the anti-director rights from (La Porta et al. 
1998) combining six different shareholder rights variables within a country: the option to mail 
proxy votes, no requirement to deposit shares prior to meetings, cumulative voting or minority 
board representation, minority judicial rights, minority preemptive rights, and procedures for 
calling extraordinary shareholders‟ meeting. Accordingly the expectation is that more rights 
awarded investors indicates less earnings management. As mentioned, LNW only include 
shareholder rights and do not explore the role of creditor rights for which data is also provided 
by La Porta et al. (1998) indicating an equity market focus in their study.  
Law enforcement is the rule of law variable from (La Porta et al. 1998) reflecting an assessment 
of law and order in a country, from the International Country Risk guide and Business 
International Corporation. The variable used in LNW is an average of three out of the five 
indicators provided by La Porta et al. in a country: legal system efficiency, tradition of law and 
order, and level of corruption. The variables not included by LNW are risk of expropriation or 
outright confiscation, and repudiation of contracts by government. The argument proposed by La 
Porta et al. is that countries may trade off weaker laws with stronger enforcement. Therefore it is 
expected that higher law enforcement will be associated with less earnings management.  
Colonial proxies 
Colonial dimensions are multifaceted and difficult to be captured completely. It is not our 
intention to provide a comprehensive set of colonial indicators. We do however attempt to 
capture economic aspects likely to have a lasting influence on the economic institutions of a 
country, and consequently its accounting quality. To achieve that we look to institutional 
economics research to derive our proxies for colonialism, as ours is quite likely one of the 
leading empirical examinations of colonial institutional dimensions in accounting quality. This 
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branch of economics has been quite active in its attempts to explain cross country economic 
development focusing on post-colonial societies. To test our prediction that colonialism affects 
accounting quality via institutions we obtain measures primarily constructed by or used in this 
literature. We use the following colonial indicators: 
Extractive: We follow the argument made by Acemoglu et al. (2001) that economic institutions 
in post-colonial countries are determined by the colonial strategy. While in some countries 
European colonizers settled and modeled their adopted home after their original one, in other 
countries they set up extractive states and administered the colonized largely from a distance 
with minimal European presence. Consistent with this literature we expect that the lower number 
of settlers is an indication of less importance to the development of institutions, and in many 
cases even the reversal of prosperous institutions (Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002). Our proxy for 
extractive is the percent of European settlers in 1900, obtained from Acemoglu et al. (2001), 
multiplied by -1. For countries that became independent prior to 1900 we do not expect large 
changes in settlement patterns, and as settlement is a mark of the 19
th
 century and earlier, we 
assume a zero settler percentage for countries colonized after that.  
Distance: The influence of countries on each other is likely a function of geographic proximity 
as indicated by the gravity model that explains the influence on cross country trade with distance 
and size (see for example, Frankel and Rose 2000). Because trade with the colonies has been a 
major source of income (Townsend and Peake 1941) we expect that geographic proximity to the 
colonial center is an indication of more influence on the colonized country‟s institutions. The 
measure is constructed from data made available on the website of French Research Center in 
International Economics. 
Years colonized: An intuitive argument, confirmed by Olsson (2009) is that colonial influence on 
institutions is stronger with the length of the colonial period. We use the number of years from 
the beginning of the official date of colonial declaration or closest known date of effective 
economic, military, or settler influence to officially declared independence. Where there were 
consecutive colonial powers in a country, we limit our years to the last one. We make one 
exception in the case of Phillipines which was colonized by the Spanish for more than 300 years 
until 1898 and then the United States until 1946. In this case we combine the dates as the 
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Spanish influence is extensive and cannot be ignored. Beginning and ending colonization dates 
are obtained from Encyclopedia Britanica and Townsend and Peake (1941).The start of 
colonization cannot always be dated with precision because most instances of large domination 
took place gradually. For example, the East India Company, a privately held trading endeavor 
spread its influence gradually and grew its own armies, while paving the way for the British 
military conquest of the subcontinent. In this case we use the start of the collapse of the Mugul 
Empire marking the increase in the influence of Britain and France in the area.  
Years independent: Another intuitive argument is that the colonial influence on institutions will 
decrease with the length of independence. This variable is the number of years from 
independence until 2011, the last year in our accounting data. However, Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2006) argue that equilibrium in economic institutions, for example property rights, is the net 
effect of political power and de facto power. When elites lose their political power, they maintain 
power via other channels such as lobbying, bribery, or even force. It is therefore possible that 
with the persistence of institutions we may not find the expected outcome. 
Ethnic fragmentation: Ethnic fragmentation, closely associated with conflict, negatively affects 
the choice of public policies and consequently long-term economic growth (Easterly and Levine 
1997). We use the proxy used in Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina et al. (2003) primarily 
measuring the possibility that two randomly selected individuals from a country are from 
different ethnolinguistic groups. As ethnic fragmentation is likely to lead to suboptimal national 
policies and institutions we expect that this variable has a positive relationship with earnings 
management. 
Artificial borders: Another measure of population fragmentation considers the borders of 
countries drawn in negotiations between colonial powers. To assess the artificiality of the 
borders of a country we use a measure developed by Alesina et al. (2011) assessing how close 
the borders are to a straight line. The idea is that straight lines are indicators of borders likely 
drawn artificially in contrast with borders carved around natural geological formations. Similar 
to ethnic fragmentation we expect this variable to have a positive association with earnings 
management. 
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Religious fragmentation: Another measure that may increase tensions in a country and reduce 
consensus is religious fragmentation as used in Alesina et al. (2003). The variable is based on 
percentage of the population that belonged to the three most widely spread religions in the world 
in 1980 (1) Roman Catholic; (2) Protestant; and (3) Muslim. The residual is called “other 
religions”. We also expect that this variable will have a positive association with earnings 
management. 
5. Sample and Results 
Our sample of firms and accounting data are obtained from Compustat Global Vantage 
database
32
and spans sixteen years for forty seven countries. The data starts in 1995, the earliest 
available coverage for all countries to 2011. Because we closely follow LNW in setting our tests, 
we begin with the sample countries used in their research and we add to it all other post colonial 
countries available in the database.  
Our initial sample consists of all firm-year observations for the forty seven countries. To arrive at 
our final sample we make the same adjustments as LNW, making note for exceptions. We first 
exclude observations with missing data for any of the variables: operating income, current assets, 
cash, current liabilities, total assets, sales, cost of goods sold, total liabilities, accounts 
receivables, and common equity. Diverting from LNW, we replace missing depreciation data 
with prior or following year data. Finally, we drop observations with remaining missing values 
of depreciation. Next, following LNW, we replace missing data in taxes payable and debt in 
current liabilities with zero. We then drop firms with less than three years of consecutive data. 
While LNW restrict their sample to a minimum of 300 observations per country we lower that 
threshold to 240 observations to allow the inclusion of countries with smaller markets and reduce 
the possibility of our results being representative of countries with larger capital markets. Table 1 
shows the different sample constructions used in our testing. Data for colonial variables are from 
multiple sources as mentioned above. 
  
                                                          
32
 December 2013 version 
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Table 1 Sample description 
 
   
 
LNW replicated Post-colonial sample 
Number of countries 31 32 
Firms 48761 38892 
Missing data -9217 -8697 
  39544 30195 
      
Firms of countries with < 240 
observations   -130 
Firms < 3 years of consecutive data -3824 -3487 
EM1/EM3 35720 26578 
      
Missing data TA -22 -20 
EM4 35698 26558 
      
Missing data CFO -64 -79 
EM2 35634 26479 
      
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for individual and aggregate earnings management scores 
by country. The rank is based on the average of the four measures and is arranged from high to 
low earnings management. Overall the means and medians for the four measures compare 
reasonably with those provided by LNW. Both values for EM4 or the loss avoidance measure are 
higher in LNW and appear to be driven by their extreme values for India, Spain, and Indonesia 
which are more in line with other countries in our analysis. Due to data restrictions we were 
unable to obtain an EM4 measure for Bangladesh so the rank is based on three measures. We do 
not expect this to make a big difference. UK, Sweden, Canada, South Africa, and Australia have 
the lowest overall earnings management while Kuwait, Portugal, Greece, Nigeria and Spain have 
the highest levels. Overall these initial results are consistent with what may be expected based on 
the research. 
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Table 2 Country scores for earnings management measures  
Country EM1 σ(OpInc)/ EM2 ρ(ΔAcc, EM3 |Acc|/ EM4 (SmProfit/ Average Rank 
  σ(CFO) (–) ΔCFO) (–) |CFO| (+) SmLoss (+) 
 Kuwait 0.4421 -0.9352 0.7485 3.4000 44 
Portugal 0.4671 -0.9088 0.6219 3.5000 41 
Greece 0.5828 -0.8833 0.7927 2.4235 38 
Nigeria 0.4890 -0.9028 0.5027 3.6667 38 
Spain 0.5808 -0.8827 0.5072 3.7407 37 
Morocco 0.5229 -0.9251 0.5013 3.1667 37 
India 0.5923 -0.8706 0.6803 2.6109 37 
Taiwan 0.5965 -0.8359 0.6577 3.5378 36 
Belgium 0.5589 -0.8275 0.5566 3.5000 34 
South Korea 0.5904 -0.8295 0.6280 3.1277 34 
Italy 0.5747 -0.8570 0.5872 2.2981 34 
Indonesia 0.6088 -0.8264 0.6162 3.6790 33 
Japan 0.5987 -0.8298 0.5448 3.5965 33 
Austria 0.5911 -0.8332 0.5781 2.7619 32 
Bangladesh 0.5490 -0.9393 0.3808 . 31 
France 0.5867 -0.8439 0.5294 2.3678 31 
Thailand 0.6029 -0.8339 0.5949 2.4086 30 
Jordan 0.4131 -0.8203 0.6865 1.2500 30 
Singapore 0.6329 -0.8065 0.6796 2.6893 29 
Hong Kong 0.6390 -0.8204 0.6250 2.7317 28 
Philippines 0.5819 -0.8094 0.6646 1.5467 28 
United Arab 
Emirates 
0.6384 -0.8600 0.5006 2.5714 27 
Malaysia 0.6539 -0.7930 0.6289 2.6814 27 
Germany 0.6186 -0.7846 0.6329 2.1475 26 
Pakistan 0.6014 -0.8530 0.4787 2.1207 26 
Egypt 0.5799 -0.8573 0.4081 1.2500 22 
Chile 0.6343 -0.8364 0.4643 1.8846 21 
Brazil 0.7025 -0.8122 0.5275 2.0444 20 
Switzerland 0.7544 -0.7818 0.4323 3.8286 19 
Netherlands 0.6109 -0.7814 0.4711 2.1795 19 
Denmark 0.6188 -0.7524 0.5277 1.7347 19 
Mexico 0.6798 -0.8411 0.3747 1.7222 16 
Peru 0.7941 -0.7762 0.4719 2.8333 16 
Argentina 0.7538 -0.7830 0.5085 1.8696 16 
Finland 0.7279 -0.7572 0.4784 2.2857 16 
Sri Lanka 0.6848 -0.7907 0.5011 1.4706 15 
Norway 0.6902 -0.6806 0.5828 1.5139 14 
New Zealand 0.6186 -0.7460 0.4054 1.7273 13 
Kenya 0.6565 -0.8034 0.4061 0.8571 11 
Ireland 0.7090 -0.7062 0.3697 2.2000 11 
United States 0.7285 -0.6843 0.4904 1.6352 11 
Colombia 0.6271 -0.7821 0.3570 1.2500 10 
United Kingdom 0.7347 -0.6890 0.4423 1.8148 10 
Sweden 0.8298 -0.6086 0.4432 1.8875 9 
Canada 0.7889 -0.5692 0.4746 1.4861 7 
South Africa 0.7667 -0.7345 0.3855 1.5455 7 
Australia 0.8703 -0.5125 0.3447 1.5054 3 
Mean 0.6356 -0.8000 0.5275 2.3489 
 SD 0.0779 0.0862 0.0838 0.5919 
 Median 0.6848 -0.7818 0.4719 1.8148 
 Min 0.5799 -0.8600 0.3447 0.8571 
 Max 0.8703 -0.5125 0.6646 3.8286 
 Definition of variables in Appendix B .
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Table 3 provides descriptive data for our colonial proxies. Higher values of settler percent, years 
colonized, ethnic and religious fragmentation, are indication of more colonial influence while the 
opposite is true for years independent, artificial borders, and distance. Consistent with common 
knowledge settler percentages in Canada, US, Australia, and New Zealand are the highest, while 
colonial strategies in most of Asian and African countries are consistent with the extractive and 
low settlement pattern. Years colonized is those under the last European power except the case of 
Philippines which includes 48 years of US colonization.  
Table 4 presents correlations between the different variables. The correlation between investor 
rights protection and most colonial variables overall appears weak except in the case of settler 
percent and religious fragmentation. In the first case, this is likely because the largest settlement 
colonies are the US, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand that all have a British tradition of 
property rights. The same set of countries, except Canada, also have the highest rates of religious 
fragmentation. Law enforcement exhibits a strong positive correlation with settler percent and 
primary schooling likely because of the British settlement colonies just mentioned. The Law 
enforcement coefficient exhibits a strong negative correlation with artificial state indicating that 
it is higher in artificial states. As expected there is a strong positive correlation between law 
enforcement and investor protection consistent with prior research. The years independent is 
strongly related to settler percent (61%), this is expected because European settlement was no 
longer a strategy in the 20
th
 century and the settler countries like US, Canada, and Australia had 
gained their independence by the early part of that century. 
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Table 3 Colonial index 
Country Colonizer Settler 
percent 
Years 
colonized 
Years 
independent 
Ethnic 
fragmentation 
Religious 
fragmentation 
Artificial 
borders 
Distance 
(ln)  
Colonial 
index  
Argentina Spanish 0.60           279  195         0.26          0.22          
0.03  
   9.22         12  
Australia British 0.98           113  110         0.09          0.82          
0.10  
   9.72         11  
Bangladesh British 0.00           240  64         0.05          0.21        
0.08  
   9.00           9  
Brazil Portugese 0.40           322  189         0.54          0.61        
0.04  
   8.91         16  
Canada British 0.99           104  144         0.71          0.70        
0.01  
   8.67         19  
Chile Spanish 0.50           270  201         0.19          0.38        
0.03  
   9.28         12  
Colombia Spanish 0.20           285  201         0.60          0.15        
0.03  
   9.00         13  
Egypt British 0.01  68  89         0.18          0.20        
0.01  
   8.20         13  
Hong Kong British 0.04           158  14         0.06          0.42        
0.10  
   9.17         12  
India British 0.00           240  64         0.42          0.33        
0.04  
   8.90         12  
Indonesia Dutch 0.00           343  66         0.74          0.23        
0.04  
   9.34         13  
Jordan British 0.00  24  65         0.59          0.07        
0.02  
   8.23         12  
Kenya British 0.01  68  48         0.86          0.78        
0.01  
   8.85         19  
Kuwait British 0.00  62  50         0.66          0.67        
0.01  
   8.47         17  
Malaysia British 0.00           117  70         0.59          0.67        
0.05  
   9.28         11  
Mexico Spain 0.15           292  201         0.54          0.18        
0.02  
   9.12         13  
Morocco French 0.01  52  55         0.48          0.00        
0.01  
   7.44         15  
New Zealand British 0.93  66  104         0.40          0.81        
0.10  
   9.83         11  
Nigeria British 0.00  66  51         0.85          0.74        
0.03  
   8.52         16  
Pakistan British 0.00           240  64         0.71          0.38        
0.03  
   8.75         15  
Peru Spanish 0.30           297  190         0.66          0.20        
0.05  
   9.16         14  
Philippines Spanish/US 0.00           381  65         0.24          0.31        
0.10  
   9.43           9  
Singapore British 0.05           133  52         0.39          0.66        
0.10  
   9.30         12  
South Africa British 0.22           104  101         0.75          0.86        
0.03  
   9.16         17  
Sri Lanka British 0.00           133  63         0.42          0.49        
0.10  
   9.08         11  
UAE British 0.00  79  40         0.63          0.33        
0.02  
   8.63         16  
United States British 0.88           169  235         0.49          0.82        
0.01  
   8.84         17  
                   
Mean              174         103          0.48          0.45          
0.05  
   8.94    
SD              106          65          0.24          0.27        
0.03  
   0.49    
Median              133          66          0.54          0.38        
0.03  
   9.00    
Min     24          14          0.05          0.00        
0.01  
   7.44    
Max              381         235          0.86          0.86        
0.10  
   9.83    
Definition of variables in Appendix B.
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Table 4 Correlation matrices  
  
Settler 
percent 
Years 
colonized 
Years 
independent 
Primary 
schooling  
Ethnic 
frag 
Religious 
frag 
Artificial 
borders Distance  
Colonial 
index EM rank 
Investor 
rights 
Law 
enforce 
Settler percentage 1.0000 
           
Years colonized -0.0105 1.0000 
          
Years independent 0.6098* 0.4634* 1.0000 
         
Ethnic fragmentation -0.1776 -0.1792 -0.0290 -0.3847* 1.0000 
       
Religious fragmentation 0.4434* -0.3677 -0.0338 0.4450* 0.2152 1.0000 
      
Artificial borders -0.2306 0.4049* 0.1688 -0.6431* 0.1082 -0.2911 1.0000 
     
Distance  0.3812* 0.4326* 0.2147 0.3490 -0.2754 0.3757 0.0130 1.0000 
    
Colonial index 0.2677 -0.4324* 0.0702 0.2770 0.5140* 0.5578* -0.3309 -0.2517 1.0000 
   
EM rank -0.6437* -0.0304 -0.5486* -0.3169 0.0339 -0.3339 0.1937 -0.4205* -0.2717 1.0000 
  
Investor rights 0.3230 -0.0470 -0.0303 0.2828 -0.2310 0.4038* 0.0907 0.1744 0.2434 -0.0582 1.0000 
 
Law enforcement 0.5610* -0.4960* 0.0138 0.6474* -0.1349 0.5723* -0.4179* 0.2363 0.3719 -0.3684 0.4083* 1.0000 
* p<0.05. Definition of variables in Appendix B. 
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Discussion of main results 
Table 5 panel A presents the results of regressions of earnings management rank on investor 
protection and legal enforcement, the main institutional variables used by LNW. In the first 
column we include only countries used by LNW but for the extended years, 1995-2011. The 
results are similar to those of LNW (table 4, column 1); even though our coefficients are larger, 
both investor rights and legal enforcement are negatively and significantly associated with 
earnings management. The r-squares are also similar. In the second column we extend the 
sample to include all other colonial countries we have data for, and we find that the model loses 
some of its explanatory power as the strength of the investor rights and law enforcement 
coefficients becomes weaker, and both variables lose some of their statistical significance. This 
suggests that the additional colonial countries included in the sample have different institutional 
characteristics, so in the third column we restrict the sample to post-colonial countries. In the 
case of post-colonial countries, we find that investor rights loses all statistical significance so it 
can no longer explain differences in earnings management as it did in the LNW sample. Law 
enforcement on the other hand remains negatively significant and a good explanatory variable. 
These results provide initial support to the hypothesis that colonialism influences the 
environmental institutions associated with earnings management, and are consistent with the 
research showing that colonialism influences institutions (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2006; Easterly and Levine 1997; Sokoloff and Engerman 2000, Treisman 2000). 
Table 5 Earnings management  
Panel A: using LNW model 
VARIABLES 
EM rank  
(LNW sample) 
EM rank  
(LNW sample 
expanded)  
EM rank  
(LNW post-colonial 
expanded) 
        
Investor rights -2.14*** -1.98** 0.55 
 
(0.67) (0.95) (0.74) 
Law enforcement -1.77*** -1.46** -1.20** 
 
(0.48) (0.58) (0.49) 
Constant 36.82*** 40.73*** 19.35*** 
 
(4.49) (5.74) (3.65) 
    N 31 47 27 
Adj R-sq 0.39 0.15 0.15 
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   Table 5 Earnings management 
 
 Panel B: using a post-colonial sample 
  Expected 
 
Model 
1 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 
sign 
                        
Investor rights - 0.93 0.85 0.44 0.72 0.56 0.78 0.53 
  
 
(0.56) (0.68) (0.55) (0.68) (0.78) (0.71) (0.84) 
Law enforcement - -0.21 -1.73** -1.15*** -0.99* -1.20** -0.89 -1.18** 
  
 
(0.51) (0.64) (0.41) (0.53) (0.49) (0.65) (0.56) 
Extractive + 11.56**
* 
            
  
 
(2.64)             
Years colonized +   -0.02           
  
 
  (0.01)           
Years independent -     -0.05***         
  
 
    (0.01)         
Distance (lg) -       -4.45**       
  
 
      (1.75)       
Ethnic 
fragmentation 
+         0.10     
  
 
        (4.76)     
Religious 
fragmentation 
+           -5.03   
  
 
          (6.33)   
Artificial state -             4.47 
  
 
            (54.71) 
Constant   14.50**
* 
24.69**
* 
24.67**
* 
57.20**
* 
19.28**
* 
18.83**
* 
19.19*** 
    (3.88) (5.79) (3.59) (14.88) (3.95) (3.86) (4.12) 
                  
N   27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Adj R-sq 
 
0.44 0.22 0.44 0.27 0.15 0.18 0.15 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Definitions of variables in Appendix B. 
 
          
 
          
In Table 5 panel B we present the results of entering the individual colonial variables in the 
analysis of institutions on earnings management using only the post-colonial sample. Consistent 
with the prior analysis, investor rights does not have the expected sign nor is it statistically 
significant in any of the models confirming that in the post-colonial sample investor rights 
cannot explain earnings management. This supports the argument that different institutions have 
varying levels of importance in different settings, and it is not a one size fits all. The LNW 
finding that investor protection explains earnings management across countries is likely due to 
European countries constituting a large part of their sample. These countries share a historic 
specificity related to the origins of property rights in response to the earlier feudal system and the 
expropriations by the State. It is therefore not surprising that in European countries and some of 
their settled colonies there is a large emphasis on institutions supporting property and investor 
rights. In contrast, one can consider the tradition of land communal ownership known to the 
north and south Native American nations where a tradition of property rights protection is not 
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likely to thrive. Other results show that the influence of law enforcement on earnings 
management is mostly in the expected direction, with one exception, and in most models it is 
statistically significant. The influence of law enforcement institutions appears to be more 
generalizable across countries.  
One of the most important results in table 5 panel B is that in model 1 representing the influence 
of the colonial strategy of extraction or settlement on earnings management. Together with the 
prior literature controls, the three variables can explain 44% of the variation in earnings 
management, slightly above the 39% in LNW. As mentioned earlier in economic extraction 
colonies institutions that mattered to Europeans were those relevant to exploiting plantations and 
mines, so obtaining mass labor and establishing hierarchies were focal strategies, which explains 
why institutions supporting economic development in extractive societies are not intended to 
support long term economic development like they would in settler ones (Engerman and 
Sokoloff 2000). The results also show that even with the persistence of institutions the passage of 
time since independence contributes to countries developing better financial reporting quality. 
The Years colonized coefficient is not in the expected direction, while distance between the 
colonies and center of colonial power is as expected negatively associated with earnings 
management, in other words closer countries subjected to more colonial influence exhibit larger 
earnings management. 
In general, we do not find support for the ethnic and religious fragmentation, and artificial states 
arguments. While the ethnic fragmentation coefficient has the expected positive sign it is not 
statistically significant, and religious fragmentations and artificial state are not in the expected 
direction. It is possible that the religious fragmentation results are explained largely by the US, 
Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa which have the highest religious fragmentation in our 
sample and are mostly settler states. Overall we interpret results in this table as providing support 
for the colonial influence on institutions affecting earnings management in post-colonial 
countries. 
Next, we apply a principal-components analysis to the colonial data to reduce the number of our 
independent variables in case there are systematic relations between the variables, even though 
most correlations do not appear to be high. Table 6 shows that the analysis produces three 
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principal components (PCs) with an eigenvalue greater than one, which cumulatively explain 
about 76% of the variation in the data. PC1, PC2, PC3 are uncorrelated transformations of the 
original set of 7 colonial variables with PC1 retaining most of the variation in the original 
variables. The + or - sign indicates a coefficient with absolute value greater than half of the 
maximum coefficient (Jolliffe 2002). We do not attempt to interpret these PCs as that attempt 
will likely be an oversimplification (Jolliffe 2002) and at this stage of the research we are only 
interested in finding if there is a correlation between colonialism and earnings management.  
Table 6 Principal component analysis 
  
 
    
Unrotated         
Retained factors: 3         
Variable PC1 PC2 PC3 Uniqueness 
          
Settler percentage 0.882 -0.158 0.216 0.152 
Years colonized 0.266 0.841 -0.023 0.222 
Years independent 0.622 0.468 0.463 0.180 
Ethnic fragmentation -0.356 -0.224 0.809 0.169 
Religious fragmentation 0.445 -0.688 0.286 0.247 
Artificial borders -0.215 0.678 0.315 0.395 
Distance  0.755 -0.005 -0.323 0.325 
          
Orthogonal oblimin rotation       
Retained factors: 3         
Variable PC1 PC2 PC3 Uniqueness 
          
Settler percentage 0.915 0.020 -0.107 0.152 
Years colonized 0.058 0.841 -0.260 0.222 
Years independent 0.627 0.644 0.112 0.180 
Ethnic fragmentation -0.005 -0.078 0.908 0.169 
Religious fragmentation 0.651 -0.535 0.208 0.247 
Artificial borders -0.235 0.696 0.257 0.395 
Distance  0.584 0.025 -0.577 0.325 
Definitions of variables in Appendix B.  
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In table 7 we present the results of regressions with two variable combinations, first the factors 
from the principal component analysis, and second an aggregate index of all colonial variables in 
this study. PCA factor 1 supports the hypothesis that colonialism influences earnings 
management even though the direction of this influence is negative. This is most likely because 
one of the variables loading highest on this factor is settler percent (the negative of the extractive 
variable) which is consistent with our results in table 4. The colonial index does not provide 
statistical support for our hypothesis, however we present it in the hope that as data on other 
countries becomes more available future research with expanded samples may benefit from this 
start. 
Table 7 Earnings management using a post-colonial sample and aggregating colonial variables 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
 
Model 3 Model 4 
         
Investor rights   0.95*   0.57 
    (0.50)   (0.71) 
Law enforcement   -0.36   -1.18** 
    (0.72)   (0.51) 
PC1 -3.61*** -3.71***     
  (0.86) (0.75)     
PC2 1.96** 1.69     
  (0.88) (1.53)     
PC3 -0.85 -0.85     
  (0.84) (0.87)     
Colonial aggregate index     -0.27 -0.17 
      (0.45) (0.43) 
Constant 13.89*** 12.65** 17.60*** 21.45*** 
  (0.88) (5.35) (5.88) (5.70) 
          
N 27 27 27 27 
Adj R-sq 0.48 0.51 0.02 0.15 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Definitions of variables in          
Appendix B.         
 
Overall our primary regression results support the argument that colonialism influences earnings 
management via the persistence of institutions.  
6. Further testing 
In additional testing we replace the law enforcement measures from La Porta et al. (1998) with 
measures based on Kaufmann et al. (2011) and updated by the World Bank in 2013. First we 
include an average of the six law enforcement measures for the years 1996-2012 then we explore 
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the influence of each measure independently. In our data the correlation between most Kaufmann 
measures and La Porta measures is not as high as the 96% found by Ahmed et al. (2013), but at 
an average of 87% it also indicates that the measures are quite similar. The only exception is 
voice and accountability which has a 66% correlation. The results in table 8 show that all 
measures are negatively related to earnings management with mixed statistical significance. 
Voice and accountability is highly significant in all models except the case of extractive states. 
This measure evaluates the participation in selecting the government, freedom of expression, 
association, and media. Prior literature shows that democratic institutions in their modern form 
contribute to the economic development of society (Olsson 2009). Olsson argues that in the 
colonies that followed the British market-orientation, the spread of wealth and equality after the 
abolishment of slavery, provided stronger grounds for the exposure to the Western democracy 
ideas especially in the 19
th
 century. The distribution of political power determines the 
development of economic institutions in the conflict over resources and the barriers to economic 
entry (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Perotti 2014) so our results are likely an indication of the 
role of developed capital markets in  
Table 8 Earnings management using a post-colonial sample and Kaufmann variables 
 
Panel A  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
               
Investor rights 0.71 0.54 0.18 0.54 0.44 0.81 0.49 
 
(0.65) (0.77) (0.62) (0.72) (0.80) (0.71) (0.88) 
Kaufman aggregate law enforcement 0.14 -0.49** -0.31 -0.30 -0.46** -0.32 -0.44 
 
(0.17) (0.23) (0.18) (0.23) (0.20) (0.26) (0.26) 
Extractive colony 13.47*** 
      
 
(2.33) 
      Years colonized 
 
-0.01
     
  
(0.01) 
     Years independent 
  
-0.05***
    
   
(0.01) 
    Distance (lg) 
   
-4.19**
   
    
(1.97) 
   Ethnic fragmentation 
    
-1.77
    
    
(4.95) 
  Religious fragmentation 
     
-5.90
   
     
(5.83) 
 Artificial state 
      
-0.70
       
(59.23) 
Constant 14.30*** 13.81*** 18.34*** 49.66*** 13.59*** 13.94*** 12.55*** 
 
(2.34) (3.28) (3.11) (16.91) (4.16) (2.98) (2.97) 
        N 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Adj R-sq 0.45 0.15 0.37 0.23 0.13 0.17 0.13 
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Panel B 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
               
Investor rights 0.62 0.35 0.08 0.42 0.23 0.67 0.11 
 
(0.65) (0.89) (0.66) (0.79) (0.89) (0.75) (0.97) 
Rule of law 1.14 -2.08 -1.39 -1.13 -1.78 -0.99 -1.34 
 
(1.10) (1.54) (1.11) (1.30) (1.24) (1.47) (1.63) 
Extractive colony 13.81*** 
      
 
(2.43) 
      Years colonized 
 
-0.01
     
  
(0.01) 
     Years independent 
  
-0.05***
     
  
(0.01) 
    Distance (lg) 
   
-4.74**
   
    
(1.92) 
   Ethnic fragmentation 
    
-1.35
    
    
(5.22) 
  Religious fragmentation 
     
-7.16
   
     
(5.73) 
 Artificial state 
      
24.30
       
(60.82) 
Constant 14.62*** 14.51*** 19.03*** 54.98*** 14.08*** 14.89*** 13.22*** 
 
(2.41) (3.47) (3.14) (16.37) (4.43) (2.98) (3.12) 
        N 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Adj R-sq 0.46 0.08 0.35 0.20 0.06 0.14 0.07 
 
 
Panel C 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
                
Investor rights 0.80 0.53 0.22 0.52 0.45 0.83 0.47 
 
(0.67) (0.79) (0.63) (0.75) (0.82) (0.71) (0.92) 
Government effectiveness 0.21 -2.70* -1.88* -1.62 -2.56* -1.82 -2.42 
 
(0.83) (1.49) (1.08) (1.45) (1.29) (1.63) (1.71) 
Extractive colony 12.46*** 
      
 
(1.90) 
      Years colonized 
 
-0.01
     
  
(0.01) 
     Years independent independence 
  
-0.05***
    
   
(0.01) 
    Distance (lg) 
   
-4.18**
   
    
(1.94) 
   Ethnic fragmentation 
    
-1.49
    
    
(4.93) 
  Religious fragmentation 
     
-6.09
   
     
(5.83) 
 Artificial state 
      
4.06
       
(63.02) 
Constant 13.80*** 14.26*** 18.70*** 49.98*** 13.97*** 14.34*** 13.04*** 
 
(2.40) (3.26) (3.07) (16.38) (4.17) (2.94) (2.94) 
        N 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Adj R-sq 0.44 0.14 0.37 0.22 0.12 0.17 0.12 
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Panel D 
       Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
                
Investor rights 0.86 0.39 0.11 0.46 0.32 0.73 0.42 
 
(0.67) (0.74) (0.61) (0.73) (0.78) (0.72) (0.84) 
Regulatory quality -0.18 -2.95** -1.99* -1.93 -2.85** -2.16 -2.90* 
 
(0.71) (1.36) (0.98) (1.38) (1.23) (1.55) (1.59) 
Extractive colony 11.91*** 
      
 
(1.93) 
      Years colonized 
 
-0.01
     
  
(0.01) 
     Years independent 
  
-0.05***
    
   
(0.01) 
    Distance (lg) 
   
-3.96*
   
    
(1.94) 
   Ethnic fragmentation 
    
-1.48
    
    
(5.09) 
  Religious fragmentation 
     
-5.67
   
     
(5.71) 
 Artificial state 
      
-9.29
       
(58.51) 
Constant 13.61*** 14.79*** 18.99*** 48.43*** 14.54*** 14.63*** 13.71*** 
 
(2.50) (3.28) (3.11) (16.46) (4.12) (2.79) (2.92) 
        N 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Adj R-sq 0.44 0.16 0.38 0.24 0.15 0.20 0.15 
 
 
Panel E 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
                
Investor rights 0.68 0.41 0.10 0.44 0.30 0.71 0.28 
 
(0.66) (0.81) (0.62) (0.76) (0.84) (0.74) (0.92) 
Corruption control 0.81 -2.04 -1.30 -1.15 -1.80* -1.15 -1.63 
 
(0.79) (1.25) (0.91) (1.16) (1.04) (1.24) (1.35) 
Extractive colony 13.63*** 
      
 
(2.26) 
      Years colonized 
 
-0.01
     
  
(0.01) 
     Years independent 
  
-0.05***
    
   
(0.01) 
    Distance (lg) 
   
-4.50**
   
    
(1.97) 
   Ethnic fragmentation 
    
-1.12
    
    
(5.21) 
  Religious fragmentation 
     
-6.57
   
     
(5.82) 
 Artificial state 
      
10.15
       
(59.86) 
Constant 14.35*** 14.45*** 18.91*** 52.80*** 13.83*** 14.61*** 13.11*** 
 
(2.41) (3.40) (3.11) (16.97) (4.33) (3.01) (3.05) 
        N 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Adj R-sq 0.45 0.11 0.35 0.21 0.09 0.15 0.09 
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Panel F 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
                
Investor rights 0.66 0.08 -0.15 0.27 0.00 0.53 -0.17 
 
(0.66) (0.78) (0.59) (0.79) (0.81) (0.75) (0.80) 
Political stability 1.28 -1.47 -0.84 -0.76 -1.19 -0.49 -0.71 
 
(0.97) (1.36) (0.97) (1.21) (1.26) (1.37) (1.24) 
Extractive colony 14.01*** 
      
 
(2.33) 
      Years colonized 
 
-0.01
     
  
(0.01) 
     Years independent 
  
-0.05***
    
   
(0.01) 
    Distance (lg) 
   
-4.93**
   
    
(1.93) 
   Ethnic fragmentation 
    
-0.59
    
    
(5.56) 
  Religious fragmentation 
     
-7.75
   
     
(5.56) 
 Artificial state 
      
45.45
       
(47.81) 
Constant 15.14*** 14.38*** 19.35*** 56.77*** 13.80*** 15.30*** 13.27*** 
 
(2.36) (3.36) (3.04) (16.56) (4.39) (2.82) (2.99) 
        N 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Adj R-sq 0.47 0.05 0.32 0.19 0.04 0.12 0.05 
 
 
Panel G 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
                
Investor rights 0.90 1.09 0.61 1.02 1.00 1.24* 1.06 
 
(0.59) (0.73) (0.69) (0.70) (0.74) (0.72) (0.76) 
Voice and accountability -0.62 -5.11*** -3.52** -4.40*** -5.24*** -4.63*** -5.03*** 
 
(2.31) (1.16) (1.37) (1.24) (1.12) (1.50) (1.32) 
Extractive colony 11.04** 
      
 
(4.82) 
      Years colonized 
 
0.00
     
  
(0.01) 
     Years independent 
independenc   
-0.03*
    
   
(0.01) 
    Distance (lg) 
   
-1.80
   
    
(1.89) 
   Ethnic fragmentation 
    
-2.53
    
    
(4.32) 
  Religious fragmentation 
     
-3.20
   
     
(5.24) 
 Artificial state 
      
4.12
       
(46.66) 
Constant 13.22*** 9.79*** 15.04*** 26.52 11.74*** 11.06*** 10.21*** 
 
(2.42) (3.40) (3.65) (16.23) (3.82) (2.93) (2.79) 
        N 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Adj R-sq 0.44 0.35 0.42 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.35 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Definitions of variables in Appendix B. 
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determining financial reporting quality. This is likely why also the regulatory quality indicator, 
which reflects policies related to the promotion of the private sector has good explanatory power 
in our post-colonial sample.  
As political democracy is likely to reduce opportunities for corruption we would expect that 
control of corruption may also provide a path through which colonial institutions may influence 
earning management, as it is shown to influence financial quality (Armstrong et al. 2010; Chaney 
and Parsley 2011) and explains development of economic policies in post-colonial countries 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Alesina et al. 2003), however we do not find that in our sample. 
We also find that political stability, and rule of law, are both not statistically significant, while 
government effectiveness is moderately significant.  
We further examine if the identity of the colonial power matters in institutions that determine 
accounting quality. The results in table 9 show that being a colony of Spain is consistent with 
lower earnings management while being a colony of Britain is not statistically significant. As 
prior literature may lead us to expect that British colonies are associated with lower earnings  
 
Table 9 Earnings management using colonial institutional models 
 Panel A  
 
rankcol rankcol rankcol 
       
Britain -4.75* -3.77** -3.17 
 
(2.70) (1.68) (2.12) 
Spain -7.25*** -5.60*** -6.16** 
 
(2.54) (1.88) (2.40) 
Settler percent 
 
-10.66*** -7.05 
  
(2.00) (5.17) 
British settler 
  
-4.09 
   
(5.62) 
Constant 18.67*** 20.12*** 19.63*** 
 
(2.17) (1.07) (1.46) 
    N 27 27 27
Adj R-sq 0.11 0.48 0.49 
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   Panel B 
 
rankcol 
    
 Investor rights -0.30 
 
 
(0.81) 
 Unpredicted law enforcement 0.03 
 
 
(0.64) 
 Constant 14.99*** 
 
 
(2.98) 
 
   N 27
 Adj R-sq 0.00 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Definitions of variables in  
 Appendix B. 
  
 
management given that the US, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand are among the countries 
that rank lowest in earnings management per LNW, we interact the Britain variable with settler 
percentage but find that it is not statistically significant. We interpret the results in this table as 
indicating that the colonial power identity in general does not matter. This argument would be in 
line with Acemoglu et al (2001) which shows that the identity of the colonial power does not 
explain economic development, once settlement colonial trends are accounted for. 
It is possible that the law enforcement effect on accounting quality in the presence of colonial 
institutions may also be due to developments over time in the period of independence 
unexplained by colonialism. To explore that possibility we estimate the unpredicted level of law 
enforcement in a country, given the percent of European settlers. Table 9 panel B shows that the 
unpredicted law enforcement sign changes to positive, and it is not statistically significant, 
suggesting that in our sample the law enforcement effect is an outcome of colonial institutions.  
7. Conclusions 
We examine the role of colonial institutions in explaining accounting quality in post-colonial 
societies.  We follow the accounting literature that acknowledges the role of institutions in 
explaining accounting quality, and building on findings in the institutional economics literature 
that demonstrate the specificity of colonial institutions in explaining the economic trajectory, we 
expect that this effect extends to accounting quality. We find that in post-colonial countries, 
protection of investors, a common institutional proxy used in the prior literature is unable to 
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explain accounting quality. We also find that colonial strategies can better determine the path of 
institutions that influence preparers‟ incentives and consequently explain accounting quality. 
We contribute to the literature by providing new evidence on the role of colonialism in 
explaining the persistence of institutions post-independence relevant to accounting quality. This 
brings attention to the need to reexamine some of the institutional categories prevalent in the 
accounting literature, and in particular investor protection and law system, and the need to 
provide the basis for employing the classifications. Furthermore, we provide the literature with a 
set of explanations for how this historic experience influences current financial reporting. 
Because they are exogenous the colonial variables used in our analysis are instruments that 
benefit future research, and resolve the institutions endogeniety issues acknowledged in the 
literature (e.g. LNW).  
One of the limitations of our study is that the number of post-colonial countries is limited due to 
the lack of data. Countries colonized were mostly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America where 
capital markets may not be as relevant or developed as they are in much of Europe and North 
America, resulting in the limited number of public companies or the scarcity of data related to 
these companies. The data for the final 27 countries used in the analysis was obtained from 
Global vantage. A further limitation of this study is the choice of earnings quality variables based 
originally on the work of LNW. Our intention in this work was to first replicate the LNW study, 
to the extent possible, using more recent data, then extend it to a number of countries to examine 
if the findings linking two institutional variables explaining earnings management in their study 
are generalizable to a post-colonial sample. For that we had to use similar proxies as used by 
LNW. As suspected we find that to some extent they are not, so we introduce the colonial 
variables.  
Future work thus can extend this current study using different proxies for accounting quality 
such as predictability comparing the earnings of firms within a country in two consecutive years. 
This also has the potential of increasing sample size. Future work can also examine mechanisms 
linking colonialism and accounting. For example, what institutions are most affected by 
colonialism and how do these institutions directly impact on accounting?  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
In this work I have undertaken explanations of accounting practices and behaviors in light of 
institutionalized colonialism and global trends, relevant to large parts of the world. The work 
provides detailed explanations on how ideologies embedded in artificial country borders, 
capitalist thought, educational forms, and elitism, among others, are deepened and sustained in 
the accounting field with trends like Western credentials, accounting harmonization, 
multinational auditors, and the spread of the English language. I primarily argue that the different 
features of the colonial experience are institutionalized contributing to current perceptions and 
practices in accounting. 
In chapter two I examine the interplay of the forces of colonialism and modernity in the field of 
corporate accounting in Jordan. I analyze corporate accountants‟ discourses in light of threats to 
their status given the lacking knowledge of IFRS, and intense competition. I propose that in what 
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is perceived as a project of modernity, corporate accountants are self-regulating using 
certificates, recruitment exams, English language proficiency, and image to restrict membership 
to their enacted profession and limit mobility within it. I argue that in doing so accountants 
recreate colonial forms of organization for exclusion and authority of the West, reproduced by 
enduring colonial schools. 
In chapter three I analyze the use of English in the construction of accounting hierarchy and 
identities in Jordan using Pierre Bourdieu‟s theoretical concepts on language and symbolic 
power. I show that historic and contemporary factors combine in accountants‟ habitus 
influencing their discourse and actions as they redefine their social capital and identities. I also 
elaborate on how English in the accountancy field in Jordan is a symbolic instrument used in the 
structuring of the field and the relations within it.  
In chapter four I examine the use of exogenous colonial strategies to explain institutional 
differences following the institutional economics literature (Acemoglu et al. 2000) and find 
evidence that these strategies influence accounting quality via institutions. The study provides 
evidence that investor protection (Leuz et al. 2003), a measure widely used in the international 
accounting literature to proxy for institutional variation among countries, fails to explain 
differences in earnings quality in post-colonial countries. I also examine the possibility that what 
is observed is the effect of changes in institutions over time but find no such effect. 
This thesis makes multiple contributions to accounting research. First, the study identifies 
emerging colonial-related practices in the enactment of a corporate accounting profession, while 
naming the missionary institution in the reproduction of colonial conditions. Not only do 
professional institutions and auditors introduce their own dynamics and regulate the field 
(Cooper and Robson 2006) but so do corporate accountants, likely the largest group of working 
in accounting. Second, this work contributes to research by extending Bourdieu‟s theory on 
language and symbolic power to a post-colonial context where not just the content of the 
language itself or the accent is relevant but also the hierarchy between languages. We show how 
specifically in the accountancy field audit and IFRS, among other mechanisms, contribute to the 
internalization of English, the language that has been perceived higher in the linguistic hierarchy 
in Jordan since the British colonization. We argue that with this normalization „symbolic 
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violence‟ takes shape as English becomes a source of professional distinction and domination 
reproducing hierarchy in the field of accountancy. To our knowledge this is the first paper that 
analyzes in depth the role of language within accountancy and ensuing social structural changes 
in the field. Finally, this work challenges some of the institutional categories used in comparative 
studies across countries and emphasizes the need to reexamine the widely used law system and 
investor protection in research on accounting quality (For example Leuz et al 2003). I propose 
and find that indicators of the colonial experience are better at explaining accounting quality. In 
the process I provide future instruments to minimize the endogeniety of institutional proxies as 
that are commonly predetermined with accounting quality. 
The implications of this work depend on its users. From the research point, phenomena like 
English as lingua franca, IFRS, and mainstream accounting research have more in common than 
may initially be perceived. They can all be seen as forms of standardization that detach 
themselves from any institutional context and ties and cross boarders as neutral forms of 
knowledge. The danger in this abstraction is restricting intellectual inquiry and ultimately the 
advancement of knowledge (Humphrey and Gendron 2014). In the words of Anthony Hopkins 
(2007 p 1368) „Global knowledges are often not very tolerant of local ones and yet sometimes 
they experience difficulty embedding themselves into the detail of local institutional contexts: the 
new knowledges remaining only loosely coupled to the settings in which they operate and 
thereby unable to infuse the functioning of practice‟. In non-English speaking countries 
specifically, research examining social closure and equality, professional identities, and labor 
issues can benefit from paying attention to the English dimension as one power mechanism. In 
comparative research on accounting outcomes this work shows that colonial strategies are key to 
explaining institutions that bear influence on the practice. For the accounting occupation, the 
conclusions of this work question some of the recruitment practices and skills required in the 
workplace that are not providing accountants with equitable opportunities. Practitioners can 
further benefit from the insights on the explored roles of IFRS and multinational auditors in the 
structuring of their work environment via language. And for policy makers and regulators in 
many countries, this work points to how more people may become marginalized in the place of 
work and how the inequality gap widens as imported technologies like English, IFRS, 
certification, multinational auditors, titles, software are not given enough attention.  
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In the area of accounting organizational forms this work constitutes an early contribution in the 
examination of organization among corporate accountants so one of its limitations may be its 
generalizability to other societies. Future comparative examinations can confirm or diverge from 
the findings of this work, and can provide further explanations of behaviors within corporate 
accounting. In this work I have also examined the interaction of accountants with the English 
language and have not expanded the analysis to how language is influencing the accountants 
work or accounting outcomes. Interesting insights may lie in examinations of English in the use 
of annual reports or the translations of reports for companies that publish reports in English and 
Arabic and the economic and social consequences that may bear on users and preparers in non-
English speaking countries; topics that can be considered by future research. One further 
limitation of the English language research addressed in chapter three is that it only hinted to the 
subject of how presenting the self or the work in a language different from the mother tongue can 
change the values closely associated with the mother language. Furthermore this work addressed 
the process of using English rather than the content so another interesting area of research is 
examining how and when do accountants resort to code-switching. It would be interesting to 
isolate the contexts in which the phenomenon is used and understand the underlying motivations.  
This work has touched briefly on the influence of big audit firms on the organization of corporate 
accountants but the relation between these two closely connected groups has not been explored 
enough particularly in light of the expansion of transnational auditors (Suddaby et al. 2007). One 
such examination may explain how knowledge transfers occur, the types of knowledge, and the 
consequences not just to individuals, but also to accounting processes.  
Finally, in the area of accounting outcomes one of the limitations of this work is that the number 
of post-colonial countries is limited due to the lack of data. Countries colonized were mostly in 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America where capital markets may not be as relevant or developed as 
they are in much of Europe and North America, resulting in the limited number of public 
companies or the scarcity of data related to these companies. A further limitation of this study is 
the choice of earnings quality variables based originally on the work of LNW. Our intention in 
this work was to first replicate the LNW study, to the extent possible, using more recent data, 
then extend it to a number of countries to examine if the findings linking two institutional 
variables explaining earnings management in their study are generalizable to a post-colonial 
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sample. For that we had to use similar proxies as used by LNW. As suspected we find that to 
some extent they are not, so we introduce the colonial variables.  
Future work thus can extend this current study using different proxies for accounting quality 
such as predictability comparing the earnings of firms within a country in two consecutive years. 
This also has the potential of increasing sample size. Future work can also examine mechanisms 
linking colonialism and accounting. For example, what institutions are most affected by 
colonialism and how do these institutions directly impact on accounting? In the earlier chapters 
this paper showed the influence of colonialism on profession so future research can examine the 
potential influence of the audit profession or corporate accounting profession in post-colonial 
settings on accounting outcomes.   
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Appendix A: Interviewee Profile 
Pseudo name Age Gender Position Industry Type of Entity Size * 
Mohammad 30-35 M Accountant Agriculture Non profit Small 
Ahmad 30-35 M Chief Accountant Web development Private company Medium 
Ammar 35-40 M Accountant Web development Private company Medium 
Lara 25-30 F Junior Accountant Technology Private company Large 
Ahed 35-40 M Senior Accountant Technology Private company Large 
Ragad 40-45 M Finance Manager Engineering  Private company Medium 
Sanad 40-45 M Financial 
Controller 
Accounting services Private company Medium 
Maher 45-50 M CFO Finance Private company Medium 
Nayef 35-40 M Financial 
Controller 
Technology Private company Large 
Yazan 45-50 M CFO Pharmaceutical retail Private company Large 
Rania 35-40 F Chief Accountant Technology Private company large 
Haytham 55-60 M Chairman of the 
Board 
Accounting services Private company Medium 
Fahed 50-55 M Finance Director  Manufacturing  Private company large 
Khaled 50-55 M CFO Manufacturing Private company large 
Faten 30-35 F Accountant Pharmaceutical 
wholesale 
Private company Small 
Azza 20-25 F Accountant Investment Private company Medium 
Luma 20-25 F Accountant Pharmaceutical retail Private company Large 
Sana 30-35 F Finance Manager Media Private company Large 
Nasser 50-55 M Head of Finance Banking Listed company Large 
Khaldoun 45-50 M CFO Manufacturing Listed company Large 
Imad 55-60 M CFO Banking Listed company Large 
Samir 50-55 M CFO Manufacturing Listed company Large 
Hisham 45-50 M Partner  Audit Audit  Large 
Mamdouh 55-60 M Managing Partner Audit Audit Small 
Kasim 35-40 M Audit Manager Audit Audit Large 
Salim 25-30 M Senior Auditor Audit Audit Large 
Walid 45-50 M Partner Audit Audit Large 
Samia 50-55 F Tax Section Head Public Sector Government   
Mazen 40-45 M Tax Assessor Government Government   
Salem  40-45 M  N/A Securities 
Commission 
Government   
Adel 40-45 M Assistant Professor Education Education   
Basim 55-60 M Associate Professor Education Education   
Majed 50-55 M Professor Education Education   
* Small is <20 employees, and large is >100. 
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Appendix B 
Variable Definition 
 
Average Rank country rank based on the aggregate of the four EM measures (LNW).  
EM1 ratio of standard deviation of operating earnings to standard deviation of cash 
flows from operations. 
EM2 correlation between changes in accruals and changes in cash flows from operations 
scaled by lagged total assets. 
EM3 median of absolute value of firms‟ accruals scaled by absolute cash flow from 
operations. 
EM4 ratio of small profits to small losses where small losses are values of net earnings 
scaled by lagged total assets between (-0.01, 0.00) and small losses are values 
between (0.00, 0.01). 
Investor rights anti-director rights as in LNW from La Porta et al. (1998). Combines six 
shareholder rights variables within a country: option to mail proxy votes, no 
requirement to deposit shares prior to meetings, cumulative voting or minority 
board representation, minority judicial rights, minority preemptive rights, and 
procedures for calling extraordinary shareholders‟ meeting. 
Law 
enforcement 
rule of law variable as in LNW. Average of three out of five indicators provided by 
La Porta et al. (1998) legal system efficiency, tradition of law and order, and 
level of corruption. 
Extractive Settler percentage multiplied by -1. 
Distance proximity of a colonized country to the colonial center. Constructed from data 
available on the website of French Research Center in International Economics 
Years 
colonized 
number of years from the beginning of the official date of colonial declaration or 
closest known date of effective economic, military, or settler influence to 
official independence, using dates from Encyclopedia Britanica and Townsend 
and Peake (1941). In the case of consecutive colonial powers years are limited 
to the last, with the exception of Phillipines where we combine the US and 
Spanish colonial periods as the latter, due to its length, cannot be ignored. 
Years 
independent 
number of years from independence until 2011, the last year in our accounting 
data. 
Ethnic 
fragmentation 
possibility that two randomly selected individuals from a country are from 
different ethnolinguistic groups (Easterly and Levine 1997; Alesina et al. 
2003). 
Artificial 
borders 
measure of artificiality of a country‟s borders assessing how close the borders are 
to a straight line (Alesina et al. 2011). Lower values indicate more artificiality. 
Religious 
fragmentation 
based on percentage of the population that belonging to the three most widely 
spread religions in the world in 1980, Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Islam. 
The residual is called “other religions (Alesina et al. 2003). 
Settler 
percentage 
percent of European settlers in 1900 (Acemoglu et al. 2001). For countries that 
became independent prior to 1900 we assume the same value as that in 1900 as 
we do not expect large changes in settlement patterns. For countries colonized 
after 1900 we assume a zero settler percentage as settlement is a mark of the 
19
th
 century and earlier. 
Colonial index country rank based on the average of the seven ranks of the colonial variables. 
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PC1, PC2, 
PC3 
factors with eigenvalue >1 using principal component analysis of colonial 
variables. 
 
